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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the efficiency and implications of the market microstructure
provided by the London Stock Exchange (LSE), extending the framework of O'Hara
(1995), Parlour (1998) and Madhavan (2000) to accommodate the idiosyncrasies of
the Stock Exchange Trading System (SETS) and the Stock Exchange Automated
Quotation System (SEAQ).
First, we offer a comparison of the two trading platforms using the methodology of
Haung and Stoll (1996) and Venkataraman (2001) to show that the SETS order book
is a more efficient platform, although it has a limited ability to cope with large orders.
We compare the results with those from other exchanges described in Biais et al
(1995) and De Jong et al (1995).
We then offer a detailed analysis of the SETS order book, the aggregate behaviour of
traders, and a detailed look at an investor's order choice between aggressive market
orders and passive limit orders. Building on theories described in Glosten (1992),
Keim and Madhavan (1995), Elarris and Elasbrouk (1996), Griffiths et al (2000) and
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) we ask such questions as, when and in what way does
the spread and depth vary? How do market conditions affect the choice of orders and
vice versa? And how do the official order book market and the unofficial dealer
market coexist? We analyse the aggressiveness of orders sent to SETS, as Beber and
Caglio (2003) and Ellul et al (2003) do for the NYSE, and explain how spread, depth
and asymmetry of depth affect the choice between limit orders and market orders.
We find that, as the market moves from a bull phase to a bear phase, overall order
activity increases, the proportion of trading going through the order book increases,
the quoted spread remains constant but the asymmetry of depth increases. We also
find that daytime returns are higher during the bear market, due to the speculative
nature of the continuous market (compared to the actions of the off market traders and
the price set during the opening call auction). Finally, we differentiate between the
behaviour of sellers and buyers; buyers are more heterogenous, and their decisions are
more reliant on the time of day and market conditions.
As well as applying most of the market microstructure theory to the LSE for the first
time, and building towards a short term forecasting model, we analyse the
appropriateness of the categorisation of investors and some commonly used measures
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1 INTRODUCTION
This study, along with many before it, is built around the aim of finding a way to
make money. While this may seem a less than noble pursuit, the competition
between profit seeking traders is the only path to an efficient market. Also, although
it may seem like splitting hairs, investors cannot make money. They take it from
others (i.e. for one investor to beat the market return, there must be at least one
investor who does not match the market return). The question then is how to take
this money from other investors who are trying to do the same. The Efficient
Markets Hypothesis (EMH) in its strongest form will tell you that it is not possible,
and that any trading gains are a product of chance. In the weaker form of the EMH,
it states that you need better information than your competitors to succeed.
Regulations have (we assume) removed the risk of insider trading, but this is just one
interpretation of the term "information". This term that is used so widely, but
defined so scarcely will be discussed at length later in this thesis. For now, we will
simply state that having the ability to analyse market wide data in ways that no other
investor can, is an informational advantage.
An alternative definition of market "efficiency" is that prices fully reflect all
information i.e. the market value equals the true underlying value. This definition is
used extensively in the market microstructure literature. To give an example of why
these definitions are different, consider a fixed trading cost e.g. 0.5% stamp duty.
Increasing the fixed cost makes it more difficult to exploit miss-pricing errors.
Using the first definition, a sufficiently large trading cost would lead to an efficient
market, since nobody can systematically make profits. But we may conclude that the
market is less efficient, under the second definition, since the prohibitively expensive
trading costs dissuade investors, leaving the market less liquid and more volatile.
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The days of human intermediaries in the more liquid financial markets seem
numbered. Investors can trade directly with other investors through automated order
books, placing aggressive market orders that execute immediately, or more passive
limit orders, which sit on the order book as a firm commitment to trade at a given
price, for a given volume, until a counter party is found or the trade is withdrawn.
Stock exchanges vary in terms of the detail they provide to market participants,
regarding the standing limit orders. Some show the best prices on either side of the
market. Some state the identity of the traders immediately after a trade. The London
Stock Exchange (LSE) gives real time data showing the total depth and number of
orders along with the top ten quotes on either side of the market: limit price, trading
volume and the number of orders at that price. This is an enormous amount of
information. A computer designed to analyse the order book in real time, storing the
orders placed and drawing conclusions about the trading interests of the other market
participants is beyond the capabilities of modern technology. It is for this reason that
we can say that investors are not using this information (in a detailed and scientific
way). This has two advantages. First, when the technology catches up, this may be
the basis for a new trading strategy. Second, any conclusions drawn about the
profitability of different strategies are not self fulfilling i.e. traders could not have
found actions that were profitable in the past, and acted on them in a way that
ensures the persistence of the result. 1
Given such a wealth of data, the question is where to start. Various academic papers
(Allen and Gorton (1992), Harris and Hasbrouk (1996), Parlour (1998), Goettler et al
(2003)) suggest theories defining how traders should react to market conditions,
while others show the actual behaviour of traders (Barclay and Warner (1993), Keim
and Madhavan (1995), Lee and Radhakrishna (2000), Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001)), but very few put the two pieces together. For example, one possible
indicator for the orders that will be placed in the near future is the relative imbalance
of depth on the order book. Parlour (1998) states that after a market buy order has
6
been submitted, the most likely order to follow is a limit sell order, thus moving the
book back to equilibrium. Keim and Madhavan (1995) state that sell orders tend to
be more aggressive. So if, in a stable market, there are an equal number of buyers
and sellers, there would be more market sell orders than market buy orders, and more
limit buy orders than limit sell orders. This suggests that in equilibrium, we might
expect to see more standing limit orders on the buy side. Clearly, it is only when a
comparison is made between the order imbalance on the book and the equilibrium,
that a meaningful conclusion about future orders can be drawn. So the question of
where to start might be to identify the equilibrium position of the order book.
Another place to start may be to look at how things have changed from the days
before the automated order books. There is an extensive literature, both theoretical
and empirical, explaining how market participants behave, how prices are set, what
market intermediaries add to the process, how aspects of the microstructure
(transparency, information services, barriers to entry, anonymity) affect the
efficiency of the market, and why anomalies like the Monday effect, the January
effect or the closed end fund puzzle exist. The data set obtained from the LSE does
in fact lend itself to a comparison of the old and new trading systems. So, in keeping
with Haung and Stoll (1996), Venkataraman (2001), La Plante and Muscarella
(1997), Jong et al (1995), and other market comparisons, we compare the Stock
Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ) system of competing market makers and
the replacement Stock Exchange Trading System (SETS) automated order book. In
a working paper, Naik and Yadav (1999) look at this "effect of market reform", but
there is plenty of scope for alternative methodologies.
This thesis uses both of the suggested starting points, and makes the lengthy journey
towards a potential trading strategy. Along the way, various gaps in the current body
of literature are explored. For instance, the analysis of the bid-offer spread in a
market with asymmetric depth is often qualified with a few caveats, but we rarely
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find a solution or even an alternative. Another gap concerns the process of price
setting in an automated order book market. The two popular theories of inventory
risk and asymmetric information risk which explain the price setting process, do not
easily extend to a market with no intermediary, and so a discussion follows about the
price setting process. Another frequently side stepped issue is that of "alternative
trading platforms". Most of the modern liquid markets (New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), Paris Bourse, Tokyo Stock Exchange, NASDAQ) are hybrid markets,
usually mixing an element of automation for small trades and large trade market
maker system. On the LSE, although the out dated market maker system was
replaced with an automated order book, the firms that previously made the markets
have continued to offer liquidity to traders who ask for it. In each of the markets
mentioned above, the trading activity away from the official market (i.e. away from
the NYSE trading floor, Paris Bourse order book or LSE SETS order book) makes
up a significant proportion of the total trading.
The remainder of the thesis is split into 5 main sections. In chapter 2 we summarise
the design features of the largest financial markets, and explain the rationale behind
their design. Establishing the differences is important for two main reasons. Firstly,
a practical application of a study of market microstructure is the design of the market
itself. Studying the types of market used in practice, is a sign of what market
officials believe to be the most efficient trading platform. Secondly, academic
research has been carried out on several exchanges, and extending conclusions from
one market to another is not always easy or even possible. This issue is discussed
further in the literature review.
The literature review provides a summary of the important results, and so a context
in which the analysis of the thesis may be placed. Market microstructure has become
a broad subject and so there are several sections in this chapter. We provide a brief
summary of the early models from which the subject germinated, and then show
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many of the areas in which it has grown. The thesis touches on many areas and so it
is important to lay this broad background to the subject. As well as establishing the
previous results, there is extensive discussion of the results and an indication of how
this relates to the analysis in later chapters. In particular, a discussion follows for
any area that seems to be incompletely or incorrectly addressed. This is the basis of
the analysis in the following chapters.
Chapter 4 looks at the differences between the SEAQ market makers and the SETS
automated order book. This offers a rare comparison between stocks on the same
exchange, subject to the same legislative requirements, but traded on different
platforms. We use this comparison to evaluate the relative efficiency of each market
design. We also scrutinise and offer an alternative to the methodology of previous
research.
Chapters 5 and 6 look at the SETS order book in isolation. We begin by describing
the profile of the limit orders sent to the order book, how they vary during the day
and under what market conditions. We then investigate how and when market orders
are sent to the market. This offers a detailed insight into how aggregate trader
behaviour is affected by market conditions. Only with these foundations, can we
draw conclusions about short term price forecasting. For instance, if the depth 'at
best price is an indicator of short term price movements, we must first establish what
the average depth at each side of the spread is, and how this is affected by other
factors like time of day, and seasonal variations.
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2 MARKET BACKGROUND
2.1 Types of Market
It is difficult to find a unanimous decision regarding the primary aim of a stock
exchange. Many academics seem to assume that a better market is one with lower
transaction costs. Goettler et al (2003) show that reducing transaction costs is not
always in the interest of traders, arguing that the net welfare of the population should
be used as the benchmark. The 2002 President of the World Federation of
Exchanges, Antonio Zoido1, states that "the crucial contribution bourses make to
every economy is asset price discovery." The objectives of the exchange become
even less clear when you introduce the conflict of interests of shareholders (owners
of the exchange), investors (trading on the exchange), and the economy as a whole.
This confusion leads to a myriad of market design options. Before launching into a
description of the London Stock Exchange, it is worthwhile defining the major
features of stock exchanges. This provides a context and a platform from which to
compare the worldwide exchanges.
1. Market Makers - Some markets have human intermediaries. The obligations
of these intermediaries varies in many ways. The number of market makers
also varies significantly.
2. Monopolistic Specialist - where a single market maker is appointed by the
exchange.
3. Automated order books - No human intermediary. Market orders are
matched against limit orders by an electronic mechanism.
1 Information taken from www.worldfederationofexchanges.com
10
4. Continuous Markets - Markets may open for a number of hours during the
day. Trades may execute at any time during the trading day, or at specific
times. Some markets offer a batch auction as the opening or closing
procedure for an otherwise continuous market.
5. Call Auction - Traders post orders with a quantity and price during an auction
period. At the end of the period a strike price is set automatically, or by a
specialist.
6. Transparency - What information is available at the time of the trade,
regarding the identity and trading interests of other parties?
7. Access to information - Who has access to the market? How many
information gathering firms are present in the market, and who has access to
these? Are they cost prohibitive for smaller investors?
8. Fixed Costs - Although the market spread is present in all markets, they vary
in terms of stamp duty or other costs such as commission.
9. Cross-listed stocks - traders may be able to buy stocks on a choice of markets.
10. Upstairs markets - Some markets offer an alternative execution route,
through member firms that arrange trades with other member firms. This
facility is typically used for large block trades.
11. Off market trades - Many markets are regulated in such a way that allows
their stocks to be traded away from the market. This is the case for most of '
the developed markets, due to monopoly rules.
12. Derivatives markets - Options and Futures are rarely traded for individual
stocks, although it is usually possible to arrange such derivatives.
2.2 History of the LSE
Michie (1999) provides a comprehensive history of the London Stock Exchange
(LSE). The LSE was formed with the agreement of several proprietors, in 1801.
The purpose back then was to provide a venue for members to trade in their listed
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securities. They faced competition for this service from many places: the coffee
houses that the LSE was born from, the Rotunda of the Bank of England and the
Royal Exchange. At that time, it was by no means certain that the self-regulating,
members organisation would out last its competitors to become the largest stock
exchange in London. By 1900, the LSE was the largest and most important stock
exchange in the world. While the fortunes of the London Stock Exchange closely
followed the rise and fall of the British Empire, the conflict between the owners and
the members led to the market's competitive position. However, it was the strong
position that the member firms had established that fuelled the decline in the second
half of the twentieth century.
The members profited from the activities of the LSE, and didn't want anything to
change. However, the increasing use of technology and alternative trading systems
used in the USA and across Europe could no longer be ignored. Later than was
desirable, from the point of view of the exchange, the LSE introduced an automated
quotation system. The Stock Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ) system was
modelled on that employed by the NASDAQ, and was fully implemented by 1986.
While the LSE believed this to be the best exchange system at the time, even
improving on NASDAQ, it was soon apparent that their new technology was
obsolete. The profits earned by the member firms were under threat once mom.
Several years and one sacked director of the LSE later the Stock Exchange Trading
System (SETS) was introduced, in October 1997. This system was an automated
order book, modelled on the Paris Bourse.
2.3 Regulation and Tax
Providing a comprehensive history of the changes to the regulation of the LSE, along
with tax changes and other factors that affect the efficiency of the market would take
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a great deal of time, so we will simply introduce some of the important events of
recent years.
The Financial Service Authority (FSA) took over the responsibility of many of the
regulatory bodies like the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) and the Personal
Investment Authority (PIA). The change may have made little practical difference,
but it may have distracted from the number of financial scandals of recent years.
Shortfalls due to non-payment of Lloyds members, losses due to mis-selling of
private pensions, mortgage endowments or split capital investment trusts all lead to a
lack of trust of the financial industry. The failure of regulatory bodies must have an
impact on the markets. And what of the regulations that did work? Rules such as
those aimed at policing money laundering have an impact on the aggregate trading
behaviour. Illegal money that once churned through the financial markets quickly
(and usually with a loss) is, we assume, no longer present. And what of other illegal
activity? Insider trading is policed far more effectively now than it ever was.
Similarly, the rules are constantly evolving to cope with traders who deliberately
manipulate the market. This activity is illegal, but it is so difficult to define that it is
hard to regulate, without specific rules and examples. And investors evolve in
exactly the same way that the regulations try to. The reason that the laws exist is
because someone has tried it, and probably profited from it.
The UK tax rules are generally considered to be the most complex in the world, as a
result of the years of tax evolution. An example of an outdated tax is the stamp duty
imposed on share transactions. LSE is one of the few exchanges that must charge a
stamp duty of 0.5% on every domestic share transaction. The implications of this
fixed charge will be discussed in detail later on. Another tax related issue concerns
pension funds. Until 1997, pension funds paid no tax on UK dividends. Pension
funds represent a large proportion of the UK market, and the loss of this tax relief,
along with changes to the pension fund valuation rules, meant that equity was no
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longer as attractive to pension funds. Ironically, the instant shortfall faced by
pension funds, meant that they became net buyers over the short term. The ageing
population, the distrust of the financial industry, the worry over retrospective tax
changes, the limits imposed on what pension funds can be used for, the availability
of other tax efficient investments, all add up to a changing demand for UK shares.
2.4 SEAQ
Until 1986, information was gathered and trades were arranged in person and over
the phone2. The introduction of the Stock Exchange Automated Quotations (SEAQ)
system didn't affect the settlement procedure, but it did significantly improve the
distribution of information. Member firms who nominate themselves as "market
makers" for a given stock are obliged to quote firm prices, for trades up to the
Normal Market Size (NMS), throughout the trading day. The Normal Market Size
represents the average order size and is calculated as a percentage of the average
daily trading volume.
Market makers compete for order flow by posting a bid and offer price
electronically. SEAQ also shows the quote size (which may be bigger than NMS)
and the time that the quote was last updated. As well as the current market maker
quotes, SEAQ displays a number of other pieces of information: the closing price on
the previous trading day, the NMS, the last 5 trade prices, the volume traded so far
that day, and the daily highs and lows of the trade price and the mid market price.
Although the last 5 trades are shown on screen, there may be delays of up to 90
minutes before trades are reported to the market. Furthermore, trades that take place
under the "block trade scheme" can be reported much later.
2 information taken from Michie (1999) and www.LSE.co.uk
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While the prices quoted by SEAQ market makers are firm, trades frequently take
place at prices better than the best quoted price. Because orders are still arranged
over the phone, a broker has the opportunity to bargain with the market maker. If a
broker is acting on behalf of a third party, they must trade at the best price possible.
The potential for price improvement makes this difficult to regulate.
2.5 SETS
SETS was introduced in October 1997 for the FTSE 100 stocks only. Having made
the switch from SEAQ to SETS, companies did not switch back in the event of
dropping out of the top 100. As a result of this, SETS became the trading
mechanism for the top 130 or so stocks on the FTSE 350. From time to time, other
liquid FTSE 250 stocks were added to SETS and then in September 1999, following
a review of the criteria for SETS listing, a further 30 stocks switched over. There are
currently in the region of 170 companies on SETS.
SETS is an automated order book market. However, a significant proportion of
trading volume occurs through the member firms, which used to be market makers
for these stocks, before the switch was made from SEAQ to SETS. The relative
proportions of trading are discussed in subsequent chapters, but note that, although
the formal market mechanism is an automated order book, in many respects SETS is
a hybrid market.
The trading day starts with a call auction period. Investors are invited to submit limit
orders or market orders between 07:50 and 08:00. During this time, a notional
crossing price and the volume that would trade at that price is displayed on screen.
The crossing price is calculated automatically as the price at which the greatest
volume would trade. After a random period of up to 30 seconds, the auction closes
and all market orders and limit orders within the crossing price trade at that price. In
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the event of a crossing price being set that would lead to unexecuted market orders
(i.e. market orders on one side are greater than all orders on the other) the auction
period is extended by 2 minutes. This is known as a Market Order Extension
(MOE). In the event of the crossing price deviating from the transaction price of the
last automated trade by more than 10%, a further 5 minutes is added to the auction
period. This is known as a Price Monitoring Extension (PME). Each period of
extension ends with a random period of up to 30 seconds.
After the opening, if the price of consecutive automated trades differ by more than
5%, then an Automatic Execution Suspension is called. Trading is suspended for 5
minutes, and in the event of notionally unexecuted market orders a further 2 minutes.
This price monitoring function is disabled between 10:02 and 10:30 on index expiry
days, when the price is expected to fluctuate significantly.
The trading day ends with the Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) period
from 16:10 to 16:30. The VWAP is calculated for all trades in this period and is
used for index purposes. The day closes with another auction process between 16:30
and 16:35. The process is similar to the opening auction. A 2 minute MOE and two
5 minute PMEs may follow, each with a random period of up to 30 seconds. This
means that the closing price may be set as late as 16:48.
Continuous trading throughout the day, operates as most other automated order
books. Investors can submit a number of different orders. All orders are for a
designated size. The primary choice is what price a trader is willing to accept.
Departing from the traditional definitions, a "Limit Order" is an order that has a limit
price less than the prevailing offer price, for a buy order, or greater than the bid price
for a sell order. A "Market Order" can have a limit price, but the limit price is at
least as great as the offer price for a buy order or as low as the bid price for a sell
order. Further conditions can be attached to market orders. An "Execute and
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Eliminate" order matches against all existing limit orders within the limit price, and
cancels the remainder of the order. A "Fill or Kill" order matches against all existing
limit orders, but if the whole order cannot be filled, then no trade takes place, and the
order is cancelled immediately.
When a dealer is given an order to trade in a SETS stock, they enter the SETS page
for that stock. The page shows a number of important figures designed to aid the
decision of how to trade. The best bid and offer prices are shown, along with the
volume on each side and the number of orders that make up the total volume at that
price. For orders placed behind the best price, the system displays the price and
volume of the next nine prices. It also shows cumulative figures for the total volume
and the weighted average price at each step. It also shows the price of the last trade,
the opening price, the highs and lows of the day, the volume weighted average price
for the day, the total volume for the day both on and off the market as well as the last
5 trade prices.
2.6 Worldwide Exchanges
With an ever globalising economy, we might expect to see a change in the financial
market trading mechanisms. Exchange officials have shown a preference for
automated order book markets, primarily because they offer a level playing field to
all investors, irrespective of geographical location. Whether this objective is met, or
in fact if it is desirable, is up for debate, but what we can say is that stock exchanges
around the world are changing all the time. It is particularly important to be aware of
changes made to markets frequently used for empirical research, in order to put
results into context, and explain changes in investor behaviour. The papers reviewed
in this thesis are in general fairly recent, and so changes made to exchanges more
than 15 years ago have been ignored.
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2.6.1 NYSE
The NYSE is the largest stock market in the world. It is also one of the most
complex and interesting hybrid markets in existence. The unusual market design is a
result of the pressures placed by the member firms that derive profits from the
trading activity, as well as collectively owning the exchange. This situation is
similar to that faced by the LSE in the early 1990s. The NYSE continues to face
competition, and some fundamental changes have recently been taken. These will be
discussed below.
The market opens with a call auction. Limit orders and market-on-open orders are
submitted to the NYSE OARS system. When the market opens, the specialist sets a
price that absorbs the order imbalance. This procedure is less strictly defined than
the opening procedure on SETS. This is an example of the impact that the
designated specialist can have on the stock price. The value of this human
intermediation is often discussed in the literature.
Orders can either be sent electronically to SuperDOT (the successor to Designated
Order Turnaround (DOT)) or they can be handled by a floor broker. A specialist
resides over the order book, and publishes the best price quotes on either side of the
market, along with the associated depth. The depth can include limit orders and the
specialist's own position. If a market order is received, it is matched against the
depth at best price provided by the limit orders, with strict time priority, before the
specialist's quoted depth is filled. Market orders and limit orders can be submitted
with conditions attached such as Fill-or-kill, Good Till Close, Stop-loss and Market-
on-close.
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Unlike SETS, and many other order book markets, market orders are not matched
automatically against the standing limit orders. Instead, the specialist has the option
to match the trade or stop the order. The specialist guarantees that a stopped order
will execute at a price at least as good as the average price that it would receive if
matched against the order book. The specialist may pass this order on to a floor
trader, who will try to match the order in a trading pit, or the specialist will trade
directly with his own inventory (at a price better than the market spread).
Irrespective of execution method, all trades are reported within 90 seconds and
published with no delay.
We mentioned above that orders may be routed through the SuperDOT order book to
the floor brokers, but many orders are sent through brokers directly to the floor
traders. It is usually the larger trades that bypass the order book in this way. There
is also an informal upstairs dealer market. They must execute trades within the
quoted spread, and once arranged, they must formally cross the orders on the trading
floor. Although the issue is rarely addressed, it should be stated that the brokerage
firms charge a commission for their service. Collated information regarding the
amount of commission they charge is difficult to find. Importantly, there is no
commission for orders routed through SuperDOT, although if traders do not have
access to the order book, a broker may charge a commission for that service.
Due to the liquidity in the market, trading halts are rarely called. Specialists have the
right to ask for a trading halt, but given their obligation to maintain a continuous
liquid market, they are reluctant to use this facility often. A market wide trading halt
would be called automatically in the event of a decline in the DJIA (Dow Jones
Industrial Average) of more than 10%.
19
The tick size3 before the 23rd of June 1997 was one eighth of a dollar. After this
date, the tick size for stocks above $1, was reduced to one sixteenth of a dollar, only
to be changed again recently, when the NYSE was decimalised. Following
decimalisation, on the 24th of January 2002, the NYSE introduced "OpenBook",
which meant that all market participants can see the depth at every price. Previously,
traders could only see the best bid and offer price, while the specialist was privy to
the information about limit orders. This change was intended to improve the
efficiency of the market. Whether it succeeds, remains to be seen. One thing that is
certain is that the specialist has lost his strategic advantage. The specialist will still
be expected to offer liquidity when others do not, and he will still rank behind other
traders at the same limit price. On the plus side, the specialist is physically close to
the trading floor, and can still exploit this position. Importantly, nearly all of the
research on the NYSE takes data from before 2002, and so it should be considered as
a closed order book market.
2.6.2 NASDAQ
It is significant that America still has several distinct markets. American companies
can choose to list on either or both of the two largest financial markets in the world.
One reason that the two markets coexist is that they operate in such different ways,
and so offer different advantages to listed companies.
NASDAQ is a dealer market. Competing dealers, or "market makers" post best bid
and ask prices electronically. There are often between 30 and 60 market makers for
each of the active stocks. Market makers must satisfy certain requirements (such as
solvency and administrative issues), but they are not obliged to maintain a stable
market, in the same way as a NYSE specialist. The NASDAQ dealers are free to
3 "tick size" is the minimum price movement for quoted prices.
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maximise their own profits, subject to the rules described below, and it is this
competition that leads to a stable market.
Investors can send market orders or limit orders to a dealer. These orders do not
execute automatically, but are dealt with by the dealer. If a dealer accepts a limit
order, then they must not trade ahead of it. For a given limit price they must execute
the trades in the order they were received. These rules are similar to those imposed
on the NYSE specialist. Market makers may have arrangements set up with certain
clients where they promise to match the best price quoted on the market. These are
known as "Preferred Orders", and they explain why the market maker with the best
quote does not always get the order flow.
Dealers must quote firm prices for up to 1000 shares. In addition to the telephone
based market maker trading platform, NASDAQ offered a Small Order Execution
System (SOES, superseded by SuperSOES) for trades of up to 1000 shares. This
was designed for smaller investors who may be unable to bargain with market
makers in the way that larger players can. Market orders are routed directly to the
broker with the best price, or a broker nominated as part of the order.
2.6.3 Paris Bourse
By 1990, the Paris Bourse had switched from a daily call auction to a computerized
limit order market. The market model was very successful, and has been used as a
benchmark for many other exchanges around the world. In 2001, the Euronext
Market Model was implemented, and the exchanges in Belgium, France and the
Netherlands effectively merged. Although the physical venues for each of the
exchanges still exist, the rules and regulations are set collectively, and the market is
considered as a single entity. Much of the previous research was carried out on the
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Paris Bourse, before this merger, and so the description and the references that
follow, concern the Bourse before the merger.
The Paris Bourse opens with a call auction. The market opens at 08:30 and orders
are added or deleted from the order book until 10:00. This is known as the
"tatonnement process, through which the markets discover the economic price"
(Biais et al 1999). At 10:00, a price is set that maximises the initial trading volume.
Biais et al (1999) tell us that "the majority of the orders placed during the preopening
period obtain execution" and that the opening batch trade accounts for 10% of the
daily trading volume. The market remains open until 17:00.
The Paris Bourse allows orders similar to the NYSE. One important difference is
that traders can submit large limit orders with part of the depth hidden. This depth is
only revealed when another trader submits a market order larger than the exposed
depth. The automated matching process strictly adheres to time priority. Screens are
usually updated within a second of an order being submitted, but just after the
opening and just before the closing, when the flow of orders is very thick, the screens
take approximately 1 minute to update. This delay makes the choice of order type
particularly important. The tick size varies by price, from 0.01 for stocks less than FF
5 up to 1 for FF 500 stocks or more. This is a finer subdivision than the NYSE (pre-
decimalisation) and so the potential for front running4 the best price, makes time
priority less important on the Paris Bourse.
The term "market order" is used inconsistently, around the world. On the Paris
Bourse, market orders are effectively limit orders at the opposite side's price. If the
size of the order is larger than the opposite side depth, the remainder of the order is
left on the order book. This means that a limit order with a limit price greater than
the opposite side price is more aggressive than a limit order. "Paris Bourse officials
"Front running" is the practice of placing a limit order just inside the spread, thus gaining priority
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have suggested to us that this mechanism helps to educate small traders, previously
familiar with the daily call market, to limit their market impact in the newly created
continuous market" Biais et al (1995)
Although a fully automated order book, the Paris Bourse does employ market makers
or 'animateur de marche' for the smaller stocks listed on the exchange. These
market makers, now known as PLP (Permanent Liquidity Providers), are responsible
for maintaining liquidity in the less liquid markets. They sign a commercial
agreement with the exchange, agreeing to quote a spread at least as narrow, and a
depth at least as high as the limits set out in the contract. They must also agree to
trade exclusively on their own account.
The Paris Bourse has an upstairs block trading market, where dealers arrange trades
through private negotiation. Orders can be routed to either market, and although the
upstairs dealers must at least match the weighted-average price in the downstairs
market, they operate distinctly. Block trades may be reported with a greater delay
than the automated trades. Block trading in French stocks also takes place on SEAQ
international. De Jong et al (1993) find that between 30% and 50% of the trading
volume of the ten most traded stocks occurs on LSE. These trades are not bound by
the same time and price priority rules as on the Paris Bourse. They are also reported
with greater delay.
2.6.4 Tokyo
Very little research has been published in the international journals using data from
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, but as one of the largest exchanges outside of America it
is worth mentioning. In April 1999, Tokyo switched from a floor trading market to a
fully automated market. The automated order book market operates under two
systems: Itayose and Zaraba. These are roughly equivalent to the call auction and
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the continuous trading mechanism employed by SETS on the LSE. The market is
open for three hours in the morning and three hours in the afternoon. The first hour
in the morning and the first half hour in the afternoon are Itayose periods, and Zaraba
is used for the remainder. The Tokyo Stock Exchange has no human intermediation
at all. This structure naturally exposes investors to wide fluctuations and the risk of
poor liquidity, and so they employ measures to cope with large price movements. If
prices vary by more than a set limit from the previous trade, Zaraba is halted and
Itayose operates for 5 minutes. Limits vary from 1% for small stocks to less than
0.1% for larger stocks. If the crossing price implied by Itayose is still outside the
tolerances, the period is extended for a further 5 minutes and the limit is increased.
This is repeated until the crossing price is within the limit, or until the daily price
limits are met. Daily price limits vary from roughly 30% for small stocks to 10% for
large stocks. If a trade price under either of the mechanism would break this rule,
then a further period of Itayose is called. Traders on the Tokyo Stock Exchange can
submit orders with various conditions such as market on close, fill or kill, execute
and eliminate as per SETS, and also a "limit order at the most recently executed
price" or "limit order at one tick prior to the most recently executed trade" or




Member firms are allowed up to 15 minutes to fill the order in the upstairs market.
The upstairs market represents the larger trades, and roughly 50% of the trading
volume. The crossing price must be at or within the downstairs market spread.
The downstairs market is an automated limit order book. There is strict price
priority, but time priority applies up to a maximum volume. After the "priority
volume" is filled, the rest of the volume at that price is filled in proportion to
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volume. Hidden orders must be disclosed before they are filled, by cancelling and
resubmitting, thus losing time priority.
Designated market makers have a role similar to the NYSE specialist, although the
focus is on small orders. They have no direct contact with the upstairs market where
the block trades occur. Market Makers have very little power. They may choose to
take part in up to 50% of the trades that would execute on the order book anyway,
but they cannot gain priority over existing orders at the same price. Furthermore, in
the event of the depth at the best price being below the Minimum Guaranteed Fill
(MGF) limit, they may be forced to trade at the market price.
2.7 Size and Performance
Table 2.1 shows the market capitalization of the world wide stock exchanges. The
figures ignore derivatives and collective investment vehicles such as Investment
Trusts and Closed-end Funds. They also exclude foreign companies listed, which
explains why the LSE appears to have a relatively small percentage of the world
market share. However, we can still identify the major markets as NASDAQ,
Tokyo, Euronext and of course NYSE, which according to the end of 2002 figure
represents almost 40% of the world market capitalization.
Table 2.2 shows the trading activity on each of the exchanges. Again we can see that
the most active exchanges in descending order are NYSE, Nasdaq, LSE, Euronext,
Tokyo. Based on the 2002 figures, Nasdaq has roughly 70% and LSE has roughly
40% as much trading volume as NYSE. The difference between this picture and the
one painted by the market capitalisation statistics reflects two things. Firstly, the
trading volume includes foreign companies and investment funds. Secondly, Nasdaq
and SEAQ are dealer markets. With a market maker standing between each trade,
we effectively double count the trading interest from the real investors.
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Table 2.1
Important Notice : When using these data, please always mention World Federation ofExchanges as the source of Information.
MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF SHARES OF DOMESTIC COMPANIES





Time zone Exchange End 1990 End 1991 End 1992 End 1993 End 1994 End 1995 End 1996 End 1997 End 1998 End 1999 End 2000 End 2001 End 2002
North Amex 102302 124454 88797 105116 86036 103147 97911 124606 126307 90745 82717 60223 45691 0.20%
America Bermuda NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1500 1323 2160 2469 2175 0.01%
Chicago NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 298 245 184 134 122 0.00%
Mexico 41054 102764 138745 200865 130246 90694 106770 156595 91746 154044 125204 126258 103941 0.46%
Nasdaq 310800 490685 618774 791706 793669 1159940 1511824 1726390 2243734 5204620 3597086 2739675 1994494 8.75%
NYSE 2692123 3484340 3798238 4212956 4147937 5654815 6841988 8879631 10277900 11437597 11534613 11026587 9015271 39.57%
TSX Toron 241924 265697 241875 326549 315054 366345 486978 567635 543394 789180 766204 611493 570223 2.50%
South Buenos Air 3615 18640 18623 44055 36867 37784 44692 59252 45333 55848 45839 33384 16549 0.07%
America Lima 812 1118 2630 5113 8178 10907 12583 15485 9869 12092 9750 9790 11441 0.05%
Santiago 13636 27990 29595 44887 68195 72928 65971 72046 51866 68228 60401 56310 49828 0.22%
Sao Paulo 11201 32152 45416 96779 189303 147636 216906 255478 160886 227962 226152 186238 126762 0.56%
Europe, Afi Athens 15309 12921 10724 13597 12819 16527 23558 33784 80126 196847 107503 83481 66040 0.29%
Middle Eas Budapest NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 11909 10367 13017 0.06%
Copenhage 39063 44793 30140 41651 48784 57692 71074 93766 98881 105293 107665 85145 76750 0.34%
Deutsche E 355311 392470 346891 460754 499278 577365 664913 825233 1086749 1432167 1270243 1071749 686014 3.01%
Euronext 2271728 1889455 1538654 6.75%
Helsinki 22721 14237 12205 23595 38308 44137 62579 73322 153811 349394 293635 190456 138833 0.61%
Irish NA NA NA NA NA 25836 34738 49371 66596 68773 81883 75298 59938 0.26%
Istanbul 19065 15508 9756 36613 21605 20772 30312 61095 33646 112716 69659 47150 34217 0.15%
Italy 148766 158811 123659 145300 185971 209522 256595 344665 565975 728240 768363 527467 477075 2.09%
JSE South 136869 167958 148675 215883 240026 277109 239579 211599 150670 180463 131321 84344 116544 0.51%
Ljubljana 216 297 891 1876 2985 2854 3100 3461 5578 0.02%
London 850012 986107 928393 1150557 1145290 1346641 1642582 1996225 2372738 2855351 2612230 2164716 1800658 7.90%
Luxemboui 10456 11276 11921 19314 28518 30443 32411 33892 37931 35939 34016 23783 24551 0.11%
Malta - 7 19 377 409 422 788 3862 2024 1357 1374 0.01%
Oslo 26130 21997 17840 27542 36459 44587 56879 66503 46273 63695 65267 69445 68103 0.30%
Spanish Ex 111449 127297 98847 118869 123616 150914 241028 290355 399848 431649 504222 468203 461560 2.03%
Stockholm 92015 97055 78079 106968 130603 172550 240382 264711 278708 373278 328339 236514 179117 0:79%
Swiss Exct 157635 173766 189117 270879 284721 398088 400285 575339 701576 693133 792316 625909 547020 2.40%
Tehran NA NA 1333 1149 2380 6535 12869 11476 11115 17243 5893 7385 11761 0.05%
Tel-Aviv 8274 13228 27884 47518 31130 35116 34463 44371 39230 63472 65338 58229 40774 0.18%
Vienna 26320 26040 21680 28322 30792 32513 33629 37280 35544 33023 29935 25204 33578 0.15%
Warsaw 146 227 2719 3057 4564 8413 12135 20461 29577 31429 26155 28849 0.13%
Asia, PaciniAustralian 107936 142404 133555 202014 216826 243475 311865 295766 328854 427655 372794 375598 380087 1.67%
Colombo 917 1936 1439 2501 2857 1998 1865 2096 1705 1584 1074 1332 1680 0.01%
Hong Kong 83386 121881 171984 385043 269508 303705 449219 413323 343567 609090 623398 506073 463055 2.03%
Jakarta 8081 6823 12038 32824 47241 66454 90857 29050 22078 64045 26813 22998 30067 0.13%
Japan(Tok 2928534 3117297 2318929 2906299 3592194 3545307 3011161 2160585 2439549 4463298 3157222 2264528 2069299 9.08%
Korea 110301 96466 107661 139584 191778 181955 139122 41881 114593 306128 148361 194470 215662 0.95%
Kuala Lum 47869 56722 91471 219759 190163 213757 306165 93174 95561 139908 113155 118981 122892 0 54%
Mumbai 109243 130390 0.57%
National St 112403 112454 0.49%
New Zealar 8824 14285 14680 24595 27118 31950 36879 29889 24458 27827 18490 17736 21715 0.10%
Philippine 6632 10835 15335 40148 56648 58780 80464 31211 34911 41536 25261 20606 18183 0.08%
Shanghai 333356 306444 1.35%
Shenzhen 192490 156648 0.69%
Singapore 34269 47594 48934 135050 136303 150959 153107 106317 96473 198040 155126 117338 101554 0.45%
Taiwan 98927 123460 100166 193252 247325 187206 273776 287813 260498 376508 247597 292872 261311 1.15%
Thailand 20777 37526 57278 127474 125599 135774 95901 22792 34118 57177 29217 35950 45406 0.20%
' Following Ihe Canadian market reorganization. Montreal Exchange now concentrates on derivatives products but maintains a small share market business
NA Not Available - : Not Applicable
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Table 2.2 Important Notice : When using these data, please always mention World Federation of Exchanges as the source of information.
TOTAL VALUE OF SHARE TRADING
(Domestic & Foreign, including Investment Funds)
(000.000 of US$)
Time zone Exchange 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
North Amex 37715 40919 42236 42236 58511 72717 91330 143230 287929 477822 945391 817042 642181
America Bermuda NA NA NA NA NA NA 3410 11170 27934 87151 252850 436474 413744
Chicago 71304 74504 84356 99623 91198 105686 124958 198325 298912 580865 1190087 723900 532040
Mexico 12169 39551 51398 63740 86334 35037 43584 54962 31192 35172 45768 38469 32286
Nasdaq 452430 693852 891055 1350104 1449301 2398213 3301776 4481682 5518946 10467369 19798799 10934573 7254594
NYSE 1325332 1520164 1745466 2283390 2454242 3082916 4063655 5777602 7317949 8945205 11060046 10489031 10311156
TSX Toronl 54776 59132 62735 113795 133421 151559 221216 305155 331848 357443 636533 461557 408165
South Buenos Air 780 4584 15846 49690 112987 31933 31326 38424 26056 11875 9701 7564 1277
America Lima 99 130 417 1672 3091 3812 3830 4279 3050 2729 2518 934 1187
Santiago 759 1880 2055 2809 5370 11412 8488 7444 4412 6859 6083 4450 3011
Sao Paulo 3967 6941 14782 27081 66360 57025 97510 190657 139583 83772 101537 63475 46300
Europe, Afr Athens 3840 2401 1612 2779 5187 6077 8234 21137 50020 189280 94163 37812 23462
Middle Eas Budapest NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 12162 4815 5908
Copenhagc 11349 10499 22435 23675 27405 28336 36440 46732 64954 66605 102636 70772 53262
Deutsche E 508707 404649 454206 563962 592104 593936 811626 1067688 1491796 1551467 2119785 1423371 1212302
Euronext - - - - - - 2092540 1988359
Euronext A 40823 38916 45728 66368 85263 124324 191102 279688 409520 471226 678764
Euronext B 9110 8226 9754 13961 16113 18343 25415 33867 60928 58629 43787 -
Euronext L - - - 2439 5177 4241 7245 20808 50077 40479 54897 27602 -
Euronext P 121064 116649 124879 170362 202070 213161 282014 414321 587854 770076 1064866 -
Helsinki 3975 1553 2182 7859 13298 19207 21961 36252 61117 109902 208326 180927 178202
Irish - - - - - - 11794 17301 39865 47611 14381 22789 33270
Istanbul 5870 8277 8346 21126 21667 50889 36233 56088 68485 81099 178998 74530 69937
Italy 42172 23448 27660 66040 119389 87118 102568 203280 486507 539449 1019625 633937 634635
JSE South 10469 8703 7754 10363 17631 17425 26998 44696 61837 86838 77446 69278 78392
Ljubljana - - - 417 348 494 544 852 1203 925 1197 1527
London 543393 553922 662991 865907 1029278 1153221 1413236 1989489 2887990 3399381 4558663 4520183 4001340
Luxemboui 108 236 292 1101 1031 487 786 1048 1673 1421 1661 703 496
Malta - - 131 12 21 354 53 188 46 48
Oslo 14065 11639 10133 17576 17694 24926 36346 49601 42944 56719 69239 62829 56127
Spanish Ex - - - - - - 653221
Stockholm: 15738 20568 28650 42746 86087 94210 136741 175822 229961 313678 485288 384396 279944
Swiss Exct NA 83080 117752 209885 261608 340114 443031 568882 689170 561894 638707 591065 599749
Tehran 5659 6332 243 454 742 2616 1212 1362 2273 1043 1087 2071
Tel-Aviv 3358 8221 14380 29980 25136 9159 8100 14158 15079 20958 28539 15674 12676
Vienna 11223 7233 5155 7297 8742 13357 10692 12724 18677 12734 9642 7693 6109
Warsaw - 26 163 1975 5207 2761 5544 7953 8913 11139 19305 9876 7811
Asia, Pacifi Australian 40186 46697 45577 67792 94909 98310 146236 168999 161001 198195 226485 244463 295399
Colombo 39 104 114 378 695 210 130 309 282 209 143 156 319
Hong Kong 34676 38597 78645 132287 126057 95832 166429 453657 206153 230032 376664 241013 194004
Jakarta 3967 2963 3918 9088 11788 14403 32452 42605 10637 17241 15109 9410 13050
Korea 75625 85092 116138 211968 286829 185428 177506 170826 145061 733423 556246 379623 596632
Kuala Lum 10698 10714 19732 148556 120859 60792 178011 145688 26840 42431 52869 23880 32923
Mumbai - - - - - 100638 68539
National St - - - 147244 128535
New Zealar 2072 3107 3276 6802 7188 8719 10139 10725 14274 13687 12315 9933 8878
Osaka 243823 138549 120936 131999 191183 262054 253119 221990 182093 216029 325566 174510 124017
Philippine 1175 1434 3019 9853 13934 14667 25510 20350 10148 19950 8187 3129 3093
Shanghai 290658 211644
Shenzhen - - - 203073 140661
Singapore 21070 18084 18906 83529 84822 63983 60255 74137 58510 107407 95153 71094 63048
Taiwan 711737 386031 250331 352624 736708 389273 478356 1308633 895985 913610 985864 541902 633632
Thailand 15737 19678 72104 88798 81961 59303 51397 24599 20976 37246 21117 30811 41289
Tokyo 1287694 822974 476977 792977 859896 884000 938822 896055 750825 1675641 2315502 1659909 1564244
Since the market capitalisation figures make no allowance for new issues and the
layering of returns through collective investment vehicles, we have included a record
of the index levels for each of the major markets in Table 2.3. Note that the
construction of indices vary around the world, and so are not directly comparable
(although this doesn't stop analysts from comparing them). For instance, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average is an un-weighted arithmetic index based on 30 companies
set back in 1928, while the FTSE 100 is a weighted arithmetic index based on the
largest 100 UK companies, which frequently changes. These two figures are
frequently compared, despite the availability of a more appropriate American index:
the Standard and Poor's 500.
For ease of comparison of market performance, the table is repeated with a ratio of
the end of year prices, to show the annual performance (Table 2.4). The correlation
between the American markets and the large European markets is clear. In general
we find that the larger markets are more stable, although this comparison is hard to
make, without knowing the constituents of each index. However, we find that
Nasdaq is far more volatile than LSE, which is surprising since these are (for most of
the period) similar market structures.
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Time zone Exchange Name of In End 1990 End 1991 End 1992 End 1993 End 1994 End 1995 End 1996 End 1997 End 1998 End 1999 End 2000 End 2001 End 2002
North Amex Amex Comp 308.11 395.05 399.23 477.15 433.67 548.23 572.34 684.61 688.99 876.97 897.75 847.61 824.38
America Bermuda BSX Index NA NA NA NA NA 978.58 918.39 1,403.02 1,524.19 1,506.54 2,293.25 2.689.28 2,220.44
Chicago Dow Jones 2,633.66 3,168.83 3,301.10 3,754.09 3,834.44 5,117.12 6,448.27 7,908.25 9,181.43 11,497.12 10,786.85 10,021.50 8,341.63
Mexico Price & Quo 628.79 1,431.46 1,759.44 2,602.63 2,375.66 2,778.47 3,361.03 5,229.35 3,959.66 7,129.88 5,652.19 6,372.28 6,127.09
Nasdaq Composite 373.84 586.34 676.95 776.80 751.96 1,052.13 1,291.03 1,570.35 2,192.69 4,069.31 2,470.52 1,950.40 1,335.51
NYSE* NYSE Com 1.908.45 2,426.04 2,539.92 2,739.44 2,653.37 3,484.15 4,148.07 5,405.19 6,299.93 6,876.10 6,945.57 6,236.39 5,000.00
TSX Toront TSE 300 Co 3,256.75 3,512.36 3,350.44 4,321.43 4,213.61 4,713.54 5,927.03 6,699.44 6,485.94 8,413.75 8,933.68 7,688.41 6,614.54
South Buenos Air General Ind 2,202.87 17,856.02 13,427.51 20,607.23 15,855.62 16,237.81 18,494.87 23,071.71 17,408.76 21,227.75 16,331.21 13,341.51 25,509.41
America Lima General Ind 100.00 372.90 930.47 1,414.92 1,243.37 1,429.02 1,792.71 1,335.88 1,835.57 1,208.41 1,176.45 1.391.97
Santiago IGPA 1,166.70 2,483.70 2,733.46 3,915.49 5,425.17 5,739.97 4,902.59 4,794.41 3,594.75 5,167.72 4,869.04 5,397.69 5,019.64
Sao Paulo' Bovespa 25.16 607.77 6,780.50 3,754.53 4,353.93 4,299.00 7,039.90 10,196.00 6,784.00 17,091.00 15,259.00 13,577.00 11,268.00
Europe, Afr Athens ASE Compc 932.00 809.71 672.31 877.26 868.91 914.15 933.50 1,479.63 2,737.55 5,535.09 3,388.86 2,591.56 1,748.42
Middle Eas Budapest BUX - - 7,849.75 7,131.13 7,798.29
Copenhage Total Share 314.80 352.56 261.59 367.40 349.10 366.33 471.95 675.98 637,52 774.66 906.82 NA NA
Copenhage KAX Totalin - - - 247.62 211.84 166.56
Deutsche E DAX Return 1,398.23 1,577.98 1,545.05 2,266.68 2,106.58 2,253.88 2,888.69 4,249.69 5,002.39 6,958.14 6,433.61 5,160.10 2,892.63
Euronext A CBS All Sha 168.30 191.40 198.00 280.80 278.00 321.50 437.30 618.80 734.70 933.10 897.00 708.00 462.10
Euronext A AAX All Sha - - 378.84 439.04 598.31 838.57 1,000.00 1,296.75 1,222.09 966.11 631.40
Euronext B Spot Return 4.963.81 5,481.43 5,568.08 7,543.12 7,248.67 8,401.68 10,520.94 14,329.21 20,556.03 19,075.97 18,119.31 17.229.62 13,352.97
Euronext L PSI Genera 638.30 623.63 553.71 848.54 919.95 877.69 1,163.54 1,922.72 2,427.33 2,732.36 2,507.90 2,030.50 1,611.15
Euronext P SBF250 1,000.00 1,126.41 1,140.14 1,511.73 1,250.66 1,232.86 1,561.66 1,944.91 2,500.01 3,810.86 3,771.25 2,981.35 2,053.26
Helsinki HEX All Sha 1,000.00 781.84 829.00 1,582.12 1,846.59 1,704.20 2,495.93 3,302.26 5,564.87 14,578.68 13,033.74 8,805.01 5,775.37
Irish ISEQ Overa 1,201.77 1,380.23 1,227.35 1,888.94 1,850.76 2,232.45 2,725.63 4,053.80 4,995.82 5,071.54 5,722.53 5,707.00 3.995 03
Istanbul ISE Nationa 32.56 43.69 40.04 206.83 272.57 400.25 975.89 3,451.00 2,575.82 15,208.78 9,437.21 13,782.76 10,369.92
Italy MIB Index 8,007.00 7,830.00 6,916.00 9,500.00 9,813.00 9,138.00 10,332.00 16,341.00 23,035.00 28,169.00 29,681.00 22,232.00 16,954 00
Johannesb JSE Actuari 2,720.00 3,440.00 3,259.00 4,893.00 5,866.91 6,228.42 6,657.53 6,202.31 5,430.48 8,542.78 8,326.19 10,441.68 9,277.22
Ljubljana SBI 1,000.00 1,396.80 1,448.75 1,183.26 1,404.70 1,705.77 1,806.26 1,807.94 2,151.59 3,340.20
London FT SE 100 2,143.50 2,493.10 2,846.50 3,418.40 3,065.50 3,689.30 4,118.50 5,135.50 5,882.60 6,930.20 6,222.50 5,217.35 3,940.36
Luxemboui Shares Pric 2,566.38 2,713.26 2,551.40 5,207.96 4,301.38 4,325.44 5,622.99 7,009.24 7.593.24 10,227.11 NA NA NA
Luxemboui LuxX Price 1,000.00 1,397.25 1,174.11 805.32 606 82
Malta MSE Ordina 1,000.00 991.39 1,057.39 1,210.79 3,278.49 3,375.72 2,200.13 1,870.91
Oslo Oslo SE Tot 456.54 413.55 372.12 613.08 656.78 732.96 968.37 1,273.61 934.16 1,359.60 1,336.82
Oslo Oslo Bars B 100.00 128.88 166.63 119.27 174.10 175.94 147.38 99 14
Spanish Ex BCN Global 216.07 213.50 162.32 263.01 234.55 265.28 378.95 530.36 703.02 86585 806 73 729.57 502 06
Spanish Ex Bolsa Bilbac 299.16 334.04 308.33 415.04 379.26 456.67 665.02 968.17 1,344.08 1,631.27 1,628.24 1,466.72 1.090 10
Spanish Ex General Ind 223.25 246.24 214.25 322 77 285.01 320.07 444.77 632.55 867.80 1,008.57 880.71 824.40 633.99
Spanish Ex IGBV Index NA NA NA NA 224.41 257.06 370.61 521.45 693.20 821.07 721.29 666.55 481.30
Stockholm: SX General 865.00 912.00 912.07 1,387.70 1,451.00 1,716.00 2,371.00 2,936.00 3,235.00 5,382.00 4,735.00
Stockholm All Share In - 287.61 239.06 149.60
Swiss Excf Swiss Perfo 908.30 1,052.80 1,238.60 1,867.80 1,725.00 2,123.40 2,515.60 3,898.10 4,497.10 5,022.90 5,621.13 4,382.94 3,245.50
Tehran TEPIX NA NA 445.09 382.78 570.53 1,288.13 1,972.08 1,631.41 1,531.05 1,989.73 2,880.68 3,554.35 5,044.06
Tel-Aviv General Sha 224.33 363.03 191.64 270.15 163.77 186.66 184.84 249.87 257.49 423.44 424.71 396.49 317.68
Vienna Wiener Bors 502.26 418.98 348.46 270.15 429.64 387.36 429.20 486.96 464.32 493.32 456.86 464.81 479.21
Warsaw WIG 919.10 1,040.70 12,439.00 7,473.10 7,585.90 14,342.80 14,668.00 12,795.60 18,083.60 18,981.70 13,922.16 14,366.65
Asia, PacifijAustralian ASX/S&P A 1,279.80 1,651.40 1,549.90 2,173.60 1,912.70 2,203.00 2,424.60 2,616.50 2,813.40 3,152.50 3,154.70 3,359.90 2,975.50
Colombo All Share Pr NA NA NA 986.73 978.97 663.70 603.00 702.20 597.30 572.50 447.60 621.00 815.10
Hong Kong All Ordinarie 1,982.88 2,806.97 2,951.06 6,075.18 4,074.52 4,770.57 6,539.64 5,284.23 4,319.20 7,134.79 6,107.89 4,885.63 4,113.06
Jakarta JSX Compo 417.78 247.39 274 33 588.77 469.64 513.85 637.43 401 71 398.04 676.92 416.32 392.04 424.95
Korea KOSPI 696.11 610.92 678.44 866 18 1,027.37 882.94 651.22 376.31 562.46 1,028 07 504,62 693.70 627 55
Kuala Lum| KLSE Comp 505.92 556.22 643 96 1,275.32 971.21 995.17 1,237.96 594.44 586.13 812.33 679.64 696.09 646.32
Mumbai BSE-500 - 1,005.82 1,176.73
National St Nifty Fifty - 1,059.05 1,093.50
New Zealar NZSE Grosi 514.02 671.67 761.71 1,155.60 1,075.94 1,273.29 1,527.08 1,571.59 1,520.10 1,777.83 1,616.31 1,886.46 1,965.61
Osaka 300 Commc 1,464.82 1,415.57 1,122.96 1,215.20 1.339.80 1,365.51 1,314.00 1,104.87 1,020.48 1,378.72 1,238.57 985.55 800.99
Philippine PSE Compc 653.11 1,154.26 1,272.40 3,241.86 2,785.81 2,594.18 3,170.56 1,869.23 1,968.78 2,142.97 1,494.50 1,168.08 1,018.41
Shanghai SSE Compc - - 1,645.97 1,357.65
Shenzhen SSE Compc - 2,073.48 2,759.30
Singapore All Sing Eqi 323.28 404.50 394.63 628.66 533.57 555.39 536.12 425.94 380.51 668.79 502.38 426.33 348.80
Taiwan TSE Weight 4,503.16 4,600.67 3,377.06 6,070.56 7,124.66 5,173.73 6,933.94 8,187.27 6,418.43 8,448 84 4,739.09 5,551.24 4,452.45
Thailand SET 612.86 711.36 89342 1,682.85 1,360.69 1,280.81 831.57 372.69 355.81 481.92 269.19 303.85 356.48
Tokyo TOPIX 1,733.83 1,714.68 1,322.10 1,439.31 1,559.09 1,577.70 1,470.94 1,175.03 1,086.99 1,722.20 1,283.67 1,032.14 843.29
NA Not Available • Not Applicable
' NYSE New Composite index launched in 2002, and recalculated retrospectively
" Indexes lor Sao Paulo has been rebased several times due to inflation
AAX was launched in 1998, and recalculated retrospectively
"" LuxX price index was launched at the beginning of 1999
Table 2.4 otice : When using these figures, please always mention World Federation ofExchanges the source of data.
RATIO OF STOCK PRICE INDEX LEVELS AT YEAR-END
End 1991 End 1992 End 1993 End 1994 End 1995 End 1996 End 1997 End 1998 End 1999 End 2000 End 2001 End 2002
Time zone Exchange Name of In
End 2001End 1990 End 1991 End 1992 End 1993 End 1994 End 1995 End 1996 End 1997 End 1998 End 1999 End 2000
1.006 1.273 1.024 0.944 0.973North Amex Amex Comp 1.282 1.011 1.195 0.909 1.264 1.044 1.196
America Bermuda BSX Index 0.938 1.528 1.086 0.988 1.522 1.173 0.826
0.832Chicago Dow Jones 1.203 1.042 1.137 1.021 1.335 1.260 1.226 1.161 1.252 0.938 0.929
Mexico Price & Quo 2.277 1.229 1.479 0.913 1.170 1.210 1.556 0.757 1.801 0.793 1.127 0.962
Nasdaq Composite 1.568 1.155 1.147 0.968 1.399 1.227 1.216 1.396 1.856 0.607 0.789 0.685
NYSE* NYSE Com 1.271 1.047 1.079 0.969 1.313 1.191 1.303 1.166 1.091 1.010 0.898 0.802
TSX Toront TSE 300 Co 1.078 0.954 1.290 0.975 1.119 1.257 1.130 0.968 1.297 1.062 0.861 0.860
1.912South Buenos Air General Ind 8.106 0.752 1.535 0.769 1.024 1.139 1.247 0.755 1.219 0.769 0.817
America Lima General Ind 3.729 2.495 1.521 0.879 1.149 1.255 0.745 1.374 0.658 0.974 1.183
0.930Santiago IGPA 2.129 1.101 1.432 1.386 1.058 0.854 0.978 0.750 1.438 0.942 1.109
Sao Paulo Bovespa 24.160 11.156 0.554 1.160 0.987 1.638 1.448 0.665 2.519 0.893 0.890 0.830
0.675Europe, Afr Athens ASE Compc 0.869 0.830 1.305 0.990 1.052 1.021 1.585 1.850 2.022 0.612 0.765
Middle Eas Budapest BUX
1.215 1.171
0.908 1.094
Copenhage Total Share 1.120 0.742 1.404 0950 1.049 1.288 1.432 0.943
Copenhage KAX Totalin 0.856 0.786
Deutsche B DAX Return 1.129 0.979 1.467 0.929 1.070 1.282 1.471 1.177 1.391 0.925 0.802 0.561
Euronext A CBS All Sha 1.137 1.034 1.418 0.990 1.156 1.360 1.415 1.187 1.270 0.961 0.789 0.653
Euronext A AAX All Sha 1.159 1.363 1.402 1.193 1.297 0.942 0.791 0.654
Euronext B Spot Return 1.104 1.016 1.355 0.961 1.159 1.252 1.362 1.435 0.928 0.950 0.951 0.775
Euronext L PSI Genera 0.977 0.888 1.532 1.084 0.954 1.326 1.652 1.262 1.126 0.918 0.810 0.793
Euronext P SBF 250 1.126 1.012 1.326 0.827 0.986 1.267 1.245 1.285 1.524 0.990 0.791 0.689
Helsinki HEX All Sha 0.782 1.060 1.908 1.167 0.923 1.465 1.323 1.685 2.620 0.894 0.676 0.656
Irish ISEQ Overa 1.148 0.889 1.539 0.980 1.206 1.221 1.487 1.232 1.015 1.128 0.997 0.700
Istanbul ISE Nationa 1.342 0.916 5.165 1.318 1.468 2.438 3.536 0.746 5.904 0.621 1.460 0.752
Italy MIB Index 0.978 0.883 1.374 1.033 0.931 1.131 1.582 1.410 1.223 1.054 0.749 0.763
Johannesb JSE Actuari 1.265 0.947 1.501 1.199 1.062 1.069 0.932 0.876 1.573 0.975 1.254 0.888
Ljubljana SBI 1.397 1.037 0.817 1.187 1.214 1.059 1.001 1.190 1.552
London FT SE 100 1.163 1.142 1.201 0.897 1.203 1.116 1.247 1.145 1.178 0.898 0.838 0.755
Luxemboui Shares Pric 1.057 0.940 2.041 0.826 1.006 1.300 1.247 1.083 1.347
Luxemboui LuxX Price I 1.397 0.840 0.686 0.754
Malta MSE Ordina 0.991 1.067 1.145 2.708 1.030 0.652 0.850
Oslo Oslo SE Tot 0.906 0.900 1.648 1.071 1.116 1.321 1.315 0.733 1.455 0.983
Oslo Oslo Bars B 1.289 1.293 0.716 1.460 1.011 0.838 0.673
Spanish Ex BCN Global 0.988 0.760 1.620 0.892 1.131 1.428 1.400 1.326 1.232 0.932 0.904 0.688
Spanish Ex Bolsa Bilbac 1.117 0.923 1.346 0.914 1.204 1.456 1.456 1.388 1.214 0.998 0.901 0.743
Spanish Ex General Ind 1.103 0.870 1.507 0.883 1.123 1.390 1.422 1.372 1.162 0.873 0.936 0.769
Spanish Ex IGBV Index 1.145 1.442 1.407 1.329 1.184 0.878 0.924 0.722
Stockholm; SX General 1.054 1.000 1.521 1.046 1.183 1.382 1.238 1.102 1.664 0.880 0.000
Stockholm: All Share ln< 0.831 0.626
Swiss Exch Swiss Perfo 1.159 1.176 1.508 0.924 1.231 1.185 1.550 1.154 1.117 1.119 0.780 0.740
Tehran TEPIX 0.860 1.490 2.258 1.531 0.827 0.938 1.300 1.448 1.234 1.419
Tel-Aviv General Sh£ 1.618 0.528 1.410 0.606 1.140 0.990 1.352 1.030 1.644 1.003 0.934 0.801
Vienna Wiener Bore 0.834 0.832 0.775 1.590 0.902 1.108 1.135 0.954 1.062 0.926 1.017 1.031
Warsaw WIG 1.132 11.953 0.601 1.015 1.891 1.023 0.872 1.413 1.050 0.733 1.032
Asia, Pacifi|Australian ASX/S&P A 1.290 0.939 1.402 0.880 1.152 1.101 1.079 1.075 1.121 1.001 1.065 0.886
Colombo All Share Price Index 0.992 0.678 0.909 1.165 0.851 0.958 0.782 1.387 1.313
Hong Kong All Ordinarie 1.416 1.051 2.059 0.671 1.171 1.371 0.808 0.817 1.652 0.856 0.800 0.842
Jakarta JSX Compo 0.592 1.109 2.146 0.798 1.094 1.241 0.630 0.991 1.701 0.615 0.942 1.084
Korea KOSPI 0.878 1.111 1.277 1.186 0.859 0.738 0.578 1.495 1.828 0.491 1.375 0.905
Kuala Lum| KLSE Comf 1.099 1.158 1.980 0.762 1.025 1.244 0.480 0.986 1.386 0.837 1.024 0.929
Mumbai BSE-500 1.170
National St Nifty Fifty 1.033
New Zealar NZSE Gross 1.307 1.134 1.517 0.931 1.183 1.199 1.029 0.967 1.170 0.909 1.167 1.042
Osaka 300 Commc 0.966 0.793 1.082 1.103 1.019 0.962 0.841 0.924 1.351 0.898 0.796 0.813
Philippine PSE Compc 1.767 1.102 2.548 0.859 0.931 1.222 0.590 1.053 1.088 0.697 0.782 0.872
Shanghai SSE Compc 0.825
Shenzhen SSE Compc 1.331
Singapore All Sing Eqi 1.251 0.976 1 593 0.849 1.041 0.965 0.794 0.893 1.758 0.751 0.849 0.818
Taiwan TSE Weight 1.022 0.734 1.798 1.174 0.726 1.340 1.181 0.784 1.316 0.561 1.171 0.802
Thailand SET 1.161 1.256 1.884 0.809 0.941 0.649 0.448 0.955 1.354 0.559 1.129 1.173
Tokyo TOPIX 0.989 0.771 1.089 1.083 1.012 0.932 0.799 0.925 1.584 0.745 0.804 0.817
NA : Not Available -: Not Applicable
' NYSE New Composite index launched in 2002, and recalculated retrospectively
" Indexes for Sao Paulo has been rebased several times due to inflation
»•AAX was launched in 1998, and recalculated retrospectively












































































The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) comes in three forms. In its strongest form
prices reflect all information. Semi-strong form efficiency implies that prices reflect
all publicly available information. Weak-form efficiency states that the current price
reflects all information implied by previous prices. Although there is no consensus
as to the most appropriate form, if any, of the EMH, the hypothesis is frequently
used a starting point or benchmark for any financial markets research. The important
conclusion of each form of the EMH is that without superior information, it is
impossible to outperform the market systematically.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) builds on the EMH to show that the
optimum portfolio for a risk averse investor, is a combination of the market portfolio
and a risk free asset. While tracker funds account for a significant proportion of the
market (roughly a third on the NYSE), the remainder of the market continue to trade
actively, whether speculating, rebalancing portfolios or trading with some other
motivation. While many papers state that greater trading volume is a sign of market
efficiency and investor welfare, it also implies that fewer investors believe in the
conclusions of the CAPM. The financial markets are a "nil-sum" game: for every
winner there is a loser. And the volume of trading activity stands counter to the
rational behaviour predicted by the EMH.
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3.1.2 Behavioural Finance
Hirshliefer (2001) offers an alternative to EMH and CAPM, based on "imperfectly
rational behaviour": DMH (Deficient Markets Hypothesis) and DAPM (Deranged
Anticipation and Perception Model). While the hypothesis may be delivered with
tongue in cheek, he goes on to define many of the psychological theories that may be
relevant to pricing and trading activity in the financial markets.
Kahneman and Tversky (1971) introduced the idea of prospect theory, which makes
subtle differences to the standard utility theory. While standard utility theory states
that utility is increasing but convex with wealth, prospect theory states that when
faced with uncertainty, an individual will apply a function of the probability rather
than the probability itself. They find that individuals over estimate large
probabilities but under estimate small probabilities. An exception is for very small
probabilities (e.g. lottery odds) which investors over estimate. Furthermore, they
state that the utility curve is kinked at the point of current wealth, and it is convex
below, and concave above this point.
Read et al (1999) explain the idea of "Narrow Framing", where problems are solved
with a subset of information. Shefrin and Statman (1985) explain "mental
accounting" and the "disposition effect" whereby investors put gains and losses into
separate mental compartments, and become less inclined to realize the losses. This
unwillingness to realize losses is an example of a "self deception theory". Other
examples are "anchoring", where investors are influenced by information irrelevant
to the decision process, "omission bias", where regret is felt more strongly following
an active decision rather than a passive one, and the "endowment effect" or "status
quo bias" where people prefer to keep what they have rather than trade for a better
option. Two of the most commonly quoted self deception theories are
"overconfidence" and "biased self-attribution" (Odean (1998)) where people are
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overly optimistic. Furthermore, when results do go well, they take credit for it, and
when they go badly, they blame it on external forces.
A fundamental conclusion of the above theories is that "if arbitrage is costly and
noise traders are active, asset prices may deviate from fundamental values for long
periods of time." (Gemmill and Thomas (2002)) This means that static price models
such as CAPM have no chance of encapsulating the behavioural issues. DeLong et
al (1990) introduced a model of noise trader behaviour to show that arbitrageurs
could not drive the prices towards the underlying value in the presence of noise
traders, and use this model to justify the discount on investment trusts. Daniel et al
(2001) and Barberis and Haung (2000) also offer models to explain the short term
miss-pricing effects. One of the biggest problems with testing the suitability of such
models is the quantification of the behavioural attributes. If the results are taken
from a controlled experiment, then the conclusion will be distorted by the design of
the experiment, and the differences between it and the real money markets. If the
results are taken from the observed stock price movements, then there is the risk of
spurious correlation and the potential accusation of fitting the theory to the data.
To date, there have been very few empirical studies applying behavioural finance.
The difficulty is in translating the theories into expected and testable price effects on
the financial markets. Bridging the gap between "imperfectly rational" investor
behaviour and stock price movements, and offering a suitable canvas for testing
these theories is "market microstructure".
3.1.3 Market Microstructure
O'Hara (1995) defines market microstructure as "the study of the process of
outcomes of exchanging assets under explicit trading rules". Microstructure is
important to various parties e.g. investors, brokers, market makers, regulators and the
29
owners of the exchange. Each stakeholder will have a different opinion about the
best market design, but there are some common goals. While the microstructure
theory does not contradict the efficient markets hypothesis in equilibrium, Madhavan
(2000) notes that "asset prices need not equal full-information expectations of value
because of a variety of frictions" and it is this friction that is relevant to the
efficiency of prices and the transaction costs of trading. As mentioned in the
introduction, the definition of "efficiency" varies and much of the market
microstructure literature uses the stronger definition of prices fully reflecting
information. Irrespective of the definition, efficient prices are more than a
theoretical pursuit. Market designers are keen to ensure efficient prices, to avoid
market crashes, and encourage the population to invest in the economy.
Madhavan (2000) provides a comprehensive summary of the microstructure
literature. He focuses on 4 main areas: price discovery, market structure and design,
information and disclosure, and the interface of market microstructure with other
areas of finance. In this chapter, we will look in detail at the price formation theory
and models, how the structure affects this process and the interpretation of
information. We will also look at specific areas of the market design such as the role
of the market maker, the limit order book, alternative methods of trading, and a
summary of the microstructure comparisons. Although we will not go into any great
depth regarding the applications of the theory and how it relates to the other areas of
finance theory, we will take a look at some of the well established results (e.g. size
effects, seasonal and intraday patterns, volume volatility relationship).
30
3.2 Price Formation Models and Theory
3.2.1 Introduction
Early papers on efficient markets used an assumption like "all investors make an
informed decision about what the underlying value of the security is, and if the
current price is above the underlying value they sell, and if the current price is below
the underlying value, they buy." Over the years it became apparent that in the real
world, investors didn't always know the underlying value, and in some cases, they
didn't even care. Investors have many different reasons for trading, and these will be
discussed later, but it is clear that while equity shares are viewed as a long term
investment, many investors hold them for very short periods of time in an attempt to
beat the market. So the question of how the price reflects the views of the market
participants has become a popular one. One of the surprising things is that
convergence of prices towards a theoretical equilibrium is almost always assumed,
rather than proved.
3.2.2 Inventory Risk
One of the first popular theories used the risks faced by the market intermediary to
justify the existence of a bid-offer spread and explain the method by which prices
begin to reflect information. Garman (1976) explained how the supply and demand
are stochastic processes, and how the market coped with a temporary order
imbalance. Garman's model had a single market maker who sets a price he is willing
to buy and a price he is willing to sell. Order arrival follows two independent
Poisson processes for buy and sell orders. The fact that the two order arrival
processes are asynchronous leads to the market maker's problem.
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The Garman (1976) model assumes that the market maker is not allowed to borrow
stock or money and so the sole aim is to maximise trading profits while mitigating
the risk of running out of stock or money. O'Hara (1997) notes that the assumption
regarding the order arrival process implies that no subset of traders can dominate the
market, which in turn implies that traders don't act on private information or any
"synchronized order strategies (such as portfolio insurance)". These assumptions are
far from realistic and hide many of the features of the market microstructure.
Stoll (1978) extends the theory by stating that the market maker, like any other
trader, is risk averse and therefore demands compensation for bearing the risk of
holding an inventory away from his desired level. Amihud and Mendelson (1980)
extend the model in a different way, giving the market maker the ability to change
his prices in response to changes in his inventory. While the earlier models
explained how prices were set for a one period model, Amihud and Mendelson
(1980) suggested how prices may move as a response to the change in the market
maker's inventory.
Cohen et al (1981) address the issue of multiple liquidity suppliers. They find that
because markets are discrete and have transaction costs, there is always a chance of
non-execution by placing a limit order, however close to the opposing side of the
spread. Their model makes some significant assumptions e.g. trades occur at one
time period, and limit orders are cancelled immediately afterwards. Again these
assumptions have a non trivial impact on the conclusions. Ho and Stoll (1983)
extended the theory to allow for the inventory levels of competing dealers. Rather
than thinking of the collection of investors with a choice of market orders and limit
orders, they create a model of two competing dealers who were given the choice of
what prices to offer liquidity at, and whether to trade at another dealer's price. Their
assumptions were far more realistic, but still these models did not yield results about
the ability of prices to reflect the underlying value.
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3.2.3 Information Based Models
Bagehot (1971) first introduced the idea that some investors trade with better private
information than others, and that this information asymmetry has an impact on the
prices set by a market maker, or any other market structure. Stoll (1978) mentioned
the risk of trading against investors who know more than the market maker, but it
was not until Copeland and Galai (1983) that the concept was built into a market
microstructure model.
Copeland and Galai (1983) think of the bid-offer spread in two separate ways. First,
it can be thought of as the profit that the market maker gains as a reward for
providing the liquidity. Second, it can be thought of as the price of a call and put
option given to the traders. Copeland and Galai (1983) found that the mathematics
implied by the latter approach was not tractable, but that it did highlight the
importance of the risk of information asymmetry, and volatility. While the early
inventory models explained that a spread should exist as a result of the transaction
costs, the information based models explained that a spread should exist as a result of
the risk of private information, and the volatility of the stock.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) use the Copeland and Galai (1983) model to explore the
impact of asymmetric information on the price formation process. They ignore all of
the existing theory about inventory models, assuming that market makers are risk
neutral and have infinite resources. While this provides an opportunity to look at the
issue of "information" in isolation, it does not then lead to a complete picture that
could be used in empirical analysis. Another important assumption that has
remained in much of the literature is that uninformed investors will never speculate.
Uninformed traders, it is argued, will always lose money to the informed traders in
this situation, and so it is irrational for them to speculate, and so they won't. In
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response to this, the issue of different perceptions of information, and seemingly
irrational behaviour will be addressed later.
The Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model is based around a tree structure. Firstly,
there may be good or bad news held as private information. Secondly, traders may
have this information or they may not. Lastly, they may decide to buy or sell.
Clearly, an informed trader with good news will not sell and an informed trader with
bad news will not sell, but all other potential outcomes have a positive probability.
Their model leads to several important results. Firstly, they showed how the spread
depended on the arrival of orders through time. Secondly, they showed that prices
form a martingale, and so the price reflects all of the information available to the
market maker. Since, prices and public information is within the market maker's
information set, this means that the prices are semi-strong-form efficient, but not
necessarily strong-form efficient. It should be noted that introducing the concept of
inventory risk, and assuming that this has a non-negligible effect on the behaviour of
the market maker in setting prices, we might conclude that the market is not semi-
strong form efficient.
The idea that market makers revise their beliefs after every trade, as per the Glosten
and Milgrom model, implies that prices move following a trade with even an
uninformed trader. It is clear that market makers must have some way of
determining which trades were more likely to be informed and which were less
likely. The first candidate for differentiation was the size of the trade. The catalyst
for this was the empirical work of Dann et al (1977), Holthausen et al (1987), who
found greater price movements following larger (particularly block) trades.
Easley et al (1997) present a similar model, but introduce a fourth level to the
decision tree, which determines whether an information event has occurred or not.
Both the Glosten and Milgrom model and the Easley and O'Hara model suffer from
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some very restrictive assumptions. For instance, they assume that traders queue up
and trade sequentially, or that investors are chosen at random to trade at a specific
time. Both of these approaches ignore the fact that an informed trader may trade and
then wish to trade again immediately.
Having established two different models to explain the price discovery process,
which is the more appropriate? Hasbrouk (1988) finds evidence that the
"information effect dominates inventory control effects." Madhavan (2000) suggest
that this "may be due to inventory effects being spread over a longer period than
information effects." This casts some doubt over Hasbrouk's conclusion.
Madhavan's comment further implies that the information effect may not be
permanent, as so many papers seem to assume.
3.2.4 Price Discovery in an Order Book Market
Parlour (1998) defines a dynamic model of investor behaviour, in an environment
where the price doesn't change in a 1 tick market. She shows that if the bid price in
a limit order book market drops, the offer price is more likely to drop than it is to
stay constant or increase. Foucault (1999) use a dynamic model that allows for price
movements, but simplifies the detail of the order book. Goettler et al (2003) useva
"dynamic pure limit order market" to show the real costs of trading for the investors.
The conclusions drawn from each model vary, and we can only conclude that the
artificial aspects of the model design play an important part.
Madhavan (2000) states "in a hybrid market, where some trades are between public
investors without dealer intervention... We cannot estimate a structural model...
without actual market maker inventory data." Using a solution put forward by
Hasbrouk (1988) we implicitly assume that "the information effect has a permanent
effect on prices... while the inventory effect is transitory" and that these two effects
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sum to the total. By varying the level of dealer intervention, we could then expect to
see a change in the transient volatility. In the limit, we would expect a market
without dealers to have no transient volatility. This seems unlikely. Not all
assumptions can be extended to the limit, but the validity of this one should at least
be questioned. Hasbrouk (1991) offers support to this argument, saying that "in the
formal models of asymmetric information, the trade is driven partially by private
information, and partially by liquidity needs, but in no part is the trade driven by
public information which is relevant to forecasting the value of the security."
Easley (1997) counters by saying that an "important aspect of the sequential trade
approach is that it is possible to demonstrate that prices do indeed converge to full
information values." She then points out that this only occurs in the limit, and that
the models make no comment about how long the price process may take to reach
efficiency. The models also ignore the complication of new information being
introduced while the market is still adjusting to the previous information event.
Adding to this debate, Goetzmann and Massa (2001) introduce an extra explanatory
factor into the CAPM model. This reflects the "dispersion of opinions" or
"heterogeneity of trade among investors". They split traders into positive and
negative feedback traders; dependent on how they react the day after a market rise or
fall. They find that the impact of these two groups does not cancel out, which leads
to a departure from CAPM. They find that this explanatory factor works very well,
when CAPM does not.
3.2.5 Price Discovery in a Non Continuous Market
There are various methods employed for the opening of a financial market. The LSE
allows limit order and market orders to be placed before opening for SETS stocks.
Investors can't see the orders, but they can see the crossing price, which is set by
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specific rules, with the aim of maximising the volume traded. All committed parties
trade at the crossing price when the market opens. On the NYSE, a similar process
occurs, except the crossing price is not visible before the open, which the specialist,
rather than simple rules, is responsible for setting. Madhavan and Panchapagesam
(2000) study the opening procedure on the NYSE and find several important results.
Firstly "the opening price reflects specialist information and price-continuity
requirements" which "induces staleness, by tying the opening price to the previous
day's close". Secondly, "inventory effects at the open are very weak" despite the
monetary incentive for such actions. Thirdly, "the NYSE's designated dealer
(specialist) sets a more efficient price than the price that would prevail in a pure call
market using only public orders." The pure call market they refer to is a blind
auction, and they concede that a fully transparent call market may set more efficient
prices.
The Paris Bourse "tatonnement process" is similar to the opening of the LSE.
Investors place orders on the order book, but can only see the price and volume that
would trade if the market opened immediately, and the 4 next best orders. This is a
halfway house between the open and closed auction process that Madhavan and
Panchapagesam (2000) referred to above. Biais et al (1999) find a "very active order
placement during the preopening period" showing the importance of the "price
discovery phase". They cannot reject the hypothesis that a large degree of noise




3.3.1 What is Information?
The fact that everyone is using a subset of the total market knowledge and that some
may have a more useful subset than others is central to the concept of efficient
markets. The distinction of informed and uninformed traders is also an important
assumption, despite being an abstract idea. Whether it is the actual presence of
informed traders or simply the perceived risk of their presence, the evidence and the
arguments regarding asymmetric information, stand up to scrutiny. The question that
follows is, in what circumstances should the affect of asymmetric information be
largest? Should smaller stocks have a greater risk, because the larger information
gathering companies have a lower profit margin, and so devote less time on them?
Should newer companies have a greater risk? Are initial share offers a lesser or
greater risk?
Hasbrouk (1991) suggests that investors are basing their estimates on "past
performance, in house analysis, rumour and market analyst companies, gut reaction,
inappropriate models." We might add to the list with, personal experience, internal
or external performance measures, guess work, mood, confidence, liquidity
requirements or inside information. It should be noted that "insider trading" is
illegal in most markets, but this is not to say that the definitions are strict enough or
that every market participant is ethical enough to ignore this as a possible motivation
to trade. Easley et al (1997) talk of "valuation-relevant information" as the
fundamental driver of prices. It should be noted that a small proportion of the
reasons to trade listed above could be described as "valuation-relevant information".
A good example of this is the "internet bubble", in which the majority of market
participants believed that the technology sector was over priced, but still bought up
the shares for fear of missing out on the short term gains.
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3.3.2 An Example of Information
The interpretation of the term "information" is fundamental to this thesis and market
microstructure research in general. To demonstrate how vague the definition can be,
and the pitfalls that result, this section provides a detailed example. The aim is to
highlight how different parties (academics or practitioners) perceive information.
For example, the "information" that behavioural scientists perceive is not the same as
the "information" used in the market microstructure literature, and yet the two fields
seem to have been combined without addressing the issue.
Suppose company X has nearly completed a merger with another company. The
management of company X believes that this will be beneficial for both companies,
and that the stock price will go up. They have information, but this is insider
information and so they cannot trade on it. At this point, we may assume that the
stock is under priced.
A document is leaked about the merger and trader Y obtains this. Trader Y believes
he is the first person outside the company to see this, and so decides to buy shares in
company X. They have information, by most people's definition. We may assume
that the action of buying the stock will drive up the price towards or possibly beyond
its underlying value.
Trader Y decides that he may obtain a larger share of company X at a lower price if
he asks brokerage firm Z to execute the large buy order. Firm Z agrees and they start
to execute the order with their clients and contacts. Firm Z has information but
again, cannot act on it, as this would breach insider trading rules.
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Firm Z, trading on behalf of trader Y, places some orders with clients, and some
orders are placed on the automated order book, as limit or market orders. These
combined actions drive the price up.
One technical analyst observes the buying activity and decides that this is indicative
of asymmetric information, and so decides to buy. Another technical analyst, using
an alternative model believes that the price movements are an overreaction to a
previous information event and so decides to sell. Do either of these analysts have
information? We may argue that they do not have private information as they are
simply looking at the price movements, which are available to the whole market.
However, they each have a unique model, which they use to analyse the price data.
If you ask the analysts the answer may well be yes, but if you determine the answer
from the implications of previous academic research, the answers may vary. Some
papers implicitly assume that only the analysts who gets it right is the informed one.
Either way, the price formation models described earlier, require participants to
analyse price and trade information in order for prices to reflect the aggregate
information available to the market.
Lets say another trader A hears some bad news about one of company X's products.
They already own shares in company X and decide that now is a good time to sell
them. They sell them quickly and drive down the price. What trader A didn't know
is that company X was withdrawing its product as part of the lead up to the merger,
which all concerned believe to be a good thing. Trader A is using incomplete
information, but information none the less. This type of information does not fit into
the pricing model assumptions, but it does fit into the behavioural finance models.
In other words, the trader may well trade in the same way as an informed trader (e.g.
aggressively and with large trades), but if we are to assume that prices are efficient,
somehow the market would not react to this in the same way as it would to the
information implied by the trades of trader Y (who knows about the merger).
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At this point, the share price has declined, Trader A has sold his complete stake,
trader Y has bought as much as he is willing to buy, (as he is bound by limits on
exposure to individual stocks), and now another trader (trader B) stumbles upon the
information about the withdrawn product. He too decides that he is the first to hear
this information, and had better trade before the markets find out and the price
declines. They sell, and the price declines. Does he have information? His
information set is (like that of any other trader) incomplete, and (like trader A) is
misleading. The literature ignores the impact of this situation once again, and the
market has now overreacted to what will turn out to be false information.
Meanwhile, the brokerage firm Z has observed this trading activity, and noted that
the price has gone in the opposite direction from that implied by trader Y. They have
fulfilled their obligation to trader Y and so are not restricted in their trading of this
stock. They believe that trader Y was informed and so trade on their own account.
Does brokerage firm Z have information? They may or may not believe that they do.
They may trade cautiously, because they are less sure of the "information". As a
result, prices move upwards but very slowly, as the brokerage firm spreads their
trades over time. It turns out that they are trading on the right side, on second hand
information, but the market, and the models of price formation, do not react fully to
reflect the underlying information.
The information about the impending merger of Company X leaks out further.
Traders around the city, hear this information second or third hand. They decide to
buy the stock and as a result drive the price up. Do they have information? Yes, but
it is not first hand, and they cannot assume that they are the first to hear it and react
to it. They approach the market cautiously. They observe a recent drop in the share
price (as a result of traders A and B) and assume that no one else has traded on the
information. The price goes up, and the market closes on the efficient price.
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At this point a financial journalist spots the trend and discovers the information. He
prints it in a national publication, and thousands of private investors decide that
company X is a good buy, and do exactly that. The price far surpasses its theoretical
value. Are these investors trading on information? Well, their information is not
private information, and we would not expect the market to react to this trading
activity in the same way that it did to the actions of trader Y. However, according to
the efficient markets hypothesis, market prices should reflect all market wide
information. When the information was published, it became market information.
At what point did the market react to the information efficiently? Before or after?
Although the information was published to everyone, the history of price movements
can be interpreted in different ways, and so it is not obvious from the point of view
of the outsider, what prices should do as a result of this information.
Although this example seems convoluted and confusing, it is still a gross
simplification of the activity on the actual stock exchange. What we can draw from
this simple example is that it is implausible that the price always reflects market
information. Furthermore, it is not clear that it converges on a price that reflects
market wide information. And finally, it highlights the difference in the
interpretation of the term "information" in price setting theory, in trader behaviour
models and in practice.
3.3.3 Implications for the Market
The risk of asymmetric information is important to all market participants, including
the directors of the listed companies themselves. Some companies disclose more
information in their annual reports than is required by law, in an attempt to convince
the shareholders that there is nothing to hide, and so there is a lower risk of private
information. Easley et al (2000) create a model that shows "a difference of 10
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percentage points in the probability of information-based trading between two stocks
leads to a difference in their expected returns of 2.5 percent per year." They use the
PIN (Probability of information-based trading) as a measure of information. It
should be noted that this measure is calculated with reference to the price impact of
trades, and so linking this with higher returns is not surprising.
If the risk of private information exists, there is clearly a motivation to gather
information, to ensure that you are one of the "informed investors". But this
information gathering takes time and money. Easley et al (1998) state "there
remains the conundrum that if markets are already efficient, then it is hard to justify
either the information-gathering activities of analysts or the expense." Also, given
that the investment markets are a nil sum game, then greater information gathering
leads to a greater (net of expenses) expected loss from trading. This is similar to the
conundrum of why investors don't just hold the market portfolio. For some reason,
whether rational or otherwise, the majority of investors believe that they have the
upper hand.
A final question to ask is how the implication of information affects the long term
stock values. If investors see a large upward swing, resulting from an uninformed
trade, are their expectations altered? The price formation models would suggest that
this is the case, and so we have to ask how the long term equilibrium is affected. It
has been assumed for so long that Ahn et al (2001) state as a matter of fact, "an
important difference between informed trading and liquidity trading is that the
former triggers permanent price changes, but the latter results in temporary price
changes." Isn't it more likely that all trades have a short term and a long term impact
based on the likelihood of them being informative, and that we implicitly assume
that these errors (understating the impact of informed trades and overstating the
uninformed trades) roughly cancel out?
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3.3.4 Measures of Information
Harris and Hasbrouk (1996) measure the information content of a trade using the
price impact over a 5 minute time interval. It is measured as the quoted mid price 5
minutes after the trade, divided by the quoted mid price at the time of the trade.
Several studies (Venkataraman (2001), Haung and Stoll (1996), Griffiths et al
(2000)) use this measure with a 30 minute time interval, but usually test for longer
periods as well.
The time interval seems arbitrary, but is a compromise between a time long enough
for the market to adjust to the new information, but not so long to be affected by the
introduction of subsequent information. As Hasbrouk (1991) points out, "inventory
control effects are inherently transient, while the information inferred from a trade
due to asymmetric information is permanently impounded in the stock price". The
question is whether 5 or even 30 minutes is an appropriate period to exclude the
inventory effect, but include the asymmetric information effect? Hasbrouk (1991)
also states that "the full impact of a trade in the security price is not felt
instantaneously but with a protracted lag", so even if the period is long enough to
have excluded the inventory effect, it may still understate the full price impact.
s
Easley et al (1997) define "information content... as the revision induced in the
market maker's beliefs." Easley et al (1998) refine this model of price
informativeness, to take into account their constructed decision tree. But still, the
parameters are estimated from the trade data, in which they are testing. The
reasoning seems quite circular, but without explicit data to identify the motivation




Many papers talk about the risk that uninformed traders face when placing limit
orders and being picked off by informed traders. We can assume that an informed
trader will keep trading until he has reached his desired volume, or his actions have
pushed the price too far away from the original trade price. There is also a theory
that, market makers who can see the identity of the trader before they trade have a
greater ability to distinguish informed and uninformed traders. If this is the case,
then it poses the question of what happens to the short term price movements on each
market? If informed traders can trade more profitably through an anonymous order
book market, then it implies that the price is slower to react there than with a market
maker: if the market maker was slower to react then the informed trader would keep
trading with him. This questions the selection issue: given the choice in a hybrid
market, should an informed trader use a market maker or an automated order book?
And does the answer depend on which definition of "information" is being used for
this informed trader?
Measuring this is problematic, since a market maker's quotes are often improved
upon. We cannot simply compare the quoted spread on each market. Neither can we
compare the size of the effective spread, since the activity on the other side of the
spread affects the measure. What we need to compare is the speed (measured in
consecutive trades) with which a trade moves in the direction implied by an informed
trade, or a sequence of informed trades.
3.4 Classification of Investors
Many papers use a simplified categorization of investors. Below is a summary of a
few of the investor classifications commonly used, along with the assumptions and
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conclusions found for that group. The different classes of investor are not mutually
exclusive.
3.4.1 Informed Traders
As explained above, "information" is usually assumed to be perfect private
information. Specifically, every informed investor knows which direction to trade in
and is certain that nobody else possesses this information. The former condition
ensures that informed traders only ever trade with uninformed traders, and the latter
ensures that the market price reflects the information.
Theory rarely addresses the question regarding the relative proportions of informed
and uninformed investors. If we assume that informed traders only trade with
uninformed traders, we cannot assume that uninformed traders are equally likely to
buy and sell, since they must be on the "wrong side" of the market more often than
not. We must assume that uninformed traders come to the market in equal
proportions of buyers and sellers, but are then selected against, as some uninformed
traders on the "right side" fail to execute.
3.4.2 Uninformed Liquidity Traders
Extant literature describes the liquidity trader as someone who trades because they
need to trade e.g. a unit trust fund manager has to sell shares when a large proportion
of unit holders cash in their units. Liquidity traders are assumed to have no private
information, and so the market influence of their trades should be small. They are
also assumed to trade passively, and with equal probability of arriving at the market
with a buy or a sell order. We stated in the previous section that uninformed traders
must fail to execute in order to maintain the equilibrium between informed and
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uninformed traders, but if they really do "need to trade" then this assumption seems
inappropriate.
Presenting a more balanced view, Grossman and Miller (1998) tell us "a liquidity
event... leads them to perceive a gap at the current prices between their desired
holdings of a particular asset and their current holdings of the asset". This is a very
different picture. First of all, it states that a rise in prices could be seen as a liquidity
event; giving a shareholder a reason to sell and realise his gains. The same rise in
prices viewed by a technical analyst may be perceived as "information", but for the
liquidity trader, it is simply a "liquidity event". Secondly, the definition highlights
the asymmetry of liquidity events. If the market is in equilibrium, liquidity traders
may be equally likely to buy or sell. If the price then goes up, any liquidity trader
would be less likely to buy and more likely to sell. This means that whenever the
prices move, the assumption that liquidity traders are equally likely to buy and sell is
inappropriate. Irrespective of the price movements, this assumption is hard to
accept. We could argue that there are many events that lead an investor to have to
sell his holding in something quickly (e.g. the unit trust manager described above),
but fewer that would lead to a buy order. We might then expect the asymmetry
concerning the reasons for liquidity trading to manifest itself as an asymmetry in
liquidity trading activity. v
Another assumption regarding liquidity traders is that they adopt passive trading
strategies. The rationale is that they do not expect the price to move in any particular
direction in the short term, so they are willing to wait to execute the order, relying on
the transient volatility to swing in their direction.
De Long et al (1990) used this classification of investors to establish the "noise
trader" theory. They show that informed investors cannot exploit their position
completely, because there is a risk that the noise traders may drive the price away
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from the "informed value". They use this to show that uninformed investors can
survive in the long run, as sell as proposing explanations to other market anomalies
such as the closed end fund puzzle.
3.4.3 Institutional investors
Keim and Madhavan (1995) examine "the behaviour of institutional traders", which
account for 72% of the US share volume. Schwarz and Shapiro (1992) give a similar
statistic that 73% of the share volume on the LSE relates to institutional investors.
Institutional investors may be clearly defined as those who trade with money that
belongs to another party. Although these investors do not own the underlying asset,
they usually have a financial incentive (annual management charge or a performance
bonus) to ensure the best possible prices for the trade, so there is no reason to believe
that they trade with split priorities or with any less diligence than an individual
trading with his own savings. Motivations behind trade decisions are easier to
collect for a single large institution than a collection of individual investors. As such
papers like Conrad et al (2002) use the behaviour of institutions to approximate the
decisions made by the market as a whole.
3.4.4 Individual Investors '
It is fair to say that an individual investor is assumed to be everything that an
institutional investor is not, and so a description here would simply repeat the
previous paragraph. But it is worth thinking about how individuals trade. Individuals
are, as the name suggests, a far from homogenous set. They are likely to have vastly
varying wealth and technical experience concerning financial markets. We would
not expect a fund manager to trade on the stock market in the same way as an
individual with no knowledge of markets, who was given a number of shares when
his building society demutualised. The two main differences are the motivations for
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trade, and the method of trading. An uninformed individual would usually employ
the services of a brokerage firm. The investors may not know the difference between
a market order and a limit order. The broker may ask the investor or he may make
the decision to sell immediately with a market order, or enter a limit order and try to
trade at a better price before the end of the day. Either way, the instructions given by
the individual would lead to a relatively aggressive trading strategy, from an
uninformed starting point. This contradicts the generally accepted view that
uninformed traders, trade passively.
3.4.5 Foreign Investors
Very few papers draw the distinction between domestic and foreign investors,
despite being important, for a variety of reasons. Demand from foreign investors is
constantly changing, and more volatile than domestic demand. The needs of foreign
investors, along with their information set and list of alternative investments are very
different to domestic investors. According to economic theory, the reshuffling of
domestic stocks between domestic investors has a smaller impact than the "hot
money" flow of foreign investors who transfer money in and out of the market.
One paper that does address this issue is Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001). They study
the Finnish stock market, where foreign investors may play a more important role in
the market than in the UK, but it is clear that they may trade in different ways to
domestic traders. They find that "domestic investors - particularly the less
sophisticated investor categories - tend to be contrarians and foreign investors tend
to be momentum investors." It seems sensible that traders further away from the
physical market place may be less well informed and so their trading occurs later
after the information has been impacted into the prices (although a link between
information asymmetry and momentum traders has not been found empirically).
49
3.5 Market Maker Behaviour
Another important type of investor is the market maker or specialist. Although a
simple category to define, there are a few distinct kinds of market maker. Much of
the research looks at a single market maker who takes part in every trade on the
market. The monopolistic NYSE specialist, however, takes part in only a fraction of
trades, although he is obliged to offer liquidity when it is required. The competing
market makers of NASDAQ or LSE's SEAQ are also obliged to quote prices they
are willing to trade, but the competitive aspect leads to a difference in their
behaviour. Some recent papers even refer to those traders placing limit orders on an
automated order book as the market maker. This loose definition of the market
maker as the "liquidity provider" will not be used here, in preference for the official
definition (on the LSE) of a member firm that is obliged to offer liquidity whenever
the market is open.
3.5.1 The Inside Trader
In some markets (such as the NYSE) the market maker, or specialist, sits in the
middle of the automated order book. Investors can place market orders or limit
orders with the specialist. The specialist is obliged to maintain liquidity in the
market, but does this by adding his limit orders to the book. Limit orders are ranked
by price and time as usual, but the specialist always ranks last at a given price.
Chung et al (1999) find that "a large proportion of posted bid-ask quotes originates
from the limit order book without direct participation by specialists, and that
competition between traders and specialists has a significant impact on the bid-ask
spread". Given the conflicting demands for a specialist to maintain liquidity at all
times and earn a profit from trading, it is not easy to see whether the specialist is
using his position to judge when offering liquidity is profitable or when it is required
by regulation.
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Many of the models (Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley et al (1997)) assume that
the market maker is uninformed, and that he trades purely for liquidity reasons, to
control his own inventory whilst minimising the risk of asymmetric information.
This is a difficult assumption to swallow, but even more so when considering a
market like that on the NYSE. This leads us back to the question of what
information actually is. Is the limit order book informative? If so, then studying the
actions of a specialist who possesses this private information seems to be a fruitful
area. The NYSE specialist has since lost his monopoly on the order book. Boehmer
et al (2003) study this event and conclude that liquidity in the order book is
improved, transaction costs are lower, and cumulative abnormal returns are positive
as a result of this. But this does not answer the question of how much the specialist
is driven by profits and how much by regulatory requirements, and how efficient are
prices as a result of this conflict.
3.5.2 Conflicting Aims of the Market Maker
It is easy to read the literature and come to the conclusion that market makers are all
identical, rational and predictable, despite having been given woolly instructions like
"ensuring prices aren't too discontinuous". In response to this, Corwin (1999)
examines the differences in behaviour between different NYSE specialist firms. He
discovers different styles, whereby specialists who have more frequent trading halts
"are associated with lower effective spreads, more frequent price movement, and
lower transitory volatility". This relationship is not surprising. Glosten (1994)
showed that a market with lower effective spreads will, ceteris paribus, cope less
well with extreme conditions, and so require more frequent trading halts. But the
important point is that specialist behaviour is heterogeneous.
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3.5.3 Price Efficiency
Having established that market maker behaviour varies, we find ourselves asking
questions about the efficiency of the market, given this variation in behaviour. If a
market maker decides to follow the price more closely to facilitate the control of his
inventory, what impact will it have on investor expectations? Using the models of
O'Hara (1995), where orders are sent to the market maker one at a time, a large
uninformed market buy order would drive the market makers price up. If the next
order was a large uninformed sell order the market maker may not revise the price, as
his inventory objectives have been met. In practice, the higher price may attract
more sellers, and so the aggregate demand would drive the price back down. But
that is the issue; is the market maker setting the price, or is it just a product of market
demand? If investors use the quoted price as information, then the market maker
must be in part responsible for affecting the price. This is a simplified example of
how market maker behaviour may affect the long term value of shares. Harris and
Hasbrouk (1996) find results that suggest "specialists believe buy market orders
convey more information than do sell market orders." That is, the price impact of
buy orders is greater than the price impact of sell orders. But couldn't this simply
reflect the fact that a market maker with a positive inventory (usually required by
regulation) has a greater gain from seeing prices go up? 1
3.5.4 Multiple Market Makers
Many markets employ a single specialist to sit between the buyers and sellers. It is
not a coincidence that the NYE still have a single specialist and most of the previous
research looks at this case. However, both the NASDAQ and SEAQ operate a
system of competing market makers. Grossman and Miller (1988) show that
increasing the number of market makers increases the depth of the market and so
increases the liquidity, particularly around crashes and other anomalies. Similarly,
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Biais et al (2000) state that "competition among market-makers leads to a deeper
market, and a larger trading volume than in the monopoly case." However, Chan and
Fong (2000) state "NASDAQ dealers operate in a decentralized market, which may
make it difficult to identify the presence of informed dealers." These two viewpoints
do not necessarily contradict each other. While increasing the number of market
makers may lead to a more competitive market, with smaller spreads, it doesn't
imply that prices should reflect information any more efficiently. Simaan et al
(2003) add to issue of efficiency by linking pre-trade transparency to market maker
quotation behaviour.
Christie and Schultz (1994) ask, "why Nasdaq market makers avoid odd-eighth
quotes". On Nasdaq, market makers known as "preference traders" can attract order
flow by promising to trade at the best quoted price. In this way, market makers have
less incentive to offer the best price: if they do then they would lose money on the
trades they would have made anyway, and if a large proportion of the market trading
is routed to preference orders, the price improvement may not attract much new
business. In this way, the spreads may be kept higher than in a market without
preference trading rules.
While Corwin (1999) found heterogeneity between specialist on the NYSE, does th'is
affect the overall behaviour with multiple market makers? It may be that the
competition between market makers leads to a common equilibrium between stocks.
It is also possible that certain market makers dominate the market using something
other than price and depth (e.g. preference arrangements), and so the efficiency of
the market in different stocks varies. This issue has not been addressed in the
literature, and will not be quantified in this thesis, but it should be noted as an
explanation for the variability in measures of efficiency between stocks.
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Naik and Yadav (2002) examine the difference in market maker behaviour after the
LSE switched from a dealer market to an order book market with voluntary market
makers. They find that "dealers in a trading system with obligatory market-making
contracts fulfil an important and useful price stabilisation function even though these
contract are difficult to monitor or enforce". They also find that "obligatory market-
makers posting firm quotes face adverse selection losses (due to trading with
informed traders) that are not different from those faced by voluntary market-makers
who... only display quotes on request".
3.6 Trader Behaviour - Rational and Behavioural Issues
Allen and Gorton (1992) ask "is it possible for an uninformed trader to buy a stock,
drive the price up and then sell the stock at this higher price, thereby earning a
profit?" If we are to assume any of the existing theories for anonymous markets
then, this should be possible. This is one example of rational trading activity that is
not in the best interests of the market as a whole. Deliberate market manipulation is
illegal in most markets. For example, trading heavily in the last 10 minutes of trading
on the LSE to distort the volume weighted average price (VWAP) and so alter the
position of a stock in an index is a known problem. However, there may be other,
less detectable ways of manipulating the market. The fact that we have laws to stop''
this kind of activity is proof enough that there are traders willing to do this.
3.6.1 Hiding Information
The size effect, whereby large trades move the prices more than smaller trades
summing to the same value, is one of the oldest identified anomalies. Barclay and
Warner (1993) find that "informed investors... attempt to camouflage their trades by
spreading them over time, or by trading when liquidity volume is high." The ideas
of informed investors "trading when liquidity volume is high" and using market
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orders to gain immediacy before the information gets old, do not sit well together
(i.e. do they wait for liquidity volume is low, and then place market orders?).
However, Lee and Radhakrishna (2000), find that "few (6%) of the total market
orders are split up in execution." This seems to imply that stealth trading is not such
a prevalent activity, or at least not on the NYSE. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) also
find that "a much larger proportion (24%) of total market orders is batched in
execution." This type of behaviour seems to contradict the conventional knowledge
of minimising the price impact of a trade. Perhaps then, they are trying to move the
market?
It seems likely that stealth trading would vary between markets. Chan and Fong
(2000) state "adverse information associated with large trades seems to be more
substantial on the NYSE than Nasdaq". They justify this as a result of the
professional relationships built up on the NYSE, but it seems possible that it actually
reflects a difference in trading strategy.
Finally, assume that institutional traders are more likely to be informed, as in Lee et
al (1991) and assume that institutional traders are more adept at stealth trading as in
Barclay and Werner (1993). Wouldn't we expect the effect of the information to be
understated by the trades of the informed institutional investor? Lee and
Radhakrishna (2000) find that "trade size is still highly effective in separating
institutional trades and individual investor activities", but this does not rule out the
possibility of a small proportion of stealth traders affecting the equilibrium of the
market. It is possible that the stealthily executed institutional trades are larger than
the individual trades on average, but this type of trading behaviour would still have
an impact on the market equilibrium.
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3.6.2 Contrarian and Momentum Investors
A "contrarian" investor trades in the opposite direction to the market. Note that the
"opposite direction" is usually interpreted in terms of recent performance, i.e. buy
the losers and sell the winners (rather than in relation to a measure of current demand
for buying and selling). In contrast, a "momentum investor" buys the stocks that
have recently gone up, and sells those that have recently gone down.
Chordia et al (2002) find that "order imbalance increases following market declines
and vice versa, which reveals that investors are contrarian on a aggregate." To avoid
confusion it should be noted that Chordia et al refer to "orders" in a market where all
orders execute and so we should interpret "orders" as "trades". Griffiths et al (2001)
find that domestic investors tend to be contrarian while foreign investors are
momentum traders, and so Chordia et aVs statement should be read the context of the
NYSE investor profile.
Many papers have shown that both momentum and contrarian investment strategies
can be profitable. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
examine the profitability of momentum strategies. In each paper, they find similar
levels of profit from the momentum strategy. What is interesting about these two
results is that having published an article in 1993, the market has not learned from
the result and exploited the theory, thus closing out the result. They state that "the
behavioural models imply that the holding period abnormal returns arise because of
delayed overreaction to information" but then apply a warning to this interpretation
as only some of the stocks they invest in experience post holding period reversals.
DeBondt and Thaler (1987) explain the overreaction phenomenon whereby
companies with good earnings announcements continue to do well in subsequent
years, despite poorer results, and vice versa. They maintain that this is due to
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irrational behaviour, rather than the size effect1. Zarowin (1989) studies the same
result, but finds that by matching the winners and losers by size, we find no evidence
of overreaction and so can attribute the result solely to the size effect. Jegadeesh and
Titman (2001) also find greater reversals in small firms than large firms.
It seems confusing that, seemingly opposing trading strategies can both make profits.
There are a number of possible explanations. Firstly the results could be a product of
data mining, or at least dependant on the sample period chosen. It seems plausible
that contrarian investors might do well in a bear market, while momentum investors
do better in a bull market. Another possibility is the difference in return intervals
used. If stocks do follow regular patterns of ups an downs, then each strategy could
be profitable: the contrarians have to judge the peaks just before they happen, and
momentum investors must judge the start of a trend very quickly. Although timing
rules can be set easily in retrospect, it is difficult to do so in real time. It is worth
noting that the existence of such stock price patterns exist because other investors
fail to identify the trends accurately.
3.6.3 Other Types of Investor
Many conclusions have been drawn about the trading behaviour of other investor
subgroups. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that "domestic investors -
particularly the less sophisticated investors categories - tend to be contrarians and
foreign investors tend to be momentum investors." Keim and Madhavan (1995)
examine the behaviour of institutional investors. They find that different institutions
trade with different strategies, and that these are as important as the market
conditions when determining whether to place a limit order or a market order.
Milgrom and Stokey (1982) state that uninformed traders who speculate will lose out
in the long run, and so uninformed traders must trade for other reasons. This last
1 where smaller firms outperform larger firms
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classification has one of the most serious implications. Many papers since 1982 have
used this rationale to justify the actions of uninformed traders as liquidity motivated.
Isn't it possible that the uninformed traders don't know they are uninformed?
3.6.4 Behavioural Issues
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) ask, "What makes investors trade?" They conclude
"past returns, reference price effects, the size of the holding period capital gain or
loss, tax-loss selling, and, to a small extent, the smoothing of consumption over the
life cycle... are determinants of trading."
Gray and Gray (1997) liken the NFL spread betting market with the financial
markets. They find that "the market overreacts to a team's recent performance and
discounts the overall performance of the team over the season to date". In the sports
world this is referred to as the "hot hands" effect, where recent form is taken as a
better indicator than it should, but perhaps this is not caused by the individuals, but
the information providers, who choose to present the data with emphasis on the most
recent news. Information providers want to show that they are up to date, so it seems
logical that they would put more emphasis on the most recent information. This
leads to the "narrow framing" problem that Read et al (1999) talk of, whereby
investors make decisions based on a subset of information.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) state that sophisticated investors ignore past returns,
but unsophisticated investors take good returns as a signal to sell. It is not clear that
sophisticated investors should ignore past returns (although the EMH states that the
return history contains no information), but it is clear that the unsophisticated are
acting in a less than optimal way. Shefrin and Statman (1985) explain the
"disposition effect" whereby investors have a tendency to hold on to losers too long
and sell winners to soon. Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) suggest that investors may
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sell winners to rebalance their portfolio and those who buy with short term
information may sell when the price goes up as they believe this to reflect the true
price. Harris (1988) also suggests that investors may hold on to losers as they
perceive the transaction costs prohibitively high (since the losers will, on average, be
smaller than winners, and costs are higher for smaller companies). Odean (1998)
tests these theories for individuals trading through a discount brokerage house, and
finds that rebalancing portfolios and avoiding high trading costs are unlikely to
justify the result. Furthermore, he shows that the disposition effect is not present in
December, when the tax advantages of selling losers, and holding onto winners, is a
greater motivation than the unexplained behavioural bias.
3.7 Alternative Methods of Trading
3.7.1 Where Else Can You Trade?
With a few exceptions (e.g. Conrad et al (2002)), much of the empirical finance
research ignores the issue of alternative methods of trading, and even when it is
addressed, it is always a subset of the trading methods. It is possible for a given
stock to be traded on a formal domestic market, on the informal upstairs or block
market, or as a cross listed security on a foreign market. Within the formal market
(dependent on which market it is), an order may be routed to the order book as a
limit order or market order, or to a floor broker, or to one of a set of competing
market makers. The stock may also be traded as an option in the derivatives market,
although few individual stock options are exchange traded. Understanding the
choices available to an investor, including the relative merits and costs, is vital in
determining the aggregate behaviour of the markets.
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3.7.2 Selection Issues
Traditional wisdom tells us that large trades convey more information, but when
there are alternative ways of trading this may not be the case. In addition to the
competing market makers, NASDAQ offers a Small Order Execution System
(SOES). This is an automated order book, for trades of up to 1000 shares. Chan and
Fong (2000) find that SOES trades of 1000 shares convey more information than the
large institutional trades on the main market. (Their measurement of information is
the permanent price affect of the trade). The result may be because informed traders
are selecting against the other participants on the anonymous SOES market.
However, if they are splitting their trades between platforms then Chan and Fong's
result suggests that SOES should be used to finish off the order if at all (since this
trade moves the market). In fact, it seems likely that SOES may be used by
institutions wishing to move the market price. A final alternative is that the SOES is
used by the private individuals that it was designed for, and the market misinterprets
the signals as information. Either way, it is of interest for two reasons. What trades




Glosten (1992) explained that different markets cannot coexist, if competing on price
alone. Pagano and Roell (1992) state that "if agents can choose between two
competing auction markets, in the absence of a transaction cost differential all trade
will concentrate on a single market". One common assumption is that a market
maker has greater ability to identify informed traders, than an anonymous order
book, and this selection issue is sufficient to justify the existence of both markets.
However, Chan and Fong (2000) argue that "Nasdaq dealers operate in a
decentralized market, which may make it difficult to identify the presence of
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informed traders." Pagano and Roell (1992) suggest that markets compete by
"thickness... trading technology, taxes and other processing costs", and that these
factors "may separate out specific clienteles". The problem then is to identify and
quantify all of the factors that investors use to differentiate between markets. Only
then will the theory begin to match the real world.
There are many examples of aggregate investor behaviour that seems to contradict
the theory. Blume and Goldstein (1997) show that markets that compete with the
NYSE for a given stock, "attract a significant portion of their volume when they are
posting inferior bids and offers". Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that
theoretically, trading activity should gravitate to the time of day with the most
liquidity. But while we have found daily patterns, it is certainly not true that all
trading activity gravitates to one time of day.
3.7.4 Efficiency
A further question is whether the existence of alternative trading platforms adds to
the efficiency of the overall market. Cohen et al (1981) find that "consolidating the
currently fragmented system (by e.g. instituting a consolidated limit order book) will
reduce search costs and further shrink spreads by increasing the effective thickness
of the market. Although the spread is synonymous with liquidity and liquidity is
synonymous with efficiency, Cohen et al are not saying the prices are more efficient.
Neither is it the case that lowering the spread is desirable. Madhavan (2001) points
out that minimising the spread is not desirable from the point of view of the traders
who use a limit order strategy on the automated order book.
Pagano and Roell (1992) state that "prices are quicker to adjust to order flow
information in a centralised market". They assume that the prices are adjusting to a
true underlying value, but this is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, it raises the
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question regarding the efficiency of prices on different markets. Are cross listed
stock prices consistent? There are rational explanations for prices to be different e.g.
stock price is lower on the less liquid market to reflect this risk. But is the
relationship between the prices constant, or does it follow a pattern, or does it
experience inefficiencies?
3.8 Trading Activity, Liquidity, Volatility and Returns
3.8.1 Liquidity
Grossman and Miller (1988) define liquidity as "the demand and supply of
immediacy". This could be interpreted as a mixture of the price and depth at the best
price and the size of all market orders. Chordia et al (2001) use dollar trading
volume as a proxy for liquidity. Countless other articles use the quoted spread or the
effective spread as a measure of liquidity. Perhaps the only consistent opinion
regarding liquidity, is that "more of it is better". In this chapter we will introduce
some of the reasons liquidity changes, and how this affects the price movements.
3.8.2 Volume and Returns
The adage of "it takes volume to move prices" is likely older than the theories that
support it. Mahieu and Bauer (1998) discuss the Mixture of Distribution Hypothesis,
which posits that "stock returns and trading volumes are jointly dependent on the
same underlying, latent information flow variable." But it would be. naive to assume
that volume alone was the explanation, rather than the underlying reasons why
volume changes.
The EMH implies that returns reflect information, and so, if volume increases when
there is a greater asymmetry in information, then returns would in turn reflect this
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information. Hasbrouk (1991) confirms that the impact on prices, and so, the
information asymmetry appear more significant for smaller firms. This is often sited
as proof of the information asymmetry / prices relationship, although it is also
possible that the price impact is simply measuring the immediate impact of a large
trade in an illiquid market for the smaller stocks.
A wide spread is also an indicator of asymmetric information and Hasbrouk (1991)
finds that "trades which occur in the face of a relatively wide spread have a larger
price impact than those which occur when the spreads are narrow." However, it is
not clear how the asymmetry of the order book or the behaviour of buyers and sellers
would affect the returns. This will be addressed in chapter 6.
3.8.3 Daily Variations
Trading strategies designed to exploit the inefficiencies of the market microstructure
are very short term. During the internet price bubble, a new breed of day traders
emerged, who speculated in the morning and tried to close their position by the end
of the day. With this length of time horizon it is vital that the investor knows if and
how the market regularly varies throughout the day.
ji
Most of the papers that talk of daily trading patterns are based on the NYSE. (One
exception is Yadav and Pope (1992) who look at the intraday patterns in the stock
market risk premia, but concentrate on the cash and futures markets, so are not
directly comparable). The NYSE opens at 9am and closes at 4pm. Trades can be
arranged upstairs at any other time. On the LSE there is a very different pattern. Not
only is there a longer trading day (8am to after 4:30pm) but there is an opening call
option to consider. How do these differences affect the daily patterns?
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Madhavan and Panchepagesan (2000) and Biais et al (1999) show the importance of
the opening procedure in setting prices, and the opening accounts for a sizable
proportion of the day's trading. Biais et al (1999) state that "because of considerable
overnight valuation uncertainty, price discovery is important and difficult at the
opening of the market".
Jain and Joh (1988) find that average trading volume is "highest during the first hour,
declines monotonically until the fourth hour, but increases again on the fifth and the
sixth hours." They also find that "on average, the largest stock returns occur during
the first (except on Monday) and the last trading hours". Jain and Joh (1998) also
state that "hourly trading volume is found to be caused (in the Granger-Sims sense)
by returns".
Chordia et al (2002) find that the "change in number of transactions has a separate...
(from the order imbalance) ... and very significant positive impact on spreads".
They explain this by the "sheer volume of trading... making it more difficult for
market makers to control inventory and induce them to respond by quoting large
spreads." This is a rational explanation, but one that would not exist in an order
book market. Many studies have found the relationship between volume and price
I
movements, but not necessarily a relationship with the number of trades and price
movements. It is possible that splitting up large informed trades could be a driver
behind this result, but correcting for volume, it would be interesting to see if the
number of trades is an indicator of price movements. There are also observable
weekly and monthly patterns in trade data. Jain and Joh (1988) show that Mondays
have lower returns, and the hourly pattern of trading is different on this day. Chodia
et al (2001) find that "liquidity and trading activity fall on Fridays" and "Tuesday
tends to be accompanied by increased trading activity and increased liquidity".
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) find that momentum profits are positive for all months
except January, due to the tax incentives for selling on the NYSE in December.
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Lynch (1996) sheds some light on seasonal patterns by exploring the effect of
infrequent and non-synchronous trading activity, demonstrating that the change in
traders behaviour contributes to the stock price volatility.
Cai et al (2004) compare the daily variations in spread, volume and volatility for 5 of
the major trading platforms: NYSE, Nasdaq, SEAQ, SETS and the LSE before SETS
was introduced. They find that the dealer markets have decreasing spread, while the
others have a U-shaped daily pattern. They also show that the pattern of intraday
volume changed on SEAQ, when SETS was introduced. In particular, the mid
afternoon peak in volume disappeared, leaving just the late morning and end of the
day peaks.
3.8.4 Variability in Trading Volume
Chordia et al (2001) find a "negative and surprisingly strong cross-sectional
relationship between stock returns and the variability of dollar trading volume and
share turnover, after controlling for size, book to market ratio, momentum and the
level of dollar volume or share turnover". This contradicts their expectation, based
on the fact that risk associated with greater variability in liquidity (proxied by trading
volume) should lead to investors demanding a higher expected return. Perhaps this
is just a timing issue, in that an increase in variability of liquidity does lead to a
demand for a greater return, but since the present value of future dividends does not
change, the only way to have a higher expected return in the future is to have a lower
price now. Another explanation might be that the trading volume varies a lot more
when the stock price is going down. If there is a market wide fear of bad news for a
given stock, then the traders who make profits by offering liquidity may decide not
to offer as much liquidity. And so, investors are left with fewer options over the
strategic timing of their trades.
65
Chordia et al (2002) state that "while order imbalance appears to have no forecasting
ability, there is evidence that both the number of trades and the market return can
predict changes in liquidity", (note "order" refers to "trade") If, as stated in the
previous paragraph, there is a strong result linking variability of liquidity with stock
prices, then it would seem possible to forecast stock prices using some function of
trade imbalance.
3.8.5 Volatility
French and Roll (1986) separate the effect of public and private information by
studying the weekday exchange holidays. They suggest that the variance of returns
over the two day period starting at the close of trading before the holiday, should be
roughly double that of a normal day. They find only a 14% increase in variance and
so "most of the volatility of stock returns is caused by informed traders whose
private information is impounded in prices when exchanges are open" (Madhavan
(2000))
Gallo and Pacini (2000) use a GARCH process to explain the clustering of volatility
in prices. They look at days with "beginning-of-the-day surprises", where the
opening price is significantly different from the previous day closing price. Thdy
find that the volatility during those days are highest and that prices overreact to
perceived information in the short term. They also find that lagged information has
little impact on the result.
Chan and Fong (2000) emphasise the significance of the "size of trades beyond that
of the number of trades in the volatility-volume relation." This may reflect the
relationship between asymmetric information and size of trade, but it may also
indicate that the market cannot cope well with large trades, leading to greater
volatility and less efficient prices.
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Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that "high volatility increases the propensity of
households to buy rather than sell a stock", but find it hard to "concoct a rational
story". Their results allows for the magnitude and direction of the return.
3.9 The Automated Order Book
Glosten (1992) asks the question, "is the automated limit order book inevitable?"
The automated order book was relatively new in 1992, and Glosten would have been
unaware of just how many markets have now switched to this design. Glosten
(1992) finds that in order to compete with an automated order book, a rival market
must compete on something other than price, but the interpretation of the evidence is
far from conclusive. While most of the research ignores the issues surrounding the
automated order book, the papers that have addressed the issues (Venkataraman
(2001), Haung and Stoll (1996)), use what some feel to be inappropriate measures,
such as the bid ask spread.
3.9.1 Interpretation of the Spread
In the market maker paradigm, a low effective spread is good: investors trade with
lower costs, and so prices will reflect a more diverse set of opinions and this attracts
more investors. From the point of view of the investor, there is no down side to a
small effective spread. With regard to an automated order book, Madhavan (2001)
discusses the use of the effective spread as a measure of transaction costs, drawing
attention to the fact that many of the traders who would previously have paid a
spread to the market marker, now gain the spread from those who demand liquidity.
Goettler et al (2003) discuss the interpretation of the effective spread on an
automated order book, and state that it is not a good measure of "welfare". Having
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defined a model, which explicitly allows for an investor's choice between a market
order and a limit order, they conclude that reducing the effective spread may not be
in the interest of the investing population. They reject the effective spread as a
measure of welfare in favour of volume. But is volume such a good thing? Greater
volume would seem to imply that more traders are willing to trade because of lower
overall transaction costs, but this may not be the cause.
3.9.2 Order Flow
The automated order book is such a different market because investors have the
choice of whether to take or provide liquidity in the market to achieve their
investment goals. Previously the job of providing liquidity was performed by an
expert. Their aim was to provide a continuous (i.e. prices don't jump, volatility is
low) and liquid market. But now, liquidity is supplied by individuals, with no
explicit aims regarding the overall welfare of the market. Naik and Yadav (2002)
find that "public investors supplying liquidity face adverse selection losses that
are significantly higher than those faced by (voluntary) market intermediaries."
What impact does this have on the efficiency or liquidity of the market? The
automated order book has only been introduced to markets with sufficient depth
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of trading interest. Beber and Caglio (2003) show that liquidity is supplied (limit
orders placed) when liquidity is low (spreads are wide) and so there is a natural
equilibrium that ensures that markets are liquid. However, there is no such
justification for investors to keep the markets continuous. This leads us to a very
different situation; one in which prices may be manipulated. Clearly the
behaviour of order book investors, and in particular the choice of market orders




"Aggressiveness" (not "aggression" for some reason) is a term that reflects an
investor's demand for immediacy. A market order that executes immediately is
aggressive, while a limit order is passive. The further away from the spread the limit
order is, the more passive it is. Size also plays a part in measuring the
aggressiveness of orders. A large market order is considered more aggressive than a
small market order, particularly where the large order "walks the book" or eats up
the depth at best price, thus increasing the spread. The size of a limit order is harder
to interpret. If a large order is placed inside the spread, it is neither more aggressive
nor more passive than a smaller order at the same price.
3.10.1 Information
The relationship between aggressiveness and information has been used for so long
that it is now treated as a fact. Beber and Caglio (2003) ask "do order submission
strategies change around periods when traders are likely to be asymmetrically
informed?" Griffiths et al (2000) find that "aggressive buyers tend to be more
informed on average than other buyers, whereas aggressive sellers tend to be
motivated by liquidity". But what other factors would imply a greater asymmetry 6f
information? We will look at investor type, spread, depth, previous order activity
and volatility.
3.10.2 Investor Type
Studies have been carried out on trader behaviour around the world: Harris and
Hasbrouk (1996) on the NYSE, Griffiths et al (2000) in Toronto, Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001) in Finland, Biais et al (1995) in Paris. In each market it is
generally assumed that informed institutional investors trade aggressively and
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uninformed individual investors trade passively. Observing that this simplification is
non trivial, Keim and Madhavan (1995) look at institutional investment styles. They
differentiate between classes of institutional investors such as, (informed)
momentum investors, who may use market orders to exploit short term information,
(informed) value managers, who may not require quick execution and so use limit
orders and (uninformed) benchmark fund managers who may use market orders for
closer matching to the index.
3.10.3 Gravitational Pull Effect
Cohen et al (1981) first referred to the "probability jump" or "gravitational pull
effect" to "explain why market spreads may be substantial even in markets composed
of many traders". They show that investors faced with a bid-offer spread may
choose to place a limit order inside the spread to gain priority in the queue. For a
buy order, the limit price would typically be one tick ahead of the existing best bid
price, but it could be anywhere in the spread. Given the choice of placing a limit
order closer to the best offer price, we reach a point where the investor would rather
gain the certainty of execution, than gain the difference between the best offer price
and the posted limit price. In markets with discrete prices, this explains why a
spread exists. It is useful to think of this "gravitational pull" to determine the factors
that may affect the decision between an aggressive market order and a limit order.
Beber and Caglio (2003) split the determinants into two main groups: microstructure
variables such as spread and depth, and market condition variables such as
performance of the market, performance of the stock, volatility of the stock.
3.10.4 Size of Spread
Ellul et al (2003) find that "wider (narrower) quoted spreads increase the probability
of limit (market) orders." This is consistent with findings from Biais et al (1995),
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and Beber and Caglio (2003). It is clear that, holding everything else constant, a
wider spread can be viewed as a greater gain for limit orders or a greater cost for
market orders.
On the opposing side of this argument, Harris and Hasbrouk (1996) look at the
"stopped orders that are subsequently executed at better prices" on the NYSE. This
is where a broker (usually the specialist) guarantees to fill the order, but attempts to
find a better price for the trader. When the NYSE spread is wider, there is a greater
opportunity for this to happen. They find that "the price improvement is greatest for
small orders and for orders placed into markets with wide spreads." This price
improvement mitigates some of the cost of trading in a wide market, although, it is
not clear when the specialist chooses to stop the order, and so there may be issues
regarding anti-selection risk.
3.10.5 Depth
Ellul et al (2003) find that "larger quoted depth elicits net demand for that liquidity".
Biais et al (1995) also note that limit orders are more common when the order book
is thin. As we discussed above, the spread indicates the relative gains to be made
from the choice of market or limit order. Depth is also an indicator, for markets that
use time priority. If an investor places a limit order at the spread, there is a greater
probability of execution, so this strategy is more likely to be profitable.
To ensure price stability on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, a large market order, which
would otherwise move the stock price by more than a fixed limit, is held as an
"indicative order". This order is effectively held as a limit order at the threshold, and
other investors are invited to fill the order. Hamao and Hasbrouk (1995) state that
"holding order size constant, an order that is held with an indicative quote has a
larger cumulative price impact than one that is immediately executed in full." They
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interpret this as an indication that "price limits do not merely smooth transient
liquidity effects, but are also associated with changes in market depth". The latter
reflects the cancellation of limit orders as they are repriced to match the price limit.
But the selection issue of when the indicative quote is held (when prices would move
too much) that makes this result unsurprising. It also provokes questions about the
behaviour of those who place limit orders at prices that can't fully execute (in the
short term at least).
3.10.6 Previous Orders
Sandas (2001) suggests that "the market order flow distribution and the price impact
function changes with market conditions" and "in particular, the variance of the
market order flow distribution is positively correlated with the past trading volume."
However, not only is the overall variance and volume predictable, but the choice of
orders is as well. Parlour (1998) proposes that order type follows certain patterns.
For instance, observing a limit sell order is most likely after a market buy order. The
next most probable preceding order type is a limit buy order. The next is a market
sell order. And finally, we are least likely to see two consecutive limit orders.
However, in empirical tests, Ellul et al (2003) state that "positive first-order auto
correlation exists for order type", but that "negative autocorrelation exists for order
type over longer horizons". Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2000) find that trade
"imbalances are strongly positively auto-correlated for up to five lags". Parlour
(1998) argues that this may be due to stealth trading. This issue was discussed
earlier, and we may conclude that this is not an adequate explanation of what seems




Griffiths et al (2000) state that "stock price volatility is expensive for the aggressive
trader but beneficial to the trader with passive executed orders." Beber and Caglio
(2003) use the volatility of a stock price as an explanatory variable for the
aggressiveness of orders. They calculate volatility as a moment of the exponential
moving average of past returns over a 20 day period. They argue that an investor's
decision concerning if and how to trade depends on not only the expected liquidity,
but the volatility of the liquidity. Chordia et al (2001) also posit that "agents are risk
averse and dislike variability in liquidity, so that stocks with greater variability
should command higher expected returns." The scientific rational is sound, but it
relies on investors actually calculating the "variability of liquidity", rather than using
the present or average level of liquidity. An investors faced with trading in a volatile
stock may change his strategy, but it would also depend on their prior expectation of
the performance of the stock. If they believe that the stock is going up, and so they
want to buy, they are unlikely to decide on a very passive limit order strategy to
benefit from the volatility.
3.10.8 Time Remaining in the Day / Daily Patterns
Abhyanker et al (1997) and Ellul et al (2003) suggest that the "time remaining in the
trading day is a factor in order choice". They add that "order activity exhibit a U-
shaped intraday pattern" and that sellers become "more aggressive later in the day".
Beber and Caglio (2003) on the other hand, find that the "time of the day is more
important in affecting buy order aggressiveness than sell order aggressiveness".
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3.10.9 Which Strategies Make Profits?
Knez and Ready (1996) state that "limit orders may be inappropriate for
implementing a particular trading strategy because of the risk that the strategy's
potential profit will evaporate while waiting for the order to be hit." This argument
clearly has merit, but the overall cost and potential profit needs to be measured for a
more balanced view.
Griffiths et al (2002) state that the "optimal strategy to minimize overall costs in
filling an order is to buy (sell) at the bid (ask) price" on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
Harris and Hasbrouk (1996) find similar results on the NYSE, with the most
profitable strategy involving limit orders at or better than the prevailing quote.
Harris and Hasbrouk (1996), who ignore many of the explanatory variables, qualify
their conclusion by saying that only when we know the information or liquidity
motivations for trade, can we really determine what a profitable trading strategy is,
and so the Knez and Ready (1992) theory may still be appropriate for informed
traders.
The result that limit order strategies are more profitable is even more surprising for
Harris and Hasbrouk (1996) who look at the NYSE, where there is frequently'a
market order price improvement by the specialist. They also make an overstatement
of the cost of not transacting, by assuming that these orders are immediately replaced
by a market order at the time of cancellation. Interestingly, they also state that the
"best limit order strategies were the ones most commonly used".
Griffiths et al (2000) find that aggressive orders have a positive price impact, and
this price impact is increasing with order size and price volatility and negatively
related to firm size. On the flip side, limit orders have a negative impact, but the
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variables listed above have little or no effect on the price impact. This asymmetry
implies that most profitable order strategies are most likely asymmetrical as well.
3.10.10 What Happens to Cancelled Orders?
Although Harris and Hasbrouk (1996) assume that all limit orders are immediately
replaced with market orders at cancellation for the empirical tests, they find that
"only a fraction of all cancelled orders are actually resubmitted". This means that
the traders were only willing to trade at that price and they were not bound by any
fixed requirement to trade. This further blurs the line between informed and
uninformed traders. The observation also implies a problem in measuring the profits
made from different trading strategies. In response to this problem, Lo et al (2002)
use a model of survival analysis to measure the time to execution of limit orders.
3.11 Asymmetry of the Order Book
There is no reason to believe that, given a finite number of traders with imperfect
information, there should be as many people willing to sell as those willing to buy.
There is also no reason to believe that those buyers and sellers would behave in the
same way, submit the same types of orders for similar sized trades or have the same
motivations to trade. Identifying the ways in which they differ and measuring the
difference is the vital step in understanding how these behavioural traits affect the
market equilibrium.
Ellul (2003), Parlour (1998), Goettler et al (2003) and Keim and Madhavan (1996)
discuss the equilibrium. They show that sellers are more likely to use market orders
than buyers. This indicates either a more sophisticated trading strategy for buying,
or that a sell is more likely to be informed than a buyl. Although the overall picture
may show sellers using more market orders, Harris and Hasbrouk (1996) state that
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"sell limit orders generally have higher fill rates than do buy limit orders placed
equally far from the market". Note that this is not surprising in a rising market.
Given that the bull markets have lasted longer than bear periods, the bias is
unavoidable, but it should be offered as a possible explanation.
3.11.1 Brokerage
Chan and Lakonishok (1993) state that in the USA "institutional sales are more
likely than purchases to involve an intermediary broker". They state this as an
explanation for the asymmetry of short term price movements, but it may also have
implications to the behaviour of traders on the order book. Intermediary brokers may
be given different or incomplete information that an in house dealer. If a firm has
information, they may not disclose it to the broker, but rather an instruction to sell
10,000 shares by the end of the day for instance. The broker's performance may also
be measured in different ways: execution price compared to the price at open, or the
price at close, or average price for the day. If they are measured against the price at
the end of the day, then playing the spread in the morning, and if unsuccessful then
placing a large market sell near the end of the day, thus driving the price down, will
lead to favourable performance figure for the broker.
1
3.11.2 Short Selling Constraints
Allen and Gorton (1992) state that "short sale constraints which make it easier to
exploit good news than bad news" imply that "if there is a different probability of a
buyer being informed than a seller, the effects of purchases and sales on prices will
again be asymmetrical (even if liquidity trading is symmetric)." It is not clear what
they mean by the phrase "even if liquidity trading is symmetric". If there are an
equal quantity of liquidity buyers as liquidity sellers, then there must be an equal
amount of informed buyers and sellers. Allen and Gorton (1992) admit that "in the
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long run the number of sales and purchases must usually balance" but that this is not
the case in the short term. If we are to believe that liquidity trading is symmetrical in
the long run, then there must be as many informed buyers and sellers in the long run.
If this is the case, then we can not have " a different probability of a buyer being
informed than a seller".
While short selling constraints may limit the ability of an investor to exploit some
very good information, it is not clear that this will limit the possibility of everyone
else using it. If the information is regarding an impending bad news event, it only
takes one of the stock holders to trade and exploit the information. According to
market microstructure theory (Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley et al (1997)), an
informed investor will trade until the price reflects the true value, and so even a
single investor, with sufficient inventory could move the price to fully reflect the
information. This is a strong assumption, and so we can not discount the issue that
Allen and Gorton (1992) highlighted, but we should note that although short selling
constraints may not restrict the volume of sell initiated trades, it certainly restricts the
number of traders behind these. It is possible that the extreme price movements
(whether justified or not) reflect the competition of many traders on the same side of
the market. Perhaps it is this competition that drives the prices, rather than the
information?
3.11.3 Implications of Asymmetry
Chordia et al (2002) state that "order imbalances in either direction, excess buy or
sell orders, reduce liquidity." They go on to explain that the drop in liquidity reflects
the greater risk of private information, and the practical constraints of a market
maker controlling his inventory. It should be noted that when they refer to "orders",
they are talking about transactions on a market maker driven market, where, since
the market maker is obliged to trade at all times, these terms are interchangeable.
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This does not mean that the result cannot be interpreted from the point of view of an
automated order book. Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2000) point out that order
imbalance is only important for the "paradigm of an intermediated market...
otherwise one could use the time-honoured statement 'for every buyer there is a
seller' to argue that order imbalances are irrelevant". But this is not the case when
you extend the definition of orders to include those orders that don't execute.
Another question that their result poses concerns the effect on prices of removing the
intermediary. If we consider a situation in which an order imbalance arises on an
intermediated market and then, holding constant the desires to trade of all investors
concerned, we replace the market maker with an automated order book, what would
happen? Would the prices move more dramatically? Would some of the trades
choose not to trade given the problems of moving the market price? Would some of
the traders adopt limit strategies? And if so, which category of investors?
Griffiths et al (2000) extend the analysis from short term fluctuations to "longer-term
returns". They support previous results, stating "aggressive buyers tend to be more
informed on average than other buyers, whereas aggressive sellers tend to be
motivated by liquidity." Given that returns are a direct consequence of the trading
interest, it is hard to accept this as a conclusive result, but it does offer support to the
asymmetry theory.
3.12 Microstructure Comparisons
The problem with experiments in the social sciences is the selection of suitable test
subjects and the lack of control on other variables. Given so few financial markets,
and even fewer sufficiently liquid to warrant a comparison, results have been scarce.
Nevertheless, making a comparison between different markets or the same market at
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different times is still one of the best methods for measuring the effects of market
design.
3.12.1 Theoretical Results
Academic results have not as yet converged on the "ideal market microstructure".
Each of the empirical studies described below discuss the theories that support their
findings. In addition, Glosten (1994) presents a theoretical paper, asking the
question "is the electronic order book inevitable?" While exchanges are, in general,
making the switch to an automated order book, it has never been proven that this is a
superior market design, or even what criterion they should be compared by.
Glosten (1994) finds that in the long term, no intermediated market structure could
compete with the automated order book by competing on price alone. This
conclusion leaves the door open for many possible alternatives. For instance, if a
market maker thought that they could differentiate between informed and
uninformed traders, they could compete with an anonymous order book market.
Other methods of competing with an order book might involve additional services
(information or administrative), trading at different times or opening the market to a
greater number of participants. There is also the possibility that traders are loyal to' a
market structure due to behavioural biases, in the same way that consumers are loyal
to their favourite brands.
Glosten (1994) also finds that the order book performs as well as any other
microstructure during times of "extreme adverse selection problems". This is set in
the concept of competing exchanges. It should be noted that a monopolistic market
maker who has the ability to make greater profits in times of stability, could provide
more liquidity during times of low or unbalanced market activity.
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Pagano and Roell (1992) also look at the theoretical differences between
microstructure types, concentrating on the issue of transparency. Their definition of
transparency concerns the speed that trading information is communicated with all
market participants, and the level of detail that is supplied, and information regarding
the best prices available at any time. This definition encompasses post trade
transparency and visibility of the orders awaiting execution, but it does not include
the identity of a trader in the order queue. This is an important difference, because it
excludes the effect of a market maker's ability to differentiate between informed and
uninformed traders. So the focus is on the ability of market participants to trade on
an equal basis with, or instead of having, a market maker.
Pagano and Roell (1992) look at 4 market types:
1. Transparent Auction - one off trade at a single price. Traders can see every
order willing to trade before execution.
2. Batch Auction - as above, but traders see limited data e.g. the implied market
price and the volume that would trade (no information on individual trades).
3. Continuous Auction - market orders are executed immediately, and limit
orders sit on a book that is visible to market participants.
4. Dealership - Monopolistic dealer, who publishes trade information after a
delay.
The main finding is that "market liquidity goes hand in hand with transparency", and
so the most transparent market structure would be the most liquid, and have the
smallest spread. This is because uninformed traders can better guard themselves to
insiders. They do admit that "in a more transparent market, prices are less
favourable over some range of order sizes" as traders adapt their strategy to the
market mechanism. However, the idea that transparency leads to more liquid
markets, along with the ability of automated order books to publish trading data in
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real time, implies that the most efficient market microstructure is an automated order
book.
3.12.2 Trading at Different Times of the Day
Madhavan (1992) demonstrates that "a periodic trading mechanism can function
where a continuous market would fail." Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that
even in a continuous market, trading activity should gravitate to the time of day with
the most liquidity. So why do we have continuous markets? The easy answer is that
investors and other market participants demand this. The relative merits of a one off
market are often discussed, and it explains in part, why most continuous markets
have a pre-opening auction process. It is this combination of a continuous dealer or
order book market, with a one off auction that makes for a popular comparison.
Biais et al (1999) point out that "because a large number of traders are batched at the
opening and because the opening is structured as a uniform-price auction, market
impact and adverse selection problems are likely to be less pronounced than during
the trading day". They use this as a rationale for large traders to use the opening
procedure more than the smaller traders. This is yet another example of selection
problems experienced in competing markets: if large traders are informed traders, we
would expect a greater proportion of information to be derived form the opening
procedure, than the proportion of trading would suggest. For example, if 10% of
trading occurs in the batched process (as claimed by Biais et al (1999), then we
might expect more than 10% of the informed trades to be present.
The main conclusion of Biais et al (1999) is that order activity during the early
stages of the opening procedure (8:30am to 9am) they cannot reject the noise
hypothesis (i.e. no information content), but as the opening procedure progresses, the
prices become informationally efficient. They suggest that the initial period of noise
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may reflect the difficulty in pricing the stocks given the many uncertainties, or it may
reflect gaming procedures from investors trying to manipulate the market. However,
if the latter is true, someone is mistaken. Either the market manipulators are wasting
their time or the Biais et al (1999) conclusion of prices reflecting information is
misleading.
Camerer (1998) tests a similar situation by placing bets at a horse race and then
cancelling them before the race. He finds that his actions did have an impact on
other betters, particularly when he placed a bet and cancelled the bet close to the start
of the race. Both Camerer (1998) and Biais et al (1999) find that the activity closer
to the end of the procedure, to be more informative. However, Biais et al (1999)
point out that as the race time approaches, there is a real chance that a gambler will
not be able to cancel the bet in time due to physical restraints such as queues, and
that this was a rational justification for prices to react to this bet as being informed
rather than deliberately misleading. This threat does not exist on the Paris Bourse
opening auction, and so the influence of manipulative orders cancelled before the
opening is mitigated. Furthermore, the two situations are far from comparable. A
gambler wishing to cancel his bet will not necessarily get the same odds as when he
placed the bet. Unless the odds are fixed for the entire period, this situation is closer
to a continuous market than the opening auction.
One alternative explanation for this noisy order activity is that the market
participants are either disguising their own orders or are trying to find out what other
orders are being placed. The Paris Bourse does not publish details of every order,
but simply the strike price and the volume that would trade if the market were to
open immediately. By repeatedly entering large orders to move the strike price in
that direction, you could take the difference in the volume that would trade and the
change in the strike price and solve the simultaneous equations to determine what
other orders were on the book. This theory has not been explored. It would be
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difficult to prove from the order data, and it is unlikely that traders using this strategy
would admit to it and lose their informational advantage. So this suggestion seems
likely to remain as an unproven theory.
Amihud and Mendelson (1987) take a different approach to the same problem. They
compare the opening and closing price data for the NYSE. They argue that the
opening price is a result of the opening call auction process and that the closing price
is a result of the continuous dealership market. They fit an ARMA (1,1)* model to
the data, which implies that prices follow a lagged partial-adjustment process with
noise. They find that "open to open" market returns are more variable than the
"close to close" market returns, and so traders in the opening procedure are subjected
to greater variability in returns. The downside of this comparison is that there are so
many differences between the opening and continuous markets, that it is difficult to
associate this result with a particular characteristic of the microstructure. Biais et al
(1999) suggested that more informed traders would choose to trade in the opening
market. This would support the results found by Amihud and Mendelson (1987).
However, Pagano and Roell (1992) state that transparency would lead to a more
liquid market, which would in turn lead to a more stable market. This contradicts the
results found by Amihud and Mendelson (1987).
s
The problem with all of the comparisons between opening procedures and the
continuous market is that there are too many differences. There are selection
problems regarding when informed traders wish to trade. There is greater
uncertainty regarding information at the open, as there are up to 18 hours between
the closing and opening. There are different ways of carrying out market
manipulation in the two markets, and different rewards. There are different risks
faced by the market participants (e.g. market maker inventory risk). There are even
behavioural issues to explain why investors react differently in the afternoon, given
1 Auto Regressive Moving Average model.
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good or bad performance in the morning. So academics decided to take an
alternative approach, and compare cross listed stocks.
3.12.3 Cross Listed Stocks
Many stocks have a primary listing on one stock market but are also traded on other
markets. Lee (1993) and Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) find that execution costs
are slightly higher on NASDAQ and the regional exchanges, compared to the main
listing on the NYSE. There are several reasons for this result. First, the liquidity of
the market and the proportion of the trading in a stock on a single market will affect
the transaction costs. Arguably, the "liquidity" is what we are trying to measure here
and so we may conclude that the NYSE is more liquid than the NASDAQ. But we
cannot say that this is solely due to the design of the market. The NYSE currently
attracts such a large proportion of the world market capitalization and trading
volume, that it is unsurprising to find that the NYSE is more liquid than the regional
exchanges.
De Jong et al (1995) and Schmidt and Iversen (1993) find that spreads are greater on
the LSE SEAQ international compared to the spreads on the domestic markets for
French and German listed stocks respectively. This is a similar result to the
American studies, in that the main listing has lower transaction costs. It also shows
that the dealer market in each comparison has the higher transaction costs. One
important difference is that the argument regarding the volume differential that we
used to justify the American result can not be used here. However, the fact that the
dealer market appears to be the less efficient in all cases raises the question as to
whether we are comparing consistent measures of execution cost? De Jong et al
(1995) compare the quoted spread and the effective spread on each market. They
look at the case of a trade at the smallest amount. Trades on SEAQ international can
and do receive price improvements, but the quoted spread on the Paris Bourse
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represents the price you actually pay, so the "equivalent" or "realistic" spread on
SEAQ international is being overstated. Comparing the effective spreads also has
pitfalls. While De Jong et al (1995) categorize trades by size, they also note that
trades on SEAQ international tend to be much bigger, and so the average size of
trade in each category will not be equal, nor will the relative frequency of
occurrence. This however, is not sufficient to explain the large difference in average
effective spread (0.3% in Paris, and 1.3% in London). De Jong et al (1992) go on to
explain that the differences in tax and that fact that many SEAQ International trades
are shown net of commission, have a significant impact on the results. For some
trade sizes (above normal market size) the transactions appear to be cheaper on
SEAQ International, net of all charges.
A further problem with trading in stocks away from the domestic or centralized
market is that of information. While modern electronic methods of communication
mitigate the issue, there is a belief that being physically near to the market aids with
the speed and quality of information retrieval. Even if this does not happen, the
perceived risk could have an impact on the market. If it was the case that SEAQ
International lagged behind the Paris Bourse in terms of prices reflecting
information, then it would be a valid strategy for informed French traders to exploit
the availability of trading in London. That would increase the asymmetry bf
information and so lead to a higher spread to compensate the market makers for the
risk.
Finally, Venkataraman (2001) quotes an unpublished paper by Mike Piwowar
studying the transaction costs of securities listed on the Paris Bourse and the NYSE.
Piwowar finds that French stocks have lower transaction costs on the Paris Bourse,
and American stocks have lower transaction costs on the NYSE. It may be that
domestic stocks attract greater order flow through familiarity or national pride or
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prejudice, or for any number of practical reasons, but the result suggests that there is
a domestic stock bias, and so studies of cross listed stocks are of limited use.
3.12.4 Matched Samples
Having established the limitations of cross listed stock comparison, Haung and Stoll
(1996) proposed another method of comparing exchanges. They created matched
samples of stocks on the NYSE and NASDAQ. They chose the 175 largest
NASDAQ stocks and matched them to NYSE stocks with the same industry
classification using stock price, leverage, the ratio of book to market value, and
market value of equity. They state that "some of these variables are also correlated
with factors that have been found to determine bid-ask spreads" but go no further in
justifying the choice of matching variables. Stock price is used as a proxy for the
tick size as a proportion of the share price. Market value of the equity is used as
larger companies typically have a more liquid market. Leverage may be thought of
as a proxy for volatility, which would also affect the spread. It is not clear what the
ratio of book to market value adds to the matching strategy.
Having matched the stocks, Haung and Stoll (1996) calculate the average spread for
the whole of 1991. They calculate the spread in several ways. The quoted half
spread, which is the difference between the quoted ask and the quoted bid, divided
by two, was found to be much larger on NASDAQ than NYSE. Even correcting for
trade size they find that the NASDAQ quoted half spread is nearly double that on the
NYSE. One explanation might be the potential for price improvements on the
NASDAQ dealer market, as explained in the previous section. However, the
effective half spread, calculated as the difference between the trade price and the
quoted midpoint, shows similar results. They both demonstrate that the price
improvements available on the NYSE are even better than those on NASDAQ. Price
improvements cannot occur on the order book unless market orders are stopped by
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the specialist and traded elsewhere. This implies that most of the price improvement
on NYSE is due to the floor traders. There are two explanations for this. It is
possible that floor traders can trade with a much smaller spread than the limit order
book. However, it is also possible that the floor trader spread is not centred around
the same price as the order book. Since the measure of effective half spread is
calculated as the difference between the trade price and the quoted mid point (on the
order book), this will overstate or understate a realistic measure of effective half
spread for each trade through the floor brokers. So would the over and
understatements cancel out? Well, if two competing mechanisms in a common value
environment are in price disequilibrium then one (or both) will tend to move towards
the other. The net result may depend on which is the dominant price setting market,
but if the order book midpoint was higher than the price at which the floor traders
were trading we might expect there to be more buy orders sent through the floor
traders. These purchases would be below the order book midpoint, and actually
produce a negative value for the effective half spread. Clearly, this would bias the
results.
The above argument assumes that all trades are correctly classified as buyer or seller
initiated. This data was not recorded on either market during 1991, and so Haung
and Stoll (1996) used the Lee and Ready algorithm. Roughly speaking, this
algorithm compares the trade price with the last trade price and the prevailing spread
and determines whether it was more likely to be a buy or a sell. Lee and
Rashakrishna (2000) revisit the Lee and Ready algorithm, and find that for a sample
of trades processed by SuperDOT, it predicts the direction of the trade 93% of the
time. When broken down slightly, they also state that it has a 76% success rate when
the trade occurs within the spread, and only a 60% success rate if it occurs at the
same price as the previous trade. These statistics support the use of the Lee and
Ready algorithm, but they do not address the issue of trades on the floor, which are
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excluded from the empirical results. This issue was also ignored in Haung and
Stoll's results, which did include the trades from the floor.
If a market maker adjusts the spread to keep it smaller when they believe trading is
going to occur in one direction, does this mean it's cheaper to trade on this platform?
They often say that market makers widen the spread when they perceive a risk of
information asymmetry, but if they think they know what direction this is (due to
past trading) there is no need to widen the spread, but rather to move it. By moving
it, you are more likely to get traders on the other side.
Venkataraman (2001) mentions the "higher commissions of the floor broker"
compared with routing the order through the SuperDOT order book, but ignored this
for most of the study. Near the end of the paper he goes on to mention evidence
from the consultants Elkins McSherry Co. that the commissions on large
transactions, (likely to trade on the upstairs market at the Paris Bourse, and so
excluded from the sample) are larger than the average commissions for institutional
trades on the NYSE (included in the sample). The average commission was 22.84
basis points in France and 13.4 basis points in the USA. Venkataraman (2001) also
states that "the brokerage commission for small trades in the United States and
France has been dramatically reduced with the entry of online brokerage houses, arid
are comparable across the two markets." In the note attached to this comment, he
admits that the online brokerage houses in the USA send orders to regional
exchanges (excluded from the sample) while the online brokerage houses in France
send the orders to the limit order book (included in the sample).
The effective spread that Venkataraman (2001) uses, is twice the difference between
trade price on the trading floor and the midpoint of the quotes on SuperDOT. This is
theoretically a common value environment, but results that show significant price
improvements indicate that it is not. There is no appropriate spread to use in this
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case, but we could put an upper and lower bound on it. Choosing a buy order,
without loss of generality, a realistic spread would be bound on the offer side by the
transaction price, and on the bid side by the SuperDOT bid quote. Using figures
from Venkataraman (2001), the NYSE quoted spread was 32.39 basis points, and the
effective spread was 21.22. This means that the average transaction price was
21.22/2 = 10.61 away from the midpoint, and an average quote that was 32.39/2 =
16.20. Using out alternative bound for the other side of the spread we would
calculate a re-centred effective spread of 26.81 (16.20 + 10.61). And so, we
conclude that the effective spread is somewhere between 21.22 and 26.81 basis
points, which is significant since the effective spread on the Paris Bourse is 24.45.
In a working paper, Naik and Yadav (2002) show an alternative means of
comparison, exploiting the fact that LSE switched from a dealer market to an
automated order book. Looking at transaction costs in the exchange before, shortly
after and 2 years after the change in trading platform, they make several conjectures.
They find that "the arguably increased competition arising from the introduction of a
limit order book into the London dealer market did not drive down transaction costs
in competing trade-size segments". This ignored many of the issues regarding
investor behaviour and how to compare the spread measures for these two market
types. These issues will be addressed in subsequent chapters. Nailk and Yadhv
(2002) also state that "the introduction of a competing limit order book increased the
relative proportion of informed trading and liquidity trading through the dealer
network in London". This stands contrary to the belief that the anonymous order
book market would attract the informed order flow. Perhaps, the ability to hide
trading intentions by keeping them away from the order book is more efficient than
the ability of dealers to detect informed trades.
Throughout the literature of market microstructure comparisons, we use the
transaction costs incurred by market orders, ignoring the limit order strategy that
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many investors employ. Madhavan (2001) comments that "it is unclear how to
interpret effective spreads or a mixed hybrid market like the NYSE where the dealer
has a small, but significant, participation rate". The aim of these studies is to
measure the "cost of immediacy". This is not clear cut on the NYSE. A market order
can be submitted to the SuperDOT order book, but remain unexecuted for a while.
According to Bacidore et al (1999), 5% of the number and 45% of the volume of
market orders are routed to the floor brokers. The rules of the exchange dictate that a
market order can not execute at a worse price than if it had been immediately
executed and so the specialist effectively underwrites the risk. But once the order is
in the hands of the floor brokers, the trades are matched (like limit orders and market
orders) with some winners and some losers. Whether the floor trading market is
centred around the same price as the order book or not, we might expect these trades
to have a net average efficient spread close to zero.
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4 MARKET MAKER V AUTOMATED ORDER BOOK
4.1 Introduction
Market structures vary in many ways. Madhavan (1992) demonstrates that "a
periodic trading mechanism can function where a continuous market would fail".
Perhaps this structure is superior, but the physical constraints and demands of
investors make this impractical. Glosten (1994) and Seppi (1997) both conclude
that, of the major market types in existence, there is no clearly superior structure.
There has been a worldwide trend for exchanges to switch from dealer markets to
automated order books. Automated order books are not bound by physical
restriction, so they appeal to international investors. The transparency is also
appealing to private investors, who can trade on an equal footing with professionals.
However, the practice of designing the market microstructure depends heavily on
who owns the exchange, and what they gain from it. The NYSE is owned by the
member firms that gain from the commission that they generate from their floor
trading services. This may be a reason for the NYSE being slow to follow the trend
of automated order book markets. Despite pressure exerted by market makers, in
1996, the London Stock Exchange introduced SETS (Stock Exchange Trading
System), an automated order book, to replace SEAQ (Stock Exchange Automated
Quotation), a multiple dealer market, for the most liquid stocks.
There have been different approaches to comparing aspects of market microstructure.
Amihud and Mendelson (1987), Biais et al (1999), and Madhavan and Panchagesan
(2000) compare trading activity during the opening procedure and the continuous
daily market. They find that prices set during the auction process are very
informative, but they cannot conclude much about other aspects of the market
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structure. Schmidt and Iversen (1993), Lee (1993), Petersen and Fialkowski (1994),
DeJong et al (1995) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) compare the execution
costs for cross listed stocks. Their results vary, but they all note that trading activity
for the primary listing or domestic market, is greater than on the alternative platform.
The importance of this relationship is hard to quantify, and so attributing results to
other aspects of the market design is difficult. Haung and Stoll (1996) and
Venkataraman (2001) compare matched samples of stocks on different stock
exchanges. These samples are matched in terms of size, price, trading activity and
market sector. Haung and Stoll (1996) compare the NYSE with Nasdaq. They
conclude that recorded execution costs are lower in the NYSE auction market than in
the Nasdaq dealer market. Venkataraman (2001) finds that the NYSE has lower
execution costs than the Paris Bourse, thus concluding that the floor traders add
value to the trading process. Conrad et al (2002) look directly at the decisions made
by institutional investors faced with a choice of trading platform. While many of the
conclusions differ in the microstructure literature there is a consensus that the
professional relationships built up on a trading floor (or a telephone based market
with competing market makers), add value to the process of price discovery and
reduce transaction costs.
The problems that cloud the conclusions of these studies vary. For example,
comparisons of NYSE and Nasdaq ignore the issue of commission. Haung and Stoll
(1996) explain that trades on the NYSE larger than £10,000 shares incur
commission, while Nasdaq spreads include the full cost of trading. Each market has
alternative methods of trading. Nasdaq offers a Small Order Execution Service
(SOES) for trades of less than 1000 shares. These trades are ignored in the
calculations of market efficiency, even though Chan and Fong (2000) highlighted the
importance of these trades as they convey more information than even the largest
orders sent to the market makers.
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Comparisons across international markets have even greater limitations. The
demand for trading can come from different sources. The SEAQ International
market (superseded by SEATS international) on the LSE attracts institutional
investors worldwide, while the Paris Bourse has a largely domestic investor profile,
including many individuals. Given that different groups of investors have different
investment needs (liquidity requirements, tax mitigation, time horizon of matched
liabilities, risk aversion) and a different economic and political environment, along
with access to different information, and understanding of the foreign market, it is
not surprising that transaction costs differ.
An important assumption regarding trader behaviour is that large traders tend to be
better informed than small traders. This is partly attributed to the gulf* in terms of
relevant knowledge, between institutional investors and individuals and also to the
fact that an investor is more likely to want to trade in large volumes to exploit good
information. Another assumption is that informed traders trade quickly, for fear of
the information leaking out before it can be exploited. Keim and Madhavan (1995)
recognise that this classification may be too simplistic e.g. a tracker fund must buy a
stock as it enters the index, and so would become a large aggressive uninformed
trader. Barclay and Warner (1993) also look at the possibility of stealth trading,
where informed traders use many small trades to fill their order. It is this recognition
that the order strategy may depend on the microstructure that is particularly
important. If informed traders trade small on an order book, and large through a
trading floor, measures of information should reflect this.
When discussing investor behaviour it is important to define the alternatives
available. Uninformed traders on the Paris Bourse may decide to take their orders to
the upstairs market, or send a market order to the order book, or place a limit order
inside, outside or at the spread. They may also decide to split the order to minimise
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the market impact or hide their intentions. Uninformed traders in a SEAQ stock
have far less choice.
This chapter explores the importance of human intermediation, by comparing the
execution costs incurred on SETS and SEAQ. The chapter is arranged as follows:
Section 2 describes the efficiency measures and Sections 3 and 4 cover the data and
research design. In Section 5 we discuss the results of the comparison, Section 6
presents the results of an alternative methodology, Section 7 discusses asymmetric
information risk, and we conclude in Section 8.
4.2 Measures of Efficiency
We calculate the statistics using a similar method to Venkataraman (2001) for ease
of comparison. These four measures are also used in previous studies (Haung and
Stoll (1996), Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997)), although different names have
been used on occasion. There are three measures of efficiency, and an indicator of
asymmetric information. The first measure is the Quoted Spread:
Percentage Quoted Spreadit = 100 * (Offerit-Bidjt) / Midit
Offerit and Bidit are the best offer and bid prices quoted by market makers on SEAQ
or the best bid and offer prices shown on the SETS limit order book for a given stock
(i) and trade (t). Midit is the midpoint of the offer and bid prices.
The quoted spread is averaged without weighting. The rationale behind this method
is that we only care about the spread when trades take place. Other arguments could
be made, and Venkataraman (2001) uses a time weighted average. The time
weighted average makes no allowance of how many trades were placed in a given
period. Furthermore, erroneous results may creep in as a result of calculating the
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spread during a trading halt, or when the market is closed (e.g. days closed early).
The only clear advantage of calculating a time weighted average is to maitain
consistency with Venkataraman (2001). The limitations of the time weighted
average, and the computational cost outweigh this gain. This issue is discussed
further in the next section.
The Effective Spread represents the cost of immediacy:
Percentage Effective Spreadit = 200 * Dit * (Priceit - Midit) / Midit
Dit is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a buy order and -1 for a sell order. Priceit is
the transaction price.
The Price impact is used as an indicator of the likelihood of a trade containing
information. It represents the permanent affect on prices of a trade.
Percentage Price Impactit = 200 * Dit * (Vj>t+n - Midit)) / Midit
Vii[+n is the mid price at the time of the first trade more than n minutes after the
original trade. For this comparison, we have taken n to be 30 minutes.
Finally we calculate the Percentage Realized Spread. This represents the total cost of
trading, including the immediate execution cost and the gain due to moving the
market. Note that the realized spread is simply the effective spread less the price
impact, as defined above.
Percentage Realized Spreadit = 200 * Dit * (Priceit - Vi t+n) / Midit
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4.3 Data
The data set was obtained from the London Stock Exchange. It includes details of
the best bid and offer prices quoted by SEAQ market makers and every limit order
placed onto the SETS order book. Each quote is time stamped to the nearest second.
A separate data set records every trade with a time stamp to the nearest second, along
with the quantity, price, participant codes, and whether it was reported by the buyer
or the seller. For certain trade types (e.g. the ordinary trades in SEAQ stocks and the
automated trades in SETS stocks) we can say with certainty whether the trade was
initiated by the buyer or the seller. These two data sets have been combined to show
the quoted spreads at the time of each trade. SETS market orders may be matched
against several limit orders. Each transaction is recorded separately, but the
combined details of the trade can be collated through the unique order code.
Timing of trades is vital for the comparison and so trades reported late are excluded
from the sample. Inspection of the data also highlighted errors. Occasionally prices
were typed with the decimal point in the wrong place, or the figures were reversed,
or the figures were simply implausible. The incidence of obvious errors in the data
were small (less than 1%), and so they were simply deleted from the sample if:
1. The Bid or Offer prices were non positive
2. The effective spread was greater than 20% of the quoted spread
3. The quoted spread was less than zero or greater than £10
4. The trade occurred out of hours.
5. The trade was reported and then corrected
6. The mid price 30 minutes after the trade was zero
While there is no official dealer market for SETS stocks, a significant proportion of
trades occur away from the order book. These are trades organised with retail
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brokers or transactions between brokerage firms. Proportions of trade types are
shown in Table 4.1. This paper compares the market makers and an automated order
book, so only the trades on the order book have been included in the SETS sample.
Venkataraman (2001) addresses this issue for the NYSE, stating that only 5% of
trades and 42% of the share volume go through the trading floor. Venkataraman
includes every trade in the sample, and not just those occurring on the trading floor.
It could be argued that this dilutes the impact of the trading floor in the statistics, but
data limitations and the hybrid nature of the NYSE led him to make this decision.
Here, we are interested in the automated trades only as these represent all of the
trades on the formally defined exchange.
SEAQ trades were matched up with the transaction reports, to identify the presence
of a market maker in the trade. All trades with a market maker on one and only one
side of the trade were included.
4.4 Research Design
All FTSE 250 stocks trading on SETS at 1 September 1998 were matched with
FTSE 250 stocks trading on SEAQ. Certain stocks were excluded from the list df
potential matches. Companies that changed trading platform were excluded.
Companies that delisted, went bankrupt, were taken over or merged during the period
were excluded. This was done to simplify calculations. There is no reason to
believe that this introduces a bias.
While the FTSE 250 constituents trading on SETS tend to be the larger companies, it
is possible to match pairs of companies using the same method as Venkataraman
(2001). Table 4.2 shows the sample of matched stocks. We use 4 different
algorithms:
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1. Price and Market Capitalisation.
2. Price and Trading Volume.
3. Industry, Price and Market Capitalisation.
4. Industry, Price and Trading Volume.
Trading Volume is calculated as the total trading volume reported to the exchange
throughout the period of review. This includes the trades that occurred away from
the SETS order book, or the SEAQ market makers. Trading volume in this context
is a proxy for liquidity, so it is sensible to look at all methods of trading rather than
the subset of trades that we are concentrating on in this paper.
Market Capitalisation is calculated at the start of the period of study. Perhaps it
would be more appropriate to average market capitalisation over the period but the
opening figure is used to be consistent with Venkataraman (2001). This is unlikely
to make any significant difference to the results.
Price is used to ensure that the tick size as a relative proportion of the stock price is
consistent. Although price is proportional to market capitalisation for a given stock,
the same cannot be said when comparing stocks. This is why both price and market
capitalisation may be used together.
Matching by industry is harder for FTSE stocks than many other markets, as the
subdivision is much finer (by the FTSE Actuaries All Share classification). Where
possible, we have matched stocks by sub-sector, but if no stock was available, we
have used stocks from the same sector. In a few cases, this has meant matching the
likes of a tobacco company with a health company. The purpose of matching by
industry is to account for trends in demand. While stocks in the same sector have
similar characteristics, there are reasons why share prices would move together, e.g.
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TABLE 4.1 BREAKDOWN OF TYPES OF TRADE EXECUTED IN EACH MARKET
FTSE 250 SEAQ









52.75 87.42 Ordinary Trades 54.70 88.69
11.07 1.82 Protected Transactions 16.35 1.86
15.98 2.07 Single Protected Transaction 12.03 2.09
7.04 4.61 Market Maker to Market Maker 4.52 3.30
6.06 0.91 Cross at same price 6.56 0.76
4.85 2.69 Non Protected Portfolio 4.32 2.77
2.25 0.49 Other Trades 1.50 0.53
FTSE 250 SETS









18.22 31.20 Automatically Executed Trades 23.94 52.08
61.89 64.50 Ordinary Trades 58.07 44.18
9.22 0.89 Cross at same price 6.20 0.42
4.57 0.17 Worked Principal Trade 2.44 0.06
3.82 2.71 Non Protected Portfolio 5.05 1.41
1.38 0.15 Protected Portfolio 0.77 0.11
0.43 0.17 Volume Weighted Average Price 2.49 0.17
0.46 0.21 Other Trades 1.04 1.57
FTSE 100 SETS









27.31 53.26 Automatically Executed Trades 36.41 65.23
56.95 44.59 Ordinary Trades 47.88 30.95
3.56 0.29 Cross at same price 1.58 0.17
4.26 0.09 Worked Principal Trade 0.68 0.01
5.60 1.55 Non Protected Portfolio 3.57 0.75
1.22 0.05 Protected Portfolio 0.72 0.05
0.86 0.10 Volume Weighted Average Price 6.99 0.31
0.25 0.06 Other Trades 2.18 2.53
Transactions were summed for the calender months shown above.
Samples included all stocks on the appropriate index and platform for the whole month.
Figures shown are percentages of the total number or volume of trading in that month.
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change in raw material cost, but also apart, e.g. one company signs an important
contract. Given the matching errors already introduced, it is reasonable to allow this
slight deviation from the original research design. One exception to this rule is that
of financials: investment trusts were not matched against other financials, as these
have very different performance characteristics.
An Average Deviation statistic was calculated for each pair of stocks. For the first
comparison, the average deviation is calculated as:
[[(PriceQ- PriceT) / (PriceQ + PriceT)] /2 + [(MCQ- MCT) / (MCQ + MCT)] /2 ]/2
where MC is the market capitalisation and the subscripts Q and T refer to SEAQ and
SETS respectively. Each pair with an average deviation greater than 0.75, was
excluded. Haung and Stoll (1996) sum over the square of the characteristic
deviation, rather than simply sum, but we have used the method of Venkataraman
(2001) for consistency.
Having matched the stocks into appropriate pairs, we collate the two samples: SEAQ
and SETS. Each of the efficiency measures is averaged over each month in the
sample. Each of the trade dependent measures is subdivided into the size of the
trade:
£50,000 < Very large
£10,000 < Large < £50,000
£5,000 < Medium < £10,000
£1,000 < Small < £5,000
Very small <£1,000
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These data points were then averaged over the year, and averaged over each stock
and each sample.
A sample period of two years, starting from 1st of September 1998 was chosen. As
companies move up and down the index, and switch trading platforms, it becomes
more difficult to match the samples appropriately for the whole period. Two years
was chosen as a compromise between this limitation, and the need for statistically
significant results.
4.5 Comparison of Matched Stocks
Table 4.3 presents the results in the same format as Venkataraman (2001) for ease of
comparison. Given that our sample relates to the less liquid stocks on the LSE, it is
not surprising that the efficiency measures are higher (less efficient) than the NYSE
and the Paris Bourse. Our results appear to contradict those of Naik and Yadav
(2002), who use a different methodology.
4.5.1 Quoted Spread
t
The results show significantly higher quoted spreads on SEAQ than SETS. This
agrees with the theoretical results of Glosten (1994), but contradicts the empirical
findings of Venkataraman (2001). However, there are several reasons why the
quoted spread should not be used to compare SEAQ with SETS (or any two markets
with different structure). First, there are always opportunities for price improvement
from SEAQ market makers, but what you see is what you get on the limit order
book. Secondly, the quoted spread on SEAQ is usually quoted for normal market
size, while the spread on the limit order book could be quoted for any quantity. For
example, it is not uncommon for traders to front run the spread with small volume
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quotes. This would understate the "realistic" spread. Thirdly, there is no generally
accepted method to cope with the fact that trades occur at different times than quote
revisions. Is it appropriate to evaluate the efficiency of trading with a measure that
doesn't involve any aspect of a trade?
4.5.2 Effective Spread
Overall, the effective spreads are larger on SEAQ than on SETS, for each matching
algorithm. Extrapolating the results from Venkataraman (2001), we would expect
SETS to have larger spreads, but based on these figures it would appear that on the
LSE, the order book is a more efficient trading platform.
The difference is largest for small trades (£1,000 - £4,999) and decreases with size.
The decreasing transaction cost could be rationalised by the proportion of investors
trading through the order book. For SETS stocks, uninformed traders of large
volume may take their business to brokers off the market. This means that on
average, we might expect large trades on the order book to contain more information
than large trades on SEAQ. However the size related decrease in transaction cost is
even more pronounced for SEAQ than it is for SETS, suggesting that other factors
are involved. In fact, for very large trades (> £50,000), the overall result is reversed
and transactions on SEAQ have a lower incurred cost than those on SETS. One
possible explanation is time selection. On SEAQ, market makers may offer
beneficial terms when they are certain of finding a counter party for the other side of
the trade, thus reducing their own inventory risk. This can occur when large trades
are offered to a market maker with a time restriction, much like an option or a limit
order. The market maker can then try to find counter parties to this trade and earn
(almost) risk free profits. There is no legally binding mechanism for this type of
"offer to trade", but traders know that future trading terms would be jeopardised by
reneging on an agreement. The equivalent time selection issue for SETS, is that
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traders are only willing or able to place large market orders when liquidity is high
(spreads are narrow and depth is high).
We observe a significant relationship between size of trade and transaction cost.
This relationship has been long established, based on the idea that large trades
convey more information or demand greater depth and so the execution costs are
bigger. But in this case, we find the opposite result. Transaction costs decrease
significantly with size for both SEAQ and SETS stocks. It would seem that while
transaction costs increase with trade size for the larger stocks on the more liquid
markets such as the NYSE or the Paris Bourse, the issues of time selection for SETS
(orders are affected by the order book, rather than the other way round) and SEAQ
(traders are willing to take the liquidity offered by market makers trying to control
their inventory risk), becomes a more pertinent issue for less liquid markets like the
mid cap stocks on the FTSE250. Any comparison of market types should therefore
allow for the fact that the results may not hold for markets with fewer market
participants or smaller company stocks.
We have used the absolute size to categorise trades. It could be argued that the
relative size is more important, i.e. we should compare the percentage of a company
being traded in any given transaction. However, two out of the four samples aie
matched using market capitalisation and this makes an approximate allowance for
the relative size of trades. Nevertheless, the results will be weighted unevenly
between stocks.
The figures vary between matching algorithms, particularly those that ignore the
industry of each firm. However, the differences all have the same sign, and the
trend by size is observed for each method.
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4.5.3 Price Impact
Overall the price impact is higher on SETS than SEAQ. Previous research (Haung
and Stoll (1996), Venkataraman (2001), interpret this statistic as a measure of
information asymmetry. Given the alternative methods of trading available for
SETS stocks, we might expect a greater proportion of the informed trades to go
through the order book, and this is consistent with our result. However, the
difference between the SETS and SEAQ values is too great to justify with this
argument alone. Even if the off market trades had the equivalent of a zero price
impact (there is no reason to justify a negative value), the weighted average would
still be larger on SETS than SEAQ.
Another interesting result, is the relationship between Price Impact and size of trade.
The relationship is roughly increasing with two exceptions. Very small trades on
SETS have a larger price impact than small trades. This may be a result of deliberate
market manipulation, whereby investors take advantage of the lack of depth to move
the spread. It may also be explained by selection. If the markets are thin, some
traders will be dissuaded from trading because of the transaction expenses (including
the effect of moving the market). The traders who are not dissuaded by the thin
markets would be those best informed. In this case we would expect the Price
Impact to be greater. Another explanation is that the smallest trades represent the
actions of private investors who are distanced from the exchange. They apply their
trading strategy with less allowance for the state of the order book, and are less
aware of the impact that the trade may have on the market.
The second exception to the rule of monotonically increasing Price Impact by trade
size, is that very large trades on SEAQ have a lower price impact than large trades.
When comparing the volume weighted Price Impact, the largest SEAQ trades have a
smaller Price Impact than almost all other trade size categories. This can again be
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explained within the asymmetric information paradigm. The uninformed traders in
SEAQ stocks will try to justify to the market maker that they are uninformed in order
to achieve a better price.
It is difficult to choose a time scale for this measure. The shorter the time scale, the
bigger the impact of the size of the trade (informed trade or not), and the longer the
time scale the more information from other sources and trades. I have used 30
minutes, to be consistent with Venkataraman (2001). Given that Venkataraman
studies the most liquid stocks on the Paris Bourse and the NYSE, and I am studying
the less liquid FTSE 250 stocks, it may be appropriate to use a longer time scale. A
market maker in a SEAQ stock may decide not to change the spread for several
hours. However, repeating the analysis with longer and shorter time scales produced
consistent results.
Also, there is no reason to believe that an order book market and a market maker
market would react to information at the same rate, e.g. 30 minutes may be
appropriate for an automated order book, but much longer may be appropriate for a
market maker market. It is possible that market makers are less concerned about
updating quoted prices, since most trades occur within the spread. This would bias
the result, as price improvements would be so long after the event that they would be
more likely to include information from other sources. On the other side, market
orders, which take liquidity from the market, may automatically change the spread.
A large enough buy order (larger than the quoted depth) will increase the spread
immediately. This does not dictate how other investors will react, but it explains
what the observed prices will do in the short term. Supporting this view,
Venkataraman (2001) states that the order book of the Paris Bourse "has a higher
number of quote updates per day (1,055) than the New York Sample (427)". Given
that we are trying to measure the efficiency of the two markets, it seems
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inappropriate to implicitly assume that the two markets are equally efficient for the
purpose of setting the time scale. However, there is no suitable alternative.
4.5.4 Realized Spread
This measure confirms what was discussed above. Interpreting the realized spread
as the total cost of trading, we find that SEAQ is more expensive than SETS. Using
the unweighted average, SEAQ trades are more than 4 times as expensive.
A negative realized spread occurs where a large trade moves the price to such an
extent that the mid price passes the original weighted average price of the trade. This
happens in two stages. The immediate impact is to widen the spread at the opposite
side. If there was great depth close to the spread, but very little behind the best price,
the immediate impact could produce a negative realized spread alone. But it is more
likely that other market participants react to the large trade by moving both sides of
the spread in the same direction as the trade, and this contributes to the negative
realized spread. Note that the negative realized spreads are relatively small
(compared to the spread) and so it does not seem possible to place a large buy order,
wait for the market to react and then reverse the transaction for a profit.
4.5.5 Trading Strategy
Table 4.4 shows the number, volume and average size of the trades in each sample,
and in each trade size category. There are more small trades on SEAQ than any
other trade size category, while SETS has more large and very large trades than any
other category. Comparing the samples by volume, the very large trades make up the
lion's share of the trading as expected. Within this trade size group, the SEAQ
trades are far larger (more than double) the size of the SETS trades. Overall it
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appears that SEAQ trades are concentrated on small trades, and a few very large
trades, while SETS trades are more evenly spread, but up to a lower limit.
We have demonstrated that the trading behaviour differs between platforms, and that
this may distort the results. But we have said nothing about the efficiency of the
trading strategies employed. If traders are unable to glean information from the
order book, and so do not adjust their trading strategy over time accordingly, the
efficiency measures would be far higher than in a theoretical equilibrium. We stated
earlier, that the proportion of trading going through the book had increased, as
traders showed a reluctance to use it. This may be an indicator of investors' inability
to use the order book as efficiently as is possible. Efficiency should increase as
investors gain the relevant knowledge and experience from trading on SETS.
4.6 Changing from SEAQ to SETS
4.6.1 Introduction
From Venkataraman (2001), we can see that the NYSE is more efficient than the
Paris Bourse, and from the above results we find that SETS is more efficient than
SEAQ. These results suggest opposite conclusions as to whether human
intermediation adds value to the market. However, both results agree that the larger
of the two markets (or the market with the larger company stocks) is the more
efficient. Although stocks were matched using various criteria, it is possible that
transaction costs are biased by the other stocks trading on that platform e.g. the larger
stocks on the NYSE ensure a more efficient market for the smaller stocks traded on
the NYSE, as a result of attracting more investors to the market.
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The size effects described above, together with the issue of order strategy, and
questions regarding the appropriateness of the matching algorithm, suggest that there
is sufficient doubt to motivate an alternative research design. We have therefore
carried out a comparison of stocks that have been traded on each of the two FTSE
platforms. Following a LSE review, it was decided to allow more FTSE 250 stocks
to switch from SEAQ to SETS on 6 September 1999. SETS was intended for the
more liquid stocks, and there was an element of status associated with stocks added
to this trading platform. Amihud et al (1997) showed how stock prices jumped when
introduced to a more liquid market structure. In our comparison, we wish to evaluate
whether the switch from SEAQ to SETS added liquidity or not. This is similar to the
approach used by Naik and Yadav (2002).
4.6.2 Research Design
We look at the two year period 1 September 1998 to 31 August 2000. The efficiency
measures for each stock are first calculated for each year. We then split stocks into
three groups: those that switched on 6 September 1999, those that traded on SEAQ
for the two year period, and those that traded on SETS for the two year period. The
remaining stocks, which switched to SETS at some other date, were excluded from
the sample. There is no need to match stocks in terms of market characteristics, aS
we are only comparing the change from year one to year two, for each group. The
un-weighted transaction costs are presented in Table 4.5. For an alternative
comparison, Table 4.6 presents the transaction costs weighted by the size of trade.
4.6.3 Results
Despite the changes in market conditions, in particular the beginning of the bear
period in year two, we see that the efficiency measures for those stocks that did not
switch platform are relatively stable. In contrast, the spreads calculated for those that
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did switch, do change significantly. The quoted spread decreases considerably, but
this is unlikely to be a good indicator of efficiency. The problems of interpreting the
quoted spread, price impact and realized spread apply equally to this situation as in
Section 4.5. However, the increase in effective spread from year one to year two
cannot be explained by data manipulation problems.
The effective spreads for the two samples that did not involve a change in trading
platform, decrease slightly (8%) from year one to year two. In contrast, the effective
spread for those that switched decreases by a significant 26%. This difference is
experienced at all trade sizes other than the largest, for which the sample that
switched platforms increases by 24%. This is consistent with the theory that the
automated order book offers greater liquidity in general but trading in large volumes
can be costly. Given the differences in possible trading strategy, it may be more
informative to look at the total weighted transaction cost. We repeat the table,
weighting by trading volume, and find a very different story. The overall effective
spread for the control samples again reduces, but the sample that switched increases
by 64%. This means that after allowing for the differences in trading strategies
between the two markets, it is more costly to trade on SETS. There are two
important points to address here. Firstly, the trades that would previously have been
passed to a SEAQ market maker are split between market orders and limit orders on'
SETS. Harris and Hasbrouk (1996) state that informed traders tend to use market
orders while uninformed traders usually use limit orders. Even if this is just partly
true, we could say that the demanders of immediacy (market orders) on SETS would
contain a higher proportion of information than the demanders of immediacy (all
traders) on SEAQ. This would suggest that a higher effective spread is appropriate
for the order book.
The second point to note is that SETS traders have the option of arranging their trade
through other dealers. These off market SETS transactions reflect two things. First,
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large traders may benefit from the human intermediation, and second, uninformed
traders may benefit from being able to bargain better terms. Considering the
traditional wisdom that larger traders are informed traders, these opposing forces
may explain the fact that off-market trades are smaller than on-market trades. A
significant proportion of the total trading volume takes place off the market (between
30% and 40% of the total volume), so it is possible that the off-market trades have
lower transaction costs and so the cost of immediacy on SETS is less than those for
SEAQ. If this were the case, the volume-weighted transaction cost off the market
would have to be negative.
In Table 4.7, we present a comparison of number, volume and average trade size for
the samples in this test. The control samples show a fairly consistent pattern in all
three variables. Interestingly, the SETS stocks had a fall in trading volume, while
the SEAQ stocks had an increase. This may be due to preference for smaller
companies (which would trade on SEAQ), or more trading off the market for the
SETS sample. Evidence suggests that the latter is unlikely. For the sample that
switched, we find the change in order size as before, as SETS traders use large and
very large trades more, but only up to a limit, while SEAQ trades are dominated by
many small trades and a few extremely large trades.
The trading volume roughly halves from year 1 to year 2. This is expected since the
removal of the intermediary would cut the reported trades in half. In addition, there
is a significant proportion of trading off the market (between 30% and 40% of the
total volume), which actually shows an aggregate increase in trading volume. This
supports the theory that more investors are attracted to the level playing field found
on an order book market.
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TABLE 4.7 TRADE STATISTICS WITHIN TRADING PLATFORM CATEGORIES
SEAQ- SETS SETS-SETS SEAQ-SEAQ
num very small 56823 5723 5961 7516 114218 121627
small 141118 25099 24764 39649 300481 326888
medium 49479 17516 22770 25841 123783 143118
large 46240 57975 64592 72618 138035 162041
very large 36896 46403 60722 61419 80850 100545
OVERALL 330556 152716 178809 207043 757367 854219
volume very small 31536 2835 2755 3692 64226 69164
small 368495 69662 76895 104610 791020 874903
medium 348862 128272 165515 175370 878061 1024949
large 1030196 1512316 1738610 1851873 3025485 3565978
very large 11275156 5954137 7407349 6629166 23408410 31380819
OVERALL 13054244 7667221 9391125 8764712 28167202 36915814
trade size very small 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.49 0.56 0.57
small 2.61 2.78 3.11 2.64 2.63 2.68
medium 7.05 7.32 7.27 6.79 7.09 7.16
large 22.28 26.09 26.92 25.50 21.92 22.01
very large 305.59 128.31 121.99 107.93 289.53 312.11
OVERALL 39.49 50.21 52.52 42.33 37.19 43.22
Propn Num very small 0.172 0.037 0.033 0.036 0.151 0.142
small 0.427 0.164 0.138 0.192 0.397 0.383
medium 0.150 0.115 0.127 0.125 0.163 0.168
large 0.140 0.380 0.361 0.351 0.182 0.190
very large 0.112 0.304 0.340 0.297 0.107 0.118
Propn Vol very small 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
small 0.028 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.028 0.024
medium 0.027 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.031 0.028
large 0.079 0.197 0.185 0.211 0.107 0.097
very large 0.864 0.777 0.789 0.756 0.831 0.850
Number of trades is a simple sum, volume of trades in pounds sterling, trade size averaged over
individual trade sizes. "Propn" figures are the number or volume in that size category expressed as
a percentage of the total number or volume of trades.
Samples are split into those that remained on SEAQ (SEAQ-SEAQ), those that remained on SETS
(SETS SETS) and those that switched from SEAQ to SETS (SEAQ SETS).
very small < £1000 < small < £5000 < medium < £10000 < large < £50000 < very large
4.7 A Measure of Information Content: Investment Trusts
4.7.1 Introduction
Earlier in this paper, we cast doubt over the interpretation of the Price Impact
measure, as a proxy for asymmetric information. The rationale behind this
interpretation is that informed trades have a permanent impact on prices, while other
trades lead to only transient volatility or noise. The price change over a suitable time
period (typically 30 minutes), should measure only the permanent impact, as the
transient component has since dissipated. How this process occurs is rarely defined
explicitly, and the differences between the process for alternative exchanges has not
yet been addressed. O'Hara (1995) assumes that the market maker can learn to
distinguish between the orders it receives, through professional relationships, but it is
not clear how the many liquidity suppliers on an anonymous order book, collectively
manage to filter out the effects of informed and uninformed trades. Ignoring this
issue for the moment, we address the question of how well the Price Impact measure
proxies for information in the intermediated market, SEAQ.
Harris (2002) notes that "spreads ... should be widest for instruments that most
traders cannot easily value", and also that, traders are more likely to have usefhl
information about a given stock than a diversified portfolio of stocks. Therefore, the
information content of trades in a diversified portfolio, such as investment trust
shares, should be lower than for individual stocks. If this is the case, we can test the
suitability of the price impact measure as a proxy for information asymmetry, by




We repeat the process described earlier, matching the investment trust shares with
other FTSE 250 companies. All of the investment trusts trade on SEAQ, and so the
matched sample also trades on SEAQ. We chose the Price and Market Capitalisation
algorithm. Matching was easier for the investment trust stocks, and so the maximum
average deviation was reduced from 0.75 to 0.375. The matched sample is shown in
Table 4.8, and the comparison of transaction costs is presented in Table 4.9.
4.7.3 Results
The Price Impact measure for the investment trust sample is lower than the matched
sample. The direction of this result conforms to expectation, and so we cannot reject
the hypothesis that Price Impact is a good measure of asymmetric information. Also
worth noting is that the Quoted Spread and the Effective Spread for the investment
trust sample is roughly half the matched sample. This is a good indication of how
information affects the transaction costs.
It is interesting that the Price Impact for the investment trust sample increases with
trade size, particularly at the large end of the scale, while the matched sample sees'a
decrease in Price Impact for the very large trades. This may be explained by the
transient volatility. There is no reason to believe that transient volatility is constant
with trade size. The transient component of the market impact may last longer for
large trades. This means that when comparing the Price Impact of different markets,
even if the mechanisms reacted to trades in a similar way (which we argued against
earlier), a difference in the average trade size would bias the comparison.
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TABLE 4.9 TRADING COST MEASURES FOR INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND MATCHED COMPANIES
Investment Matched





OVERALL 64.00 156.27 92.27
very small 56.82 117.93 61.11
small 54.76 120.19 65.44
medium 51.23 122.01 70.78
large 48.80 111.45 62.65
very large 41.94 59.14 17.20
OVERALL 52.07 110.47 58.40
very small 1.08 4.66 3.58
small 1.44 8.70 7.26
medium 1.51 15.36 13.85
large 2.50 39.45 36.94
very large 9.23 23.48 14.24
OVERALL 2.14 16.38 14.24
very small 55.74 113.27 57.53
small 53.32 111.49 58.17
medium 49.73 106.66 56.93
large 46.30 72.00 25.71
very large 32.71 35.66 2.95
OVERALL 49.93 94.10 44.16
Data set includes all trades between 1/9/98 and 1/9/99. Trades were excluded if reported late or if the
trade price was outside of the spread by more than 10%. Price and Market Capitalization figures were
taken as at 1/9/98. Investment trust stocks were matched against other stocks by Market
Capitalization and Price. Pairs were excluded if the average deviation was greater than 0.375.
Figures are quoted in basis points. Difference a simple dubtraction of the value for the investment
trust sample from the value for the matched sample.
very small < £1000 < small < £5000 < medium < £10000 < large < £50000 < very large
Quoted spread is the difference between the offer and bid price divided by the mid price
Effective Spread is two times the difference between the trade price and the mid price divided by the
mid price
Price Impact is two times the difference between the mid price 30 minutes after the trade and the
prevailing mid price, divided by the prevailing mid price.
Realised Spread is two times the difference between the trade price and the mid price 30 minutes
after the trade, divided by the prevailing mid price.
4.8 Summary
There are several aspects to the design of a market. Given the limited number of
comparable exchanges, it is difficult to evaluate the effect of just one aspect.
Comparisons of cross listed securities ignore the differences in the amount traded on
each market. Comparisons of matched stocks on different markets ignore the
investor profile, tax and information flow. Comparisons of market opening with
normal trading on the same market are distorted by the time lags in information flow
and quote revision. The comparison in this paper improves on all of these issues, by
comparing different trading platforms in the same country, in the same market, with
the same investors and that trade at the same time.
Using the methodology described by Haung and Stoll (1996) and Venkataraman
(2001) we find that SETS has much lower transaction costs. This result suggests that
the dealer market is less efficient than the automated order book, and contradicts the
conclusions of Venkataraman (2001). However, having raised questions about the
validity of the comparison, given the physical differences between the exchanges, we
revise the methodology and find a very different picture. On exchange transaction
costs increased dramatically for those stocks that switched from SEAQ to SETS.
This is attributed to the inability of the order book to cope well with large trades arid
the relative inexperience of London traders with regard to order strategy in an order
book market. The former explanation raises a question over the suitability of the
order book for the FTSE 250 stocks.
We also demonstrate that transaction costs, against expectation, decrease with size
on both markets. This result is attributed to the time selection properties of each
market, and it is suggested that for the less liquid markets and stocks (like the FTSE
250), this issue has a greater influence than the inventory risk or asymmetric
information risk theories, that lead to the opposite result in the largest exchanges.
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Finally, we compare investment trust stocks with a matched sample, to show the
extent of the asymmetric information risk on the efficiency of the market. We
support the use of Price Impact as a suitable proxy for informed trading, and also
show that the effective spread and the realized spread are significantly larger for the
matched sample.
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5 THE ORDER BOOK
5.1 Introduction
Having established some of the differences between the SETS order book and its
market maker predecessor SEAQ, we now analyse the order book in isolation.
Earlier we showed limitations in the use of theories established for other market
types, for an automated order book. The fact that traders now have the choice to
offer liquidity rather than demand it, makes the order book a fundamentally different
platform.
Another exciting aspect of the SETS order book is that it is relatively new. This
means that little empirical work has been carried out on SETS data. It also means
that market participants are acting without relevant collated data regarding the
efficiency of the market, the most profitable trading strategies or investor behaviour.
This offers an ideal area of study, with an untouched data set.
In this chapter we look at spread, depth, order size and the proportion traded on and
off the market, and determine how these statistics depend on the relative size of the
stock, seasonal variations and the likelihood of asymmetric information.
Chan and Lakonishok (1993) state that on the NYSE "institutional sales are more
likely than purchases to involve an intermediary broker", and use this to justify the
asymmetry of buyer and seller behaviour. The use of intermediary brokers on the
NYSE is justified by their access to other floor traders and the upstairs market. The
SETS order book offers no such advantage, so the presence of asymmetry in our
sample would reject this explanation, and add weight to alternative explanations,
such as short selling constraints and behavioural issues. As well as identifying
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asymmetries between LSE buyers and sellers, section 5.2 identifies which liquidity
measures (e.g. spread, depth at best, total depth) best reflect the differences in trader
behaviour.
Intraday patterns are studied in section 5.3. Admati and Pfliederer (1988) state that
traders gravitate towards the times of greatest liquidity. In Chapter 6 we test this
hypothesis, but first we must ascertain when the most liquid times of day are, and if
they differ for buyers and sellers. Abhyankar et al (1997) find a U-shaped intraday
pattern to liquidity. Ellul et al (2003) use this theory to justify why the NYSE has a
"U-shaped intraday pattern", so we might expect the liquidity provided by the order
book to follow a similar pattern. But liquidity can be measured in several ways. We
should determine which of our liquidity measures (e.g. same side depth at best,
quoted spread, weighted quoted spread, ratio of opposite side depth over same side
depth at best) follow the U-shaped pattern. If a measure does not follow this pattern,
then we may assume that the theories of Admati and Pfliederer (1988) and Ellul et al
(2003) are flawed, or that the measures of liquidity are given little importance by
traders.
Section 5.4 discusses how the order book changes over a two year period. Although
the age of a market is rarely discussed in the literature, we might expect a period bf
adjustment after a major change in the market microstructure. Our sample period
starts just 2 years after the introduction of the SETS order book, so we may expect to
find that the efficiency of the market improves throughout the period. Many papers
in this area (Abhyankar et al (1997), Ellul et al (2003), Beber and Caglio (2003),
Chordia et al (2002), Griffiths et al (2001)) choose bull markets for the sample
period. Our sample gives a more balanced view of market conditions. Beber and
Caglio (2003) show that investor behaviour differs as a result of stock performance
but ignore the importance of market performance. Ellul et al (2003) show that
positive market returns imply a greater likelihood of buy orders at or better than the
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best price, and a corresponding decrease of sell orders. However, they do not
explain how the choice of order type is affected for buyers and sellers. For example,
if a buyer is most likely to place a limit order inside the spread during a bull market,
what kind of order would he use during a bear market? Would the answer change if
"buyer" was replaced by "seller"?
Another important issue concerns how prices are set on the LSE, which has an
opening call auction, a continuous order book, and an unofficial dealer market. Are
any one of these markets more informative? And does this change with market
conditions? Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley et al (1997), and Parlour (1998)
define models for price formation in a continuous market, while Biais et al (1999)
and Madhavan and Panchapagesam (2000) address the issue of price setting in a non-
continuous market, but no one as yet, has addressed the issue of price formation in
the presence of both. Although we cannot determine what the price would have
been, if not for the presence of one of the trading platforms, we can measure the
performance during the trading day, and determine whether the continuous order
book market adds value to the price setting process. Panchapagesam (2000) finds
that specialist intervention induces "staleness, by tying the opening price to the
previous day's close". The LSE opening procedure is automated, so unless collusion
is present, the opening price should more freely match market expectations. This
will be determined in section 5.5
5.1.1 Data
Our data set is largely untapped, despite offering a greater level of detail than many
of the other world exchanges. One possible reasons why so little empirical research
has been carried out with the order book data is the computational effort required to
present it in a useful way. To give an indication of some of the problems, we
describe the basic approach to recreating the order book.
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The ViewOHe shows details of all orders placed, executed or removed from the
SETS order book for each stock. The individual stocks are identified by an IMAS
code. A stock's IMAS code can change for a number of reasons such as in the event
of a stock leaving a market segment (e.g. dropping from the FTSE 100 to the FTSE
250). Once the IMAS code has been married up with the "tradable investment code"
field by linking a specific order code in the ViewOHe and the ViewTNe table, we
can match the stocks in the sample to the IMAS code for that month. We match
each order on the ViewOHe table with an order on the ViewSOe table using the
"order code". This means that the limit price can be linked with the rest of the
details describing the order event.
We step through the order events on the ViewOHe table and take a snapshot of the
order book before each event. If more than one event occurs in a second (the SETS
order book can cope with up to ten order events per second), the snapshot is taken at
the start of the second only. This ensures that the details of the spread are
appropriate at the time of placing the order, which is what we need in order to
determine the trading strategy. In the event of an order being so large that it is
matched against several counter parties and so takes longer than a second to execute,
the details of the spread for the later parts of the trade will be incorrect. In the two
year sample for Vodafone, which comprised over 2,000,000 order events, there was
no such occurrence.
One problem with compiling aggregate information from time series data is the
persistent effect of data errors e.g. if an order was entered, but the record that showed
how the order was removed is missing, we might otherwise assume that the order is
still sitting on the order book. This kind of data error is rare (less than 0.1%), but not
to the extent that we could ignore it. Some of these erroneous orders can be removed
when the market price passes through the limit price, showing that it couldn't
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possibly still exist on the order book. The order book recreation program produces a
list of all outstanding orders at the end of the month. Inspection of these tables
shows some of the persistent problems that could be removed manually. The data
problems in the other direction (orders execute, when there is no record of it being
placed) are harder to solve. This will introduce a small bias to the result, and there is
no way around it. There is however, some effort required in identifying these orders,
and ensuring that the order book is not affected thereafter. Validation regarding the
size of orders and matching of order codes at various stages ensures that this error is
not persistent.
There are other data problems, where fields have been entered incorrectly. This is
usually the result of a missing decimal point, or other formatting problems. Some
trades are also reported incorrectly, before a "correction", and a "correct" trade is
added to the data set. Many of these problems are solved with validation at the
results compilation stage, rather than the order book construction stage. This is not
ideal, but filtering out erroneous data is prohibitively time consuming at this point.
5.1.2 Sample Selection
The LSE operates an automated order book for the FTSE 100 and the most liquid
FTSE 250 stocks. To study how efficient markets operate, it is important to look at
the largest and most frequently traded stocks. We therefore chose a selection of
stocks that remained in the FTSE 100 for the entire period of study. This had the
added bonus that each stock had a unique IMAS code for the entire period, which
simplified the programming. The list of stocks is shown in Table 5.1. The stocks are
listed in order of the average market capitalization. Market Capitalization was
obtained from Datastream, for the 1st trading day of each quarter in the sample
period, and averaged over these 8 dates. Of the 53 stocks that satisfied the criteria,
three groups of 10 stocks were chosen. In order to draw comparisons between the
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1 Vodafone 30195 36626 78780 85332 95418 205149 180306 154675 108310 1
2 Glaxo 74903 78378 67299 56540 63714 69035 73669 73764 69663 1
3 BT Group 58513 66501 72221 58968 98437 74307 58878 47528 66919 1
4 Shell Transport 36716 41458 49533 45382 51148 51099 56716 55374 48428 1
5 Smithkline Beecham 46864 50933 48401 38569 44368 49054 51047 51737 47622 1
6 Astrazaneca 24861 28849 43906 45009 45584 47259 54745 60485 43837 1
7 Uoyds TSB 46469 51752 47821 41630 42405 37506 34005 35029 42077 1
8 Barclays 19570 28074 28711 26327 26623 26385 24387 27313 25924 1
9 Cable & Wireless 17780 18108 19141 15989 25529 27157 32329 27388 22928 1
10 Diageo 24492 23133 23410 20705 17026 17267 20594 20697 20915 1
11 Prudential 17640 15454 18437 18105 23818 19120 19571 18117 18783
12 Royal Bank of Scotland 8405 11828 11815 11421 9794 22912 28930 37987 17886
13 British Sky Broadcasting 7873 9159 10231 9981 17216 26523 23921 19034 15492
14 CGU /Aviva 12316 12203 12063 12083 13090 12008 24189 21514 14933
15 Abbey National 18201 18214 17238 15324 14072 12193 10736 12721 14837
16 Reuters 8970 12871 11894 9911 12085 16393 16955 18611 13461
17 Tesco 11398 11074 11243 12301 12803 14706 13752 16612 12986
18 Colt Telecom 5308 7129 8546 9037 21137 19729 16763 13641 12661
19 RioTinto 7426 9064 11648 11120 15808 11439 12132 10524 11145
20 Pearson 7264 8570 7857 7980 12271 13545 12483 14946 10615
21 BAE Systems 8984 7408 7434 7142 12054 10964 12648 11265 9737
22 Standard Chartered 6965 9413 11437 8975 10194 9482 8850 10838 9519 2
23 British American Tobacco 8301 8045 13230 11174 7654 7098 9706 9736 9368 2
24 Siebe / Invensys 4991 10630 11601 10612 12486 9220 8748 5144 9179 2
25 Bank of Scotland 8869 10757 10951 8887 8957 8707 7692 7482 9038 2
26 Marks & Spencers 11804 11612 10533 9039 8465 7504 6864 5786 8951 2
27 Kingfisher 8847 10619 10080 8722 9399 6940 8738 6033 8672 2
28 National Grid/Transco 7074 6902 6573 6200 6993 8046 7765 8833 7298 2
29 Sainsburys (J) 9216 7361 7892 7123 6708 5762 6061 7177 7163 2
30 Rentokil Initial 12974 11003 6942 6170 6471 4795 3613 3504 6934 2
31 Bass / Six Continents 6969 6807 7414 5902 6763 7018 6364 5911 6643 2
32 GKN 5672 6703 7886 6968 6971 5655 6237 4777 6358
33 Hays 4526 5503 5756 5512 8500 7163 6278 6795 6254
34 Boots Group 9355 7996 7033 6072 5441 4744 4649 4586 6235
35 Telewest Communications 3722 5936 6325 4873 7547 10211 6585 3874 6134
36 31 Group 3451 3736 4360 4478 6608 7973 8203 9987 6099
37 RT Group 7969 6904 6792 6745 5314 3995 5310 5554 6073
38 BAA 7429 7258 6589 5405 4635 4236 5501 5778 5854
39 Reed Elsevier 5377 6372 5126 4226 5312 5186 6406 6366 5546
40 WPP Group 2803 4074 4153 4397 7575 7657 7363 6200 5528
41 Amvescap 3098 4160 3929 3346 4854 5803 7301 10230 5340
42 BOC Group 4204 4258 6096 6172 6531 5987 4621 4242 5264
43 BHP Billiton 2550 3212 4891 5361 7809 6243 5848 5751 5208
44 GUS 6372 6794 7040 4948 3641 3777 4335 4300 5151 3
45 Scottish Hydro / Scottish & Southern Energy 5924 4915 5755 4854 4257 4236 4973 4774 4961 3
46 Alliance and Leicester 5165 5004 5063 4675 4418 3713 3127 2911 4260 3
47 Land Securities 4288 4496 4796 4542 3876 3770 4092 4006 4233 3
48 EMI Group 3165 3617 4096 3428 4786 5202 5360 4084 4217 3
49 British Airways 4269 4504 4686 3641 4369 3693 4099 3051 4039 3
50 Imperial Chemicals Industries 3790 4005 4838 4685 4770 3701 3665 2657 4014 3
51 United Utilities 4689 4190 4263 3575 3293 3572 3554 3753 3861 3
52 Carlton Communications 3376 3704 3338 2754 3787 4461 5333 3397 3769 3
53 Reckitt Benckiser 3245 2769 2744 3019 3622 3820 4694 5101 3627 3
FTSE 100 stocks are ranked by average market capitalisation. Simple average is calculated from the market capitalisation at the start of each quarter in the two year period.
Sample designates the large (1), medium (2) and small (3) stock sample used in the remainder of the thesis. Market capitalisation measured in millions of pounds.
groups and attribute the differences to size, we chose the 3 groups to be as different
(in terms of average market capitalization) as possible. Sample 1 is the top ten
stocks, sample 2 contains stocks 22 to 31, and sample 3 contains stocks 44 to 53.
The period of study was chosen as 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2000 for several
reasons. Firstly, a whole number of calendar years avoids any seasonal biases, and
gives the opportunity for any seasonal trends to be investigated. The period starts at
the 1st of January (the 4th of January 1999 was actually the first trading day) because
limit orders that are left on the order book overnight are fewer for this day than any
other, which made the construction of the order book easier. Finally, the two year
period was chosen to avoid the bias of studying the order book during a bull period,
as so many other papers do. The FTSE 100 rose from 5882.6 to 6930.2 in 1999 and
was generally considered to be a bull period. The FTSE 100 fell from 6930.2 to
6222.5 in 2000 and for the purpose of this thesis we will consider it to be a bear
period. Although 2000 started positively, and many market participants may not
have considered it a bear market at the time, the 10% drop in the index value is
sufficiently different to the performance in 1999, to draw comparisons between bull
and bear markets.
5.1.3 Bid-offer Spread
The Bid-offer spread is the most common, and one of the most easily calculated
measures of liquidity. The problems and limitations of this measure are frequently
discussed in the academic literature, but rarely is an alternative suggested or
calculated. Before embarking on a study of the SETS order book, we first define an
alternative spread measure.
One important limitation of the bid-offer spread is that it ignores the issue of depth.
While more traditional market structures may require market makers to post bid and
119
offer quotes for a designated Normal Market Size (NMS), modern markets, and in
particular automated order books, may have a widely varying depth at either side of
the spread. The use of NMS is a broad-brush solution to the issue of depth. NMS is
typically calculated as the average trade size on the market, and so when the market
spread is quoted at NMS, it makes for an appropriate comparison. On an automated
order book, the depth is determined by the investors who place limit orders. The
variation in depth makes comparison of the spread at different times difficult to
analyse. One solution might be to calculate the NMS for the stocks trading on the
automated order book, and recalculate a weighted average price at either side. We
could then analyse the characteristics of the spread using this alternative definition.
This method allows for a secondary issue of the asymmetry of the depth on an
automated order book.
Another alternative is to calculate the effective spread (two times the distance from
the execution price to the mid price). This makes an explicit allowance for the
amount actually traded. It is worth noting that the amount actually traded may be
smaller than the amount that the investor wishes to trade, as trading decisions depend
on the state of the market. Another issue is that the mid price used in the calculation
is simply the midpoint of the quoted spread, and so some of the issues surrounding
the bid-offer spread can be found here as well.
An ideal measure of liquidity would allow for the asymmetry in demand, the
difference in trading strategy, and the changing market conditions. The last two
factors are hard enough to define, never mind measure, but an adjustment can be
made for the asymmetry of the order book. We could define the Weighted Quoted
Spread as the difference between the best offer price or best bid price (whichever has
the greater depth) and the weighted average price on the opposite side of the market
to fill a trade of the same depth. This measure is designed specifically to cope with
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situations where traders consistently front run (place order just inside the spread) on
one side of the market.
The calculation of this measure is limited by the data we have available. Only
summary data is collated for the order book, including the price and depth at the best
and next best prices, on either side of the market. If the depth at best price on one
side is greater than the depth at the best two prices on the other. This measure will
understate the asymmetry of the order book. However, even in this case, some
allowance has been made, and so the measure fulfils its objective. But we should
refine the definition to reflect this. The "Weighted Quoted Spread" is defined as the
difference between the immediate buying and selling price for a trade equal to the
"Current Market Size". The Current Market Size is defined as the depth on the side
with the greatest depth at best price, or the depth at the best two prices on the other
side, whichever is lower.
5.2 Volume, Spread and Depth
To put the results in subsequent sections in perspective, it is important to describe the
sub-samples. Many of the tables in this section are presented for the individual
stocks, to give an indication of variability and to expose any outliers, and thfen
summarised for each of the three sub-samples for comparison of the size related
phenomena. The tables are presented for buy and sell orders separately and as a ratio
of buy orders over sell orders where applicable. Providing such detail comes at the
cost of brevity, but the emphasis here is on exposing the data to scrutiny, rather than
hiding behind aggregate statistics. This pattern of tables (buy, sell and buy/sell) is
prevalent throughout the remainder of the thesis. Table 5.2 shows some of the order
book characteristics.
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weighted QS st dev
weighted st
dev number volume
1 0.236 0.630 0.264 1.469 620.27 42944
2 0.271 0.664 0.375 0.879 417.65 4942
3 0.323 0.824 0.403 3.224 436.94 5968
4 0.279 0.932 0.533 35.950 334.89 11678
5 0.346 0.913 0.585 20.311 346.25 4482
6 0.272 0.668 0.428 1.179 290.75 1516
7 0.332 0.883 0.538 17.355 317.24 4321
8 0.333 0.827 0.517 1.271 273.90 1980
9 0.398 1.002 0.549 2.637 277.68 4266
10 0.390 1.116 0.618 21.473 220.24 3315
avg 0.318 0.846 0.481 10.575 353.58 8541
22 0.647 2.148 1.443 43.291 142.63 1222
23 0.666 2.990 1.435 85.579 123.13 1675
24 0.511 1.870 0.876 56.540 189.16 5174
25 0.669 2.672 1.382 83.154 142.54 1499
26 0.491 1.231 0.718 2.129 194.09 3660
27 0.543 3.447 0.927 148.738 178.40 2080
28 0.507 2.440 0.780 118.552 120.97 1565
29 0.662 4.436 1.302 176.595 127.56 1937
30 0.637 1.778 1.055 12.669 134.59 3604
31 0.719 4.209 1.209 110.387 125.61 891
avg 0.605 2.722 1.113 83.763 147.87 2331
44 0.761 3.673 1.514 91.734 113.94 1118
45 0.918 6.689 1.454 144.449 98.28 868
46 0.922 5.365 1.665 147.920 93.29 596
47 0.620 7.826 1.416 213.143 98.96 600
48 0.951 7.384 1.588 201.019 98.38 916
49 0.623 1.694 1.197 13.928 134.71 1938
50 0.781 2.662 1.627 43.310 108.86 950
51 0.858 6.651 1.524 151.403 93.30 581
52 0.758 7.920 1.496 203.014 115.48 1087
53 0.791 3.794 1.493 114.442 100.91 805
avg 0.798 5.366 1.497 132.436 105.61 946
avg tot 0.574 2.978 1.030 75.591 202.35 3939
Rank refers to the size, measured as the average market capitalisation over the two year sample
QS: Quoted bid offer spread expressed as a percentage
QS Weighted: "Assymetry Adjusted" quoted spread expressed as a percentage
QS st dev: Standard Deviation of Quoted Spread
QS weighted st dev: Standard Deviation of weighted quoted spread
Number: Number of orders placed in thousands
Volume: Volume of orders placed in millions of pounds
TABLE 5.2B SPREAD BY MARKET CAPITALISATION WEIGHTED BY SELL ORDERS
US
QS weighted st
Rank QS weighted QS st dev dev number volume
1 0.235 0.626 0.248 1.045 566.20 44403
2 0.273 0.667 0.423 0.930 404.46 3431
3 0.322 0.822 0.388 3.243 411.37 6509
4 0.274 0.742 0.425 15.380 336.28 11480
5 0.356 1.320 0.633 45.490 337.72 4634
6 0.271 0.663 0.448 1.164 299.23 1491
7 0.326 0.851 0.513 13.051 306.67 4260
8 0.326 0.809 0.478 1.152 271.70 2334
9 0.402 1.006 0.553 1.349 270.04 4497
10 0.384 1.077 0.590 26.236 217.17 3156
avg 0.317 0.858 0.470 10.904 342.08 8620
22 0.627 2.053 1.428 76.062 139.83 1174
23 0.674 3.060 1.543 85.368 124.82 1622
24 0.531 2.056 1.023 75.649 191.86 5213
25 0.660 2.343 1.159 77.949 139.18 1439
26 0.484 1.212 0.651 1.744 189.82 3635
27 0.533 2.558 0.834 107.628 167.43 1920
28 0.500 1.486 1.245 31.773 120.97 1555
29 0.634 2.626 1.210 84.181 130.19 1837
30 0.618 1.631 1.049 2.890 137.74 3548
31 0.695 2.709 1.115 59.230 126.85 875
avg 0.596 2.173 1.126 60.247 146.87 2282
44 0.735 2.195 1.437 20.988 112.63 1093
45 0.881 4.173 1.404 96.436 102.63 913
46 0.874 4.802 1.559 149.515 100.35 593
47 0.632 5.024 1.939 137.218 100.91 752
48 0.922 6.016 1.485 208.672 97.10 1488
49 0.631 1.809 1.102 34.460 138.35 1871
50 0.754 2.035 1.748 19.118 112.25 920
51 0.833 3.452 1.221 64.121 95.30 588
52 0.732 4.124 1.421 119.003 113.02 1044
53 0.730 2.556 1.184 49.010 102.68 751
avg 0.772 3.619 1.450 89.854 107.52 1001
avg tot 0.562 2.217 1.015 53.669 198.83 3968
Rank refers to the size, measured as the average market capitalisation over the two year sample
QS: Quoted bid offer spread expressed as a percentage
QS Weighted: "Assymetry Adjusted" quoted spread expressed as a percentage
QS st dev: Standard Deviation of Quoted Spread
QS weighted st dev: Standard Deviation of weighted quoted spread
Number: Number of orders placed in thousands
Volume: Volume of orders placed in millions of pounds
TABLE 5.3A DEPTH BY MARKET CAPITALISATION, WEIGHTED BY BUY ORDERS
Propn
Rank Propn BD ND Propn TD BTD BBD OBD OTD
1 29.41 2.42 1.40 3891 135 121 4110
2 7.97 1.84 0.97 349 15 11 414
3 8.92 2.06 1.36 564 22 23 641
4 13.84 1.83 1.24 707 55 53 881
5 21.44 2.20 0.92 355 18 19 467
6 7.85 1.92 1.65 122 8 7 104
7 8.30 1.68 1.06 339 20 20 445
8 9.51 2.61 1.38 160 10 10 167
9 9.35 2.05 1.38 361 18 21 403
10 10.54 1.82 1.32 331 23 22 332
avg 12.71 2.04 1.27 718 32 31 796
22 7.50 1.92 1.39 153 12 12 160
23 8.61 2.04 1.22 219 31 30 278
24 11.77 1.91 1.04 524 42 40 778
25 6.66 1.85 1.10 161 15 15 216
26 7.77 1.91 1.23 563 29 28 663
27 9.69 1.82 1.16 206 16 16 263
28 14.11 1.90 1.54 349 20 21 285
29 8.99 1.93 1.31 256 22 21 282
30 13.52 2.13 1.17 497 45 39 650
31 9.01 2.06 1.27 104 11 11 141
avg 9.77 1.95 1.24 303 24 23 372
44 10.53 2.02 1.75 177 15 15 158
45 8.66 2.15 1.87 118 14 14 101
46 18.65 2.16 1.61 92 11 10 87
47 9.29 2.12 1.45 97 11 11 101
48 12.71 2.28 1.52 143 15 14 152
49 13.84 2.32 1.10 252 21 20 334
50 10.72 2.16 1.21 140 22 19 399
51 10.00 2.24 1.54 84 11 11 89
52 12.14 2.15 1.48 150 14 14 189
53 9.94 2.08 2.18 157 12 11 170
avg 11.65 2.17 1.57 141 15 14 178
avg tot 11.38 2.05 1.36 387 24 23 449
Rank refers to the size, measured as the average market capitalisation over the two year sample
Prop" BD: Ratio at depth of best bid price over depth at best offer price
Propn ND: Ratio of depth at best two prices on bid side over the depth at
best two prices on the offer side
Prop" TD: Ratio of total bid side depth over total offer side depth
BTD: total depth on the bid side of the market
BBD: depth at best bid price
OBD: depth at best offer price
OTP: total depth on the offer side of the market
TABLE 5.3B DEPTH BY MARKET CAPITALISATION, WEIGHTED BY SELL ORDERS
Propn
Rank Propn BD ND Propn TD BTD BBD OBD OTD
1 31.15 2.28 1.46 3965 125 128 4002
2 6.65 2.00 0.99 360 19 11 409
3 6.63 1.99 1.41 581 21 23 636
4 12.11 1.75 1.34 733 51 56 857
5 11.05 2.03 0.93 359 17 20 465
6 5.59 1.84 1.65 123 8 8 104
7 5.82 1.65 1.07 343 19 20 447
8 7.08 1.99 1.35 158 10 12 170
9 5.86 1.99 1.41 368 18 19 401
10 8.93 1.80 1.36 335 22 23 328
avg 10.09 1.93 1.30 733 31 32 782
22 6.71 2.02 1.38 151 12 12 161
23 7.50 2.16 1.23 220 30 30 274
24 8.56 1.83 1.15 534 39 42 766
25 6.86 2.01 1.15 163 15 15 211
26 5.95 1.86 1.28 568 28 29 636
27 7.14 1.86 1.22 212 16 17 261
28 10.37 2.13 1.63 352 21 21 286
29 7.48 2.09 1.38 264 22 21 279
30 9.97 2.32 1.21 511 47 40 648
31 8.78 2.29 1.39 108 11 11 138
avg 7.93 2.06 1.30 308 24 24 366
44 7.79 2.32 1.79 176 15 15 158
45 9.84 2.64 2.14 125 15 14 99
46 8.92 2.52 1.69 95 11 10 86
47 9.57 2.56 1.57 100 11 11 99
48 10.53 2.84 1.66 147 16 13 149
49 9.58 2.44 1.17 258 21 20 336
50 16.55 2.43 1.33 146 22 18 395
51 8.30 2.70 1.62 87 11 11 89
52 10.69 2.45 1.50 151 14 14 193
53 8.65 2.52 1.77 158 12 11 177
avg 10.04 2.54 1.62 144 15 14 178
avg tot 9.35 2.18 1.41 395 23 23 442
Rank refers to the size, measured as the average market capitalisation over the two year sample
Prop" BD: Ratio at depth of best bid price over depth at best offer price
Propn ND: Ratio of depth at best two prices on bid side over the depth at
best two prices on the offer side
Prop" TD: Ratio of total bid side depth over total offer side depth
BTD: total depth on the bid side of the market
BBD: depth at best bid price
OBD: depth at best offer price
5.2.1 Volume
The first sample has over three times the order volume of the next sample, which has
over three times the order volume of the last sample. The samples were chosen on
the basis of market capitalization, so it was not certain that the order volume would
follow this pattern from large to small. This gives us a suitable platform to compare
the size related results. Note that, within each sample, there is considerable variation
in the order volume. This may be an indication of other stock attributes, which lead
to greater speculative interest and stock price volatility.
We find a less extreme relationship for the number of trades, which implies that the
average trade size is larger for the larger companies. It is not clear whether this
larger trade size reflects greater demand from large institutional traders, or simply
that their order strategy is less compromised in the more liquid markets.
5.2.2 Spread
The quoted spread and the weighted average quoted spread are both wider for
smaller stocks. Many studies find such a relationship, but it is still difficult to
explain the extent of this phenomenon. The quoted spread for the middle sample is
almost double that of the large stock sample. Even though these are all FTSE 100
companies, and so receive similar levels of media speculation and attention from
information gathering services, this statistic states that compared to the risk of
asymmetric information in the larger sample, risk for the smaller sample is twice as
great. Part of the explanation may be due to stock prices. Although we haven't
plotted the stock price here, it is reasonable to assume that larger companies have a
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higher stock price and so the tick size is smaller as a percentage of the price.
However, this is unlikely to explain the result in full.
The difference between the quoted spread and the depth weighted quoted spread is
larger for the small stocks (in real and proportional terms). This suggests that the
order book for the smaller stocks is more likely to be lopsided. The weighted quoted
spread is more than 6 times the size of the quoted spread for the smaller stock
sample, which suggests that the order placed behind the best price on one side, could
be more than 6 times the spread behind it. This suggests a very thin market,
particularly at the time of buy orders. The asymmetry of the order book will be
studied in greater detail later on, but it is worth noting here that the weighted quoted
spread is much smaller when totalled over the market sell orders.
We also find that the spreads are more variable for the smaller stocks. This reflects
the lower level of liquidity, and the lumpiness in demand for buying and selling. If
the greater demand for trading in the larger stocks is at least partly due to a greater
number of investors, we might expect the aggregate response rate to a change in the
spread to be quicker. A large trade in a smaller stock is also more likely to have a
larger impact, which would add to this result.
5.2.3 Depth
As expected, depth at best price, and total depth, increase with the size of company.
The total depth increases at a steeper gradient than the best price depth. This may be
explained by the behaviour of competitive limit order traders, which will be
investigated later. We can also see that the ratio of depth at the best price and in total
is always positive, and in some cases extremely positive: Stock 1 (Vodafone) has a
ratio of 29.41:1, which implies a huge asymmetry in demand, or at least trading
strategy. It is not clear from these statistics, why there is such an asymmetry in
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behaviour. Allen and Gorton (1992) noted that investors are more likely to use
market orders for sells, than they are for buys. Parlour (1998) however states that the
choice of limit order or market order depends on the state of the market, and so a
huge asymmetry in depth as experienced, would make it more likely for sellers to use
limit orders. Perhaps there is a greater propensity to front run on the offer side? It is
not clear why investors may choose to do this, or whether it is a worthwhile strategy,
but it would explain the observed results.
The proportion of total depth has the same sign as described above, but is far lower.
This confirms the result that buyers are more likely to use limit orders, but the
difference in this proportion and the proportion at best prices, highlights the issues of
investor behaviour, game playing and order strategy. For two stocks out of the 30
stock sample we find the total depth to be larger on the offer side than the bid side.
It is not surprising to see this for a fraction of the sample, as this most likely reflects
poor performance. However, it is interesting that stock 5 (SmithKline Beecham) has
the second largest ratio at best prices, but the lowest ratio in total. This may suggest
game playing, as people try to indicate trading interest in the opposite direction than
they are posting their real orders. This may also be due to the performance of the
stock or a different cross section of investors. For example, if the small proportion
of informed traders are net sellers, and informed traders use market orders rather than
competitive limit orders, the offer side depth at best may be lower, with only a small
impact on the total depth.
Given that buyers and sellers trade the same volume, the fact that the order book is
deeper on the bid side indicates a preference for sellers to take liquidity. This
supports the theory of Allen and Gorton (1992) which suggests that sellers are less
patient, but perhaps the effect is exaggerated since the greater bid side depth gives
greater incentive to place a market sell order. While this highlights the importance
of the order book in the investor's decision making process, it does not tell us
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whether the buyers and the sellers use this information equally or at all. It is possible
that the buyers structure their trades systematically, placing limit and market orders
and observing the impact, while sellers have a much simpler approach that ignores or
under-weights the significance of the standing orders.
There is no clear pattern to the ratio of bid side depth to offer side depth, with size of
company. The middle group seems to have a lower ratio than the larger or smaller
stocks. It is possible that there is a relationship present, but more likely that the ratio
of buyers and sellers depends on the performance and volatility of the stock and the
types of investor who are trading in the stock, which are only loosely related to size.
5.3 Daily Trading Patterns
Table 5.4 shows how the spread and depth changes throughout the trading day. The
statistics are averaged over each trade within each quarter hour. This introduces a
bias towards the stocks and periods with the highest trading volume. As we are
looking for a general picture, and have not yet established what biases these factors
might introduce, this is adequate for our purposes.
5.3.1 Depth
Overall the depth figures vary considerably. The depth at best starts high, drops until
about 9:30, when it recovers and stays fairly consistent for the rest of the day. The
number of investors at best price starts low and increases until 10:30 and then
remains roughly constant throughout the rest of the day. This reflects the uncertainty
at the start of the trading day. Investors may set the limit price without reference to
the order book until it stabilises in the mid morning. At this point they are more
likely to follow the lead of another investor, and post an order at the best price. One
of the reasons the market is less stable at the start of the day, is the larger than
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average order size. This also explains why the number and depth at best act in
opposite directions during the first couple of hours. There is one spurious figure in
the table for the 11:30 BBD1. This represents a huge order that swamps the statistic.
This trade has been left in for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is a genuine offer to
trade and would be binding in the event of a counter party choosing to trade.
Secondly, there is no justifiable way to adjust the volume of this order. Thirdly, it
draws attention to an unusual occurrence of investor behaviour, and shows how
sensitive the statistics are to such events.
The total depth follows a different pattern. Total depth peaks around 8:30, drops
sharply and then increases until around 3pm when it plateaus. The number and depth
statistics are fairly consistent. We will discuss the daily patterns of the orders placed
later in the thesis, but for now we note that the standing orders are largest first thing
in the morning, when many investors may be reacting to private information, and
towards the end of the day, when trading activity picks up before the close.
The ratio of depth at the best bid price and the best sell price fluctuates a great deal
with no clear pattern. We might expect this, given the possibility for front running
and other order strategies, but the extent of the daily fluctuations is still surprising.
The ratio of the total depth on the bid side and the depth at the sell side is mo're
informative. The low points (when there is more demand from sellers or less
demand from buyers than usual) are first thing in the morning and 14:45-15:30, and
the high point is 8:45-9:15. We might expect first thing in the morning to be the
time of day with the most privately informed trades, given the period of time
available for information gathering. By this rationale, we might expect more buyers
than sellers, using the argument that buyers are more likely to be informed. If there
is truth in this argument, there appears to be a lag to this predicted behaviour. One
explanation for a lag concerns the behaviour of large institutions. Some companies
1 BBD is the depth at the best bid price.
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have meetings mid morning, to discuss the news and set the trading strategy. This
level of bureaucracy might explain the lagged results. But perhaps informed buyers
simply wait to see how the market reacts at the open before acting. Another
explanation is that the informed buyers use market orders at the opening, and then
use limit orders to try to fill the rest of their requirement, once the volatility of the
opening has passed.
5.3.2 Spread
The results are similar to those of Abhyankar et al (1997). The quoted spread (by
either definition) starts the day at more than 4 times the daily average. This reflects
the greater uncertainty at the start of the day. Although Madhavan and
Pabchapagesan (2000) have shown the price set in the opening procedure to be very
informative, it may still take time for investors to evaluate this information or at least
to perceive the risk to have been mitigated. By 10am the spread has levelled off, and
it remains fairly constant for the rest of the day. The weighted quoted spread varies a
lot more. This suggests that the quoted spread is kept constant by the gravitational
pull effect first described by Cohen et al (1981). They state that investors are more
likely to place orders inside the spread, when it is wider. But as the spread narrows,
there comes a point when the investor would benefit from placing a market order
instead. As well as this rational explanation, there is the possibility of behavioural
biases: If investors become used to a certain level of quoted spread they are likely to
maintain this relationship. Whatever the reason, the quoted spread is kept at a steady
level for most of the day, while the weighted quoted spread varies. The weighted
quoted spread is not a commonly analysed variable, so investors are unlikely to base
their decision on it. Furthermore, we may conjecture that the decision between a
limit order or a market order may depend more on the spread than the asymmetry of
the depth. This is something we will address later in chapter 6.
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5.3.3 Performance
"15R -1" represents the average gain over the quarter hour. It has also been
expressed as a ratio with the average fifteen minute return throughout the trading
day. By 09:30 the market settles down and the market moves rises between 0.16%
and 0.21%, in each 15 minute period. There is no clear pattern throughout the day.
However, the returns in the first hour and a half of trading are unusual. The first and
last quarters of the first hour are extremely high (0.5% and 0.8%) and the 09:00 to
09:15 period is extremely low (0.003%). The variable start to the opening of the
market may affect the first quarter, but this does not explain the huge difference in
returns in the 08:45-09:15 period. Perhaps there are announcements at 09:00 or
perhaps this adds more weight to the idea that large institutions don't start trading
when the market opens. If different types of investor choose to trade for different
subsets of the day (e.g. ignoring the opening auction or the closing auction, or taking
a lunch break) then the market performance might reflect that.
5.4 Seasonal Patterns / Bull to Bear
Having established the basic statistics for the order book, and how they vary
throughout the day, we now investigate the seasonal variations. The primary aim of
this section is to identify how the order book varies as a result of seasonal trends, the
growing practical knowledge of market participants and the shift from bull to bear
market. The secondary aim is to confirm the suitability of the sample choice, for the
comparisons in subsequent chapters.
Table 5.5 consists of all orders placed on the SETS order book, as opposed to just
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year sample has been broken up into the 24 months to highlight seasonal patterns and
trends from year 1 to year 2. One of the motivations for choosing the two year
sample, was to compare a bull market with a bear market. Although other trends
may explain some of the results, we should consider year 1 as a bull market, and year
2 as a bear market.
5.4.1 Spread and Depth
Overall, there is much more order activity in the second year. On both sides of the
spread, the depth at the best price is almost double and the total depth is
approximately three times as big in the second year. The quoted spread decreases in
the second year, and becomes less variable. This indicates a more competitive
market during the bear period. However, we would expect the spread to narrow as
the number of traders using the order book increases in preference to the market
dealers. Looking at the weighted quoted spread, we find a very different picture.
This spread measure more than doubled in year 2. This indicates that a realistic
"symmetrical depth" spread increases during the bear market. The measure is not
directional, and so we cannot conclude which side of the spread has a below average
depth, but it does suggest a greater depth asymmetry.
There are two reasons for changes between the years, and they work in opposite
directions. Firstly, as traders become more accustomed to the SETS order book, they
are more willing to trade on it. This could be the basis for the observed results.
However, the sample was chosen to illustrate the bull and bear period. We might
expect that the order activity would decrease in the bull market, but this is not the
case. Although the 2000 bear market is tame in comparison to the periods around
market crashes, we would still expect to see the behavioural aspects of traders'
behaviour to become apparent with less optimism than normal, in the media at that
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time. We should note that these are orders sitting on the book and not trades.
Perhaps investors trade more cautiously and thoughtfully during a bear period?
5.4.2 Proportion of Buyers and Sellers
One expected result that does materialize during the bear phase is the relative
proportion of standing orders on either side of the spread. The proportion of buy
orders to sell orders fell from 1.45 to 1.24. Buy orders still outweigh the sell orders
in a bear market as traders tend to sell with market orders rather than leaving an
order to be picked off from the book. In fact, with a pessimistic view of the market,
we might expect even more sellers to trade aggressively, and so this measure may
actually understate the impact of the bear market.
Curiously "Propn BD"1 increases from year 1 to year 2. If there is a greater
probability of bad news during a bear market, we might expect sellers to be better
informed than normal, and so use market orders rather than competitive limit orders.
Or perhaps all buyers are more cautious and are more inclined to try to win the
spread. If traders have fewer buy orders to place, then they may take more time
monitoring them. Also, if uninformed liquidity traders believe that the stock they
have to buy will come down, this would also act as an incentive to use a limit order.
There are many possible explanations for this result, but they all point to the fact that
investors behave very differently during optimistic and pessimistic market
conditions.
5.4.3 Up Days and Down Days
The 1DR variable was added to this table to illustrate the extent of the shift from
Bull to Bear. 1DR represents the return from the market open to the market close (or
1
Propn BD is the ratio of the depth at best bid price over the depth at best offer price
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more precisely the end of the VWAP period at 16:30). We might expect this statistic
to decrease in the second year as the market declined by 10%, but this is not
observed. There are a number of explanations for this. Firstly, the statistic is a
simple un-weighted arithmetic mean, and so if several smaller stocks outperformed a
few larger stocks then the measure would be positive, despite a decline in the index,
which is capitalisation-weighted. Secondly, this measure makes no allowance for
trading after hours, and price changes from the end of each VWAP period, through
the closing auction and the opening auction, to the start of open trading the next day.
This does not debase the results. In fact, it supports the theory that the speculative
nature of continuous trading drives prices above the realistic or underlying value, and
that these movements are corrected during the opening auction, which reflects the
aggregate supply and demand more accurately.
5.4.4 Volume
The number of orders placed increased by 35% and the volume of orders placed
increased by 140%. The increase in order activity is partly attributable to the fact
that SETS was attracting a greater proportion of market activity. It may also be due
to a shift towards less aggressive trading strategies. Aggressive trading is discussed
at length in the next chapter, but for now it may simply be interpreted as the demand
for immediacy. An aggressive market order that moves the market price has a score
of 1, while a passive limit order placed far away from the current spread has a score
of 6. The un-weighted average of the aggressive scores shows a slight increase. This
result supports the theory, but is very weak. One reason for the weakness may be the
shift in the proportion of buyers and sellers. If there are more sell orders in year 2,
and if sellers are indeed more aggressive, this measure would understate the impact
on the expected volume of orders.
131
5.4.5 Sample Suitability
We have identified monthly patterns that may be attributed to investor behaviour.
These theories will be investigated further in Chapter 6. We have also identified
year 1 to year 2 patterns. We cannot say with certainty whether this is a result of the
shift in market sentiment, due to greater knowledge, or a gloomier forecast.
However, we can say that the sample selected is long enough, and over a suitably
varied period of market activity, to yield results that are not biased towards a bull
market.
5.5 Proportion of Trading On and Off the Market
Comparisons of market activity often ignore everything outside of the market. The
comparisons in the next chapter do exactly that. So in this section we put the order
book into the context of the total demand for trading in a given stock. The aim is to
identify any significant patterns in the data, and conclude whether the sample is
appropriate for further comparison. For this comparison we use a different data set.
The total number of orders placed should not be compared with the trading activity
off the market, and so we only use the orders that execute, at least in part, in this
comparison.
A significant proportion of the total trading volume occurs off the market between
investors, and the firms that acted as market makers before the switch from SEAQ to
SETS. In chapter 4, we found that the proportion of trading activity on SETS
increased for the period September 1999 to July 2001. It is important to establish if
and how this relationship affects the sample for the latter part of the thesis. The
following section looks at the proportion of trading on and off the market. The
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results are presented for the number and volume of trades taking place on the market,
off the market and for all ordinary trades. The proportion of on market trades and
the ratio of automated trades over automated and ordinary trades is also shown. The
importance of the comparison between automated and ordinary trades is in
comparing the set of trades where the investors made a decision to trade off the
market, rather than being bound by a previously agreed trade, or part of a portfolio
transaction (buying a basket of stocks).
5.5.1 Market Capitalization
Table 5.6 shows the proportion of trading activity on and off the market by size of
company. The number of trades occurring on the order book, expressed as a
percentage of the total number of trades, decreases with the size of the company.
However, this is distorted by the average order size on and off the market for each
stock. We might expect the more liquid order books of the larger stocks to cope with
larger orders, and that is what happens in practice. The proportion of the volume of
trading increases with size of company. This supports the theory that some investors
choose the trading platform based on expected liquidity.
The average order size is expressed in absolute terms, and so we would expect the
average order size to increase with size of company. The increase we observe for the
off market trades is much shallower than the increase for automated trades. We
established in sections 4.5 and 4.6 that the transaction costs are prohibitively high on
the order book for very large trades, so these trades are either broken up or routed to
the unofficial market makers. This means that the off market transactions are a
mixture of very big and very small orders (relative to the automated transactions).
Simplifying the situation like this, we can consider the average off market trade as a
weighted average of large trades and small trades. This means that for the smaller
stocks, there are either more large off market trades, or the large trades are
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proportionately larger. If there were more large trades, this might suggest a trade
size selection issue, whereby investors choose to trade through dealers for fear of
moving the market. If the large trades were proportionately larger, we might
attribute this to an investor size selection issue. For example, a large trader, who
chooses to trade through dealers due to habit or procedure, trades his holdings with
regard to the proportions of his portfolio, rather than the percentage of the market
capitalization of the company share.
5.5.2 Seasonal Patterns
Table 5.7 shows the proportion of trading on and off the order book, over the two
year sample period. There is a small increase in the proportion of the total trading
taking place on the order book. This result holds for the unweighted and the volume
weighted statistic. This is consistent with our earlier finding that traders showed a
reluctance to switch from their traditional trading methods to the order book.
However, it may also be a reflection of the state of the market. As we are using the
year 1 to year 2 comparison to highlight differences in the bull and bear market, it is
worth noting that the order book may offer better opportunities for sellers and so it
becomes a more popular choice during a bear period. We have shown previously
that the bid side depth is usually higher, which supports this theory. 1
There seems very little seasonal pattern in the proportion on and off the market. The
proportion varies month to month, and the relationships between months is
inconsistent when comparing year 1 and year 2. We might assume that the seasonal
patterns in stock returns might be reflected in the order book, but there is no clear
evidence here.
Table 5.8 shows that overall, the average trade size increases from year 1 to year 2
both on and off the market. In year 1, the trade size was roughly equal on and off the
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TABLE 5.8 AVERAGE TRADE SIZE ON AND OFF MARKET BY MONTH





1999 1 9.799 8.943 10.434 0.523 0.957 10.24
1999 2 9.936 7.813 9.293 0.560 1.048 9.49
1999 3 9.599 8.203 10.636 0.539 0.929 10.33
1999 4 9.853 13.860 15.243 0.416 0.727 13.55
1999 5 10.156 9.980 11.956 0.504 0.896 11.33
1999 6 10.408 10.858 12.965 0.489 0.865 12.03
1999 7 9.637 9.239 11.201 0.511 0.907 10.62
1999 8 9.117 9.397 10.757 0.492 0.896 10.17
1999 9 8.839 9.986 11.920 0.470 0.825 10.71
1999 10 12.004 10.900 13.151 0.524 0.942 12.74
1999 11 12.822 11.605 14.061 0.525 0.939 13.66
1999 12 12.063 11.073 14.048 0.521 0.903 13.36
avg 10.353 10.155 12.139 0.506 0.903 11.52
2000 1 13.245 15.033 17.538 0.468 0.834 15.89
2000 2 24.089 34.891 39.881 0.408 0.712 33.83
2000 3 15.252 16.907 21.534 0.474 0.789 19.34
2000 4 14.858 17.113 19.948 0.465 0.827 17.97
2000 5 15.656 16.582 20.673 0.486 0.836 18.73
2000 6 14.014 15.554 19.088 0.474 0.828 16.93
2000 7 13.289 15.250 18.218 0.466 0.824 16.13
2000 8 16.211 15.798 18.292 0.506 0.928 17.48
2000 9 16.901 19.084 22.448 0.470 0.841 20.10
2000 10 15.875 17.522 20.542 0.475 0.858 18'.50
2000 11 16.291 18.521 20.855 0.468 0.861 18.91
2000 12 14.251 19.525 23.387 0.422 0.744 19.14
avg 15.828 18.482 21.867 0.465 0.823 19.41
avg tot 13.090 14.318 17.003 0.486 0.863 15.47
%age inc 153 182 180 92 91 169
AT: automatic trades that execute on the SETS order book
O: ordinary trades that are arranged away from the central market
Not AT: all trades that occur away from the central market
%age (AT/AT+O): percentage of "normal" trades that execute on the market
%age (AT/Total): percentage of all trades that execute on the market
Average trade size measured in thousands of pounds
market, but in year 2, the off market trades were bigger. The increase in trade size
on the market, may reflect the greater liquidity offered by the investors as they
become more accustomed to (and more efficient at) using the order book. The
relative increase in size off the market may reflect the lower information asymmetry
risk that the off market dealers may have experienced since the switch in trading
platform. An overall increase is also expected since the prices are on average higher
than the previous year.
5.5.3 Up and Down Days
An old adage states that "it takes volume to move prices". That may be true, but this
says nothing about the relative proportion of volume that might occur in and away
from the centralised market. Table 5.9 shows the average number and volume of
trades that occurred on days with different daily, returns. The daily returns are
measured from opening to 16:30 (as described in section 5.4.3). The days are
categorised into extreme (more than a 10% decline, or more than a 10% or 20%
increase) or moderate (between 5% and 10% change in either direction) or small
(between 1% and 5% in either direction or less than 1% change).
The highest proportion (38% of the number or 33% of the volume) of automated
trading occurs during stable trading days. Although this implies that more than 50%
of the trading volume occurs away from the market, we should note that if traders are
acting as market makers off the market, this volume is double counted, since the
market maker records two trades, rather than matching the buyer and seller directly.
If all of the off market trading included a pseudo market maker (and none of the
trading on the order book did), it would imply that 55% of the number or 50% of the
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The proportion of trading on the book decreases for the moderate and extreme days,
other than days with a greater than 20% increase. This result is strongest for the
number of trades. Glosten (1994) believes that the order book is less able to cope
with extreme volatility than a market maker, so it makes sense that traders would
take their business away from the market during volatile times (when market
liquidity is lower than average). It is also possible that trading halts imposed by the
market regulators force investors to take their business away from the market on the
extreme days. However, neither of these theories explain why such a large
proportion of trades go through the order book during the very extreme up days.
5.6 Summary
We have addressed many of the issues regarding the order book, how it varies within
our sample of 30 stocks, and how it varies through time. We found that spread
(using quoted spread and weighted quoted spread) and total depth increase with the
size of stock, but this result does not hold for depth at best price. The asymmetry of
buyers and sellers does not depend on the size of the stock. Sell side depth is larger
in total. Average depth is roughly symmetrical at best price, although when
weighted by buy/sell orders, the ratio of depth is always greater than average at the
bid/offer side of the spread. This supports the theory that order choice depends 6n
the prevailing market conditions.
Depth and Spread measures are highest at the start of the day, decrease for the first
hour and stay roughly constant for the rest of the day. Since liquidity is greater when
spread is lower and depth is higher, there is no definitive answer to "when is the
market most liquid". Although investors may feel drawn to the opening and closing
call auctions for many reasons, there is no clear reason why traders may choose to
trade at particular times of the continuous trading day.
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The order book changed considerably between year 1 and year 2. Order activity
increased. Average order size increased. The weighted quoted spread doubled
(although the quoted spread did not increase) implying greater asymmetry. The
proportion of standing sell orders to buy orders decreased, but the proportion at best
price increased. The average daytime return increased. While it is difficult to
separate the effects of a developing market, and change in market-wide optimism, we
may hypothesise that the unofficial dealers are important in price setting, particularly
during the bear period, despite decreasing their share of the trading activity.
The unofficial dealers are used less for larger companies, since the automated order
book is most efficient for the very liquid stocks. The order book also takes a greater
share of the trading volume on stable days, when the theoretical cost of providing
liquidity is lowest. When more limit orders are placed, market orders become more
attractive and so the order book is used more. The equilibrium depends on the
spread and depth of the order book, but this depends on the market conditions, which
in turn seems to depend on the actions of the unofficial dealers.
Most importantly, having established what the order book looks like on average, we
can measure any departures from the norm. For instance, while we may expect a
market buy order to be placed when the bid side depth is high, we now have' a
benchmark for defining "when the bid side depth is high". The obvious direction for
investigation now, is to look at the orders as they are placed, executed or removed




Having established the characteristics of the SETS order book, and how they vary
through time, we now discuss how investors formulate their trading strategies.
When do investors use market orders and when do they use limit orders? What
happens when the spread or depth on the order book changes? Which strategies
imply informed trading? Which order strategies are the most profitable?
In Chapter 5 we looked at the order book and how it varies throughout the day. Here
we look at the order events throughout the day. This comparison offers greater
insight into trader behaviour. For example, if all trading activity (limit orders and
market orders placed and deleted) slowed down during lunchtime, the order book
may not change, but the comparison in this chapter would expose this behaviour.
Abhyankar et al (1997) and Ellul et al (2003) find that order activity on the LSE and
NYSE has a roughly "U-shaped intraday pattern" and that sellers become "more
aggressive later in the day". Jain and Joh (1988) find that trading volume is "highest
during the first hour, declines monotonically until the fourth hour, but increases
again in the fifth and sixth hours." First we must check that a similar result holds for
the LSE during our sample period, then determine whether the pattern arises as a
result of more orders in total, or more aggressive orders, or a change in the behaviour
of buyers and sellers. In Chapter 2 we discussed the differences between the LSE
and the NYSE. In particular, the opening procedure, implies a different pattern of
trading activity at the start of the day. While traders on the NYSE are subject to the
discretion of the specialist during the opening procedure, the LSE order book is
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automated, so we might expect a greater proportion of investors using the LSE
opening call auction, and a smaller proportion immediately after the opening.
Beber and Caglio (2003) and Ellul et al (2003) make significant contributions to the
body of empirical analysis of aggressiveness of orders. These papers are as yet
unpublished, and were first presented after the empirical work for this thesis had
been started. As such, there is a reasonable overlap of content. Both Beber and
Caglio (2003) and Ellul et al (2003) papers study the NYSE, which operates an order
book/specialist/floor trader hybrid market. Our data set offers a comparison of
aggressive behaviour between the NYSE (described in Beber and Caglio (2003) and
Ellul et al (2003)) and the LSE, and a greater insight into a pure order book market.
Although the aforementioned papers study the most liquid market in the world,
Beber and Caglio (2003) use a sample of 10 stocks over 3 months in 1991 and Ellul
et al (2003) use 50 stocks over 1 week in 2001. Our data set of 30 stocks over a
diverse 2 year period provides a more complete picture, and one less prone to data
mining accusations.
Cohen et al (1981) refer to the "gravitational pull effect" which explains why
investors choose between market orders and limit orders. Beber and Caglio (2003)
suggest determinants for aggressiveness: spread, depth, market performance, stobk
performance, volatility of stock. Section 6.4 assesses the importance of some of
these, and goes on to show how aggressiveness depends on other aspects of the
market, such as the size of stock and time of day. Keim and Madhavan (1995) state
that informed traders are more aggressive, so we test whether the aggressive traders
are larger than average. We also test the price impact of aggressive and passive
orders. Although the price impact measure is usually used for trades rather than
orders, we justify this interpretation and test to see if aggressive orders have a greater
price impact. Furthermore, we look for asymmetry in the market reaction to buy
and sell orders.
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While large orders are often indicative of information, autocorrelated order types
may also forecast price movements. Parlour (1988) explained that placing an order
on the order book, makes a subsequent order of a certain type, more or less likely.
For example, after a market buy order, the most likely order type would be a limit
sell order, thus rebalancing the equilibrium of liquidity. The least likely order to
follow in this example, is another market buy order. However, Ellul et al (2003) and
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2000) find empirical evidence to the contrary. Ellul et
al (2003) state that "positive first-order autocorrelation exists for order type" but that
"negative autocorrelation exists for order type over longer horizons". In section 6.5
we check that autocorrelation of order type is also common on the LSE, look at the
market conditions that make this more likely, and evaluate the impact of such order
events. For example, we might expect consecutive market buys to occur when the
spread is small and the depth on both sides is great. We may also expect the
resulting price impact to be greater than that of a single market order.
The remainder of this chapter is split into 4 main sections. After describing the
research design, we look at the daily order submission and cancellation patterns in
section 6.3. Section 6.4 examines the aggressive trading: how this behaviour varies
for different stocks, throughout the day, when the spread or depth changes, or when
the market is moving or stationary. Finally, in section 6.5, we look at patterns in
consecutive orders: when orders are autocorrelated, how this depends on depth,
spread and recent market movements.
6.2 Research Design
This chapter is a natural extension to Chapter 5. The rationale behind the
methodology and sample selection apply equally to the comparisons made in this
chapter. The tables are often produced for buy orders and sell orders separately, and
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then shown as a ratio of the buy and sell order figures. A composite table could have
been produced instead, but it was felt that the asymmetry of the order book has such
a significant affect on the market that such a table may hide many of the results.
In this chapter, we discuss the importance of "aggressiveness" in great detail. While
aggressiveness is generally described as "the demand for immediacy", there is no
consistent measure adopted throughout the literature. We will use the scale used by
Beber and Caglio (2003), as this is one of the most recent studies and it pools the
benefits of previous designs together. Although there are differences between orders
on the NYSE (as studied by Beber and Caglio (2003)) and those on the SETS order
book, their classification applies equally well here. SETS market orders are
frequently entered with an optional limit price attached. Attaching a limit price in
this way, contradicts the definition of a market order on other exchanges. However,
the distinguishing factor of a market order on SETS is that the limit price crosses the
spread.
The aggressiveness scale is defined as follows:
1 A market order larger than the depth at the best price on the opposite side
of the spread.
2 A market order smaller than the depth at the best price on the opposite sid6
of the spread.
3 A limit order placed inside the spread.
4 A limit order placed at the best price on the same side of the spread.
5 A limit order placed behind the best price on the same side of the spread,
by up to 4 ticks.
6 A limit order placed more than 4 ticks behind the best price on the same
side of the spread.
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6.3 Daily Variations
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the order activity throughout the trading day, measured in
number of events and total volume from these events respectively. In addition, Table
6.3 plots the average order size. The day is split into whole hours. The 8am to 9am
and 4pm to 5pm is further split into quarter hours. The 8am to 9am subdivision is
useful to see the changing pattern at the market open and the 4pm to 5pm subdivision
is important to differentiate between an open and closed market. Unfortunately, the
market close is not at a fixed time, and so the second and third quarters may be a
mixture of an open and closed market. The 8am to 9am is also shown as a total, for
ease of comparison with the other hours. The 4pm to 4:30pm period is expressed as
an hourly equivalent figure.
The data shows order activity out of hours. While orders can theoretically be added
or removed from the order book at any time, they cannot execute. The only rational
explanation for the trading activity between midnight and 5am, is data errors. They
may have been entered in a 12 hour clock format rather than a 24 hour format. They
represent around 0.3% of the total trading in terms of number and volume. We
cannot say for certain what the values should be, and so they have been excluded
from the sample in many of the subsequent tables.
6.3.1 Orders Placed
While Abhyankar et al (1997) and Ellul et al (2003) find a U-shaped pattern for order
activity, they do not break down the data into the level of detail offered here. We find
that order frequency increases for the first two hours, then dips until lunch time and rises
to a peak at the end of the day. The average order size is roughly concave, with the
highest peak in the first hour. One blip in this pattern concerns the large buy orders
placed between 11am and 12am. It is not at all clear why this would be the case from
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TABLE 6.1 A NUMBER OF BUY SIDE ORDER EVENTS BY TIME OF DAY
Hour Z P M C D E F
1 3.90 0.99 2.19 0.01 1.70 0.00 0.02
2 5.31 1.66 3.04 0.02 2.32 0.00 0.02
3 7.98 2.42 4.27 0.02 3.67 0.00 0.03
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 47.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.89 143.44 0.00
8 1 91.59 12.06 29.99 0.25 24.61 0.06 0.42
82 91.33 14.60 38.61 0.35
0.45
33.94 0.00 0.52
83 97.49 18.09 47.05 37.86 0.00 0.56
84 131.75 20.85 49.89 0.51 44.56 0.00 0.55
8 tot 412.16 65.60 165.53 1.56 140.98 0.07 2.05
9 703.36 150.97 345.04 3.34 292.88 0.01 3.57
10 728.86 216.77 407.72 4.02 293.01 0.01 3.74
11 617.54 167.80 349.63 3.24 252.42 0.01 2.90
12 514.01 139.51 288.66 2.78 215.94 0.01 2.23
13 561.08 147.25 312.26 3.03 238.39 0.01 2.68
14 734.75 196.16 416.28 3.75 307.90 0.00 3.60










sum 6143 1650 3333 32 2584 162 31
1457.94 502.91 861.41 8.41 609.53 0.03 8.54
284.45 90.35 169.70 1.63 114.80 0.01 1.55
444.52 161.11 261.01 2.57 189.97 0.01 2.72
58.64 20.13 21.06 0.00 89.73
0.01 23.69
14.73 0.00
0.65 0.26 0.39 3.09 0.00
1.89 0.75 1.14 0.01 0.74 0.19
0.96 0.35 0.48 0.01 0.65 0.02
0.12 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Number in thousands
Z: Order placed
P: Order partially filled
M: Order completely filled
C: Remainder of market order with list price cancelled
D: Order deleted by investor
E: Order expired as per investor instruction
F: Fill or kill order failed to execute
The 0800 - 0900 hour and 1600 -1700 hour has been split into 1/4 hours. 8 tot shows the
full hourly total. 16 adj is a grossed up figure based on the last half hour of trading (1600
-1630).
TABLE 6.1 B NUMBER OF SELL SIDE ORDER EVENTS BY TIME OF DAY
Hour Z P M C D E F
1 4.56 0.98 2.21 0.01 2.23 0.00 0.02
2 7.37 1.25 3.46 0.04 3.68 0.00 0.02
3 8.54 1.97 4.72 0.04 3.73 0.00 0.03
4 5.65 1.81 3.55 0.03 3.05 0.21 0.02
7 65.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.12 168.25 0.00
8 1 87.04 13.94 28.11 0.19 21.21 0.08 0.50
8 2 85.23 16.63 36.58 0.31 29.43 0.00 0.47
8 3 90.74 20.80 44.33 0.39 32.97 0.00 0.54
8 4 124.62 22.87 47.87 jffff(0.45 39.29 0.00 0.53
8 tot 387.63 74.24 156.89 1.33 122.89 0.08 2.04
9 708.09 158.07 337.94 3.23 299.85 0.01 3.60
10 740.96 211.56 412.93 3.68 299.84 0.01 3.93
11 610.42 175.73 341.70 3.37 251.03 0.00 3.18
12 507.31 147.21 280.96 2.56 214.47 0.03 2.18
13 532.06 163.01 296.50 2.78 227.93 0.01 2.57
14 718.50 214.06 398.37 3.90 303.32 0.01 3.91
15 982.67 308.83 564.05 5.73 404.31 0.03 5.96
16 adj 1446.38 505.97 858.35 7.78 597.40 0.03 8.96
16 1 281.35 92.61 167.44 1.52 112.48 0.00 1.69
162 441.84 160.38 261.74 2.37 186.22 0.01 2.79
163 58.20 20.88 20.31 0.00 90.98 13.50 0.01
164 0.70 0.21 0.44 0.01 28.91 3.69 0.01
17 1.84 0.65 1.25 0.01 0.64 0.23 0.00
18 0.86 0.24 0.59 0.00 0.51 0.05 0.00
19 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
sum 6064 1734 3255 31 2559 186 32
Number in thousands
Z: Order placed
P: Order partially filled
M: Order completely filled
C: Remainder of market order with list price cancelled
D: Order deleted by investor
E: Order expired as per investor instruction
F: Fill or kill order failed to execute
The 0800 - 0900 hour and 1600 -1700 hour has been split into 1/4 hours. 8 tot shows the
full hourly total. 16 adj is a grossed up figure based on the last half hour of trading (1600
- 1630).
TABLE 6.1C RATIO OFNUMBER OF BUY SIDE AND SELL SIDE ORDER EVE
Hour Z P M C D E F
1 0.86 1.01 0.99 0.43 0.76 1.00
2 0.72 1.33 0.88 0.53 0.63 0.82
3 0.93 1.23 0.90 0.64 0.98 0.82
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.73 0.93 0.85
8 1 1.05 0.86 1.07 1.35 1.16 0.83 0.84
8 2 1.07 0.88 1.06 1.13 1.15 1.10
8 3 1.07 0.87 1.06 1.17 1.15 0.00 1.04
8 4 1.06 0.91 1.04 1.13 1.13 2.00 1.04
8 tot 1.06 0.88 1.06 1.17 1.15 0.85 1.00
9 0.99 0.96 1.02 1.03 0.98 1.63 0.99
10 0.98 1.02 0.99 1.09 0.98 1.38 0.95
11 1.01 0.95 1.02 0.96 1.01 2.00 0.91
12 1.01 0.95 1.03 1.09 1.01 0.37 1.02
13 1.05 0.90 1.05 1.09 1.05 1.57 1.04
14 1.02 0.92 1.04 0.96 1.02 0.38 0.92
15 1.03 0.93 1.04 0.99 1.02 0.52 0.96
16 adj 1.01 0.99 1.00 1.08 1.02 0.88 0.95
16 1 1.01 0.98 1.01 1.07 1.02 1.67 0.92
162 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.09 1.02 0.71 0.97
163 1.01 0.96 1.04 3.00 0.99 1.09 0.50
164 0.92 1.22 0.89 1.40 0.82 0.84 0.20
17 1.03 1.17 0.91 1.30 1.14 0.86 2.00
18 1.13 1.45 0.82 6.00 1.28 0.33 0.67
19 1.65 0.80 1.04 1.62 0.00
20 0.38
sum 1.01 0.95 1.02 1.04 1.01 0.87 0.96
Number in thousands
Z: Order placed
P: Order partially filled
M: Order completely filled
C: Remainder of market order with list price cancelled
D: Order deleted by investor
E: Order expired as per investor instruction
F: Fill or kill order failed to execute
Blank values show when no sell order events occur in that cell.
The 0800 - 0900 hour and 1600 - 1700 hour has been split into 1/4 hours. 8 tot shows the
full hourly total. 16 adj is a grossed up figure based on the last half hour of trading (1600
-1630).
TABLE 6.2A VOLUME OF BUY SIDE ORDER EVENTS BY TIME OF DAY
Hour Z P M C D E F
1 48 7 22 0 17 0.00 0
2 76 13 33 0 28 0.00 0
3 101 19 44 1 35 0.00 0
4 68 13 32 0 35 4.35 0
7 856 0 0 0 132 3668.99 0
8 1 2464 255 711 30 593 1 2.16 18
82 2656 300 881 131 854 0.00 64
83 2330 309 912 46 763 0.00 24
84 2611 319 904 41 729 0.02 23
8 tot 10061 1183 3408 247 2939 2.18 128
9 13480 1790 5087 266 4898 0.17 187
10 12830 2188 5463 390 3976 0.13 210
11 12881 1920 4897 209 5406 0.03 120
12 9629 1669 4287 269 3209 0.07 103
13 10176 1750 4520 250 3395 0.28 127
14 14044 2427 6437 247 4662 0.04 150
15 19222 3468 8739 502 5857 0.26 285
16 adj 28427 5885 12125 570 8891 0.59 808
16 1 5567 1100 2505 115 1691 0.18 93
162 8646 1842 3558 170 2754 0.12 311
163 1765
' ' ::X-xiV •• !
278 294 0 2495 380.01 0
16 4 16 3 8 0 357 105.27 0
17 41 9 19 0 11 6.97 0
18 25 5 8 0 15 0.21 0
19 3 0 0 0 3 0.00 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0.24 0
sum 119536 19686 49361 2669 41915 4170 1714
Volume in millions of pounds
Z: Order placed
P: Order partially filled
M: Order completely filled
C: Remainder of market order with list price cancelled
D: Order deleted by investor
E: Order expired as per investor instruction
F: Fill or kill order failed to execute
The 0800 - 0900 hour and 1600 - 1700 hour has been split into 1/4 hours. 8 tot shows
the full hourly total. 16 adj is a grossed up figure based on the last half hour of trading
(1600-1630).
TABLE 6.2B VOLUME OF SELL SIDE ORDER EVENTS BY TIME OF DAY
Hour Z P M C D E F
1 50 8 22 0 19 0.00 0
2 78 9 37 1 28 0.00 0
3 100 15 49 1 35 0.00 1
4 69 13 32 2 36 5.36 1
7 949 0 0 0 71 3682.13 0
8 1 4456 233 732 2157 565 1.62 19
82 2373 295 885 22 784 0.00 19
83 2216 fo 911 41 624 0.07 36
8 4 2587 327 896 32 783 0.00 23
8 tot 11632 1165 3426 2252 2756 1.69 96
9 12398 1798 5079 201 3949 0.07 159
10 12441 2127 5523 186 3970 0.09 127
11 11150 1916 4901 334 3455 0.07 195
12 9625 1715 4241 244 3029 0.56 139
13 10636 1804 4466 910 3178 0.17 154
14 14368 2563 6301 236 4807 0.03 145
15 19390 3567 8641 386 6314 0.38 262
16 adj 31553 5669 12342 572 12529 0.55 379
16 1 6150 1062 2544 144 2306 0.01 71
162 9627 1773 3627 141 3958 0.26 118
163 1748 291 281 0 2427 314.77 0
164 19 4 7 0 410 109.72 '/ 0
17 36 8 20 0 11 3.61 0
18 17 3 10 0 9 0.80 0
19 1 0 0 0 1 0.10 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0.39 0
sum 120483 19840 49206 5038 40769 4120 1469
Volume in millions of pounds
Z: Order placed
P: Order partially filled
M: Order completely filled
C: Remainder of market order with list price cancelled
D: Order deleted by investor
E: Order expired as per investor instruction
F: Fill or kill order failed to execute
The 0800 - 0900 hour and 1600 -1700 hour has been split into 1/4 hours. 8 tot shows
the full hourly total. 16 adj is a grossed up figure based on the last half hour of trading
(1600-1630).
TABLE 6.2C RATIO OF VOLUME OF BUY SIDE AND SELL SIDE ORDER EV
Hour Z P M c D E F
1 0.95 0.93 1.02 0.44 0.92 0.46
2 0.97 1.40 0.90 0.64 1.03 0.65
3 1.01 1.31 0.91 1.53 1.00 0.58
4 0.99 1.05 0.98 0.13 0.96 0.81 0.32
7 0.90 1.84 1.00
8 1 0.55 1.09 0.97 0.01 1.05 1.34 0.97
82 1.12 1.02 0.99 5.90 1.09 3.36
83 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.11 1.22 0.00
'
0.66
8 4 1.01 0.98 1.01 1.29 0.93 15.00 0.99
8 tot 0.86 1.02 0.99 0.11 1.07 1.29 1.33
9 1.09 1.00 1.00 1.33 1.24 2.31 1.17
10 1.03 1.03 0.99 2.10 1.00 1.37 1.65
11 1.16 1.00 1.00 0.63 1.56 0.45 0.62
12 1.00 0.97 1.01 1.10 1.06 0.13 0.74
13 0.96 0.97 1.01 0.27 1.07 1.67 0.82
14 0.98 0.95 1.02 1.05 0.97 1.20 1.03
15 0.99 0.97 1.01 1.30 0.93 0.68 1.09
16 adj 0.90 1.04 0.98 1.00 0.71 1.08 2.13
16 1 0.91 1.04 0.98 0.80 0.73 13.44 1.31
162 0.90 1.04 0.98 1.20 0.70 0.46 2.63
16 3 1.01 0.95 1.05 55.19 1.03 1.21 0.43
164 0.85 0.69 1.17 2.78 0.87 0.96 3.33
17 1.15 1.12 0.95 1.80 1.01 1.93 2.36
18 1.48 1.73 0.79 7.34 1.77 0.26 0.66
19 2.81 1.05 0.99 2.63 0.00
20 0.62
sum 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.53 1.03 1.01 1.17
Volume in millions of pounds
Z: Order placed
P: Order partially filled
M: Order completely filled
C: Remainder of market order with list price cancelled
D: Order deleted by investor
E: Order expired as per investor instruction
F: Fill or kill order failed to execute
Blank values show when no sell order events occur in that cell.
The 0800 - 0900 hour and 1600 -1700 hour has been split into 1/4 hours. 8 tot shows
the full hourly total. 16 adj is a grossed up figure based on the last half hour of trading
(1600 - 1630).
TABLE 6.3A AVERAGE ORDER SIZE OF BUY SIDE ORDER EVENTS BY TIME OF DAY
Hour Z P M C D E F
1 12.20 7.46 10.10 27.62 10.12 7.78
2 14.33 7.80 10.87 23.97 12.25 15.42
3
A
12.61 7.86 10.34 61.56 9.43 11.58
4
7 17.85 45.56 25.58
8 1 26.90 21.16 23.69 117.52 24.08 34.87 43.12
82 29.09 20.55 22.81 372.04 25.15 1.23 122.93
83 23.90 17.06 19.39 101 98 20.16 42.22
8 4 19.82 15.30 18.12 80.35 16.36 7.50 40.92
8 tot 24.41 18.03 20.59 158.21 20.85 32.55 62.39
9 19.16 11.86 14.74 79.49 16.72 13.19 52.21
10 17.60 10.09 13.40 97.15 13.57 11.58 56.05
11 20.86 11.44 14.01 64.59 21.42 4.99 41.34
12 18.73 11.97 14.85 96.80 14.86 7.28 46.19
13 18.14 11.89 14.47 82.60 14.24 25.44 47.17
14 19.11 12.37 15.46 65.91 15.14 13.61 41.75
15 18.94 12.04 14.94 88.16 14.21 18.64 49.81
16 adj 19.50 11.70 14.08 67.81 14.59 19.83 94.59
16 1 19.57 12.18 14.76 70.64 14.73 35.48 59.79
162 19.45 11.43 13.63 66.03 14.50 12.00 114.49
16 3 30.11 13.79 13.97 15.08 27.80 25.80 9.29
16 4 25.00 10.48 21.06 59.89 15.07 34.11 50.00
17 21.90 12.12 16.44 35.84 15.46 36.13 12.22
18 25.48 13.23 15.78 70.76 23.49 13.15 9.39
19 20.85 15.33 17.23 18.36 30.00
20 21.69
sum 19.46 11.93 14.81 84.21 16.22 25.80 55.57
Average order size measured in thousands of pounds
Z: Order placed
P: Order partially filled
M: Order completely filled
C: Remainder of market order with list price cancelled
D: Order deleted by investor
E: Order expired as per investor instruction
F: Fill or kill order failed to execute
The 0800 - 0900 hour and 1600 -1700 hour has been split into 1/4 hours. 8 tot shows the full hourly
total. 16 adj is a grossed up figure based on the last half hour of trading (1600 -1630).
TABLE 6.3B AVERAGE ORDER SIZE OF SELL SIDE ORDER EVENTS BY TIME OF DAY
Hour Z P M C D E F
1 10.98 8.10 9.80 26.86 8.35 16.97
2 10.65 7.40 10.64 19.68 7.51 19.51
3 11.71 7.36 10.31 25.63 9.27 16.30
4 12.22 7.02 9.09 46.40 11.88 25.77 31.49
7 14.54 22.89 21.88
8 1 51.19 16.73 26.06 11534.41 26.65 21.59 37.20
82 27.84 17.77 24.20 70.90 26.65 40.16
8 3 24.42 14.88 20.56 107.49 18.93 23.00 66.89
8 4 20.76 14.29 18.73 70.22 19.92 1.00 42.83
8 tot 30.01 15.69 21.84 1689.40 22.43 21.38 47.17
9 17.51 11.38 15.03 62.04 13.17 9.28 44.16
10 16.79 10.06 13.38 50.52 13.24 11.59 32.40
11 18.27 10.90 14.34 98.93 13.76 22.32 61.20
12 18.97 11.65 15.09 95.56 14.12 20.84 63.55
13 19.99 11.07 15.06 327.10 13.94 23.92 59.86
14 20.00 11.97 15.82 60.45 15.85 4.24 37.20
15 19.73 11.55 15.32 67.43 15.62 14.22 44.01
16 adj 21.81 11.20 14.38 73.48 20.97 16.24 42.29
16 1 21.86 11.46 15.19 95.25 20.51 4.40 42.07
162 21.79 11.05 13.86 59.56 21.26 18.78 42.42
163 30.03 13.95 13.82 0.82 26.68 23.31 10.80
164 27.07 18.41 16.06 30.15 14.19 29.76 3.00
17 19.49 12.67 15.78 25.88 17.52 16.05 10.37
18 19.35 11.07 16.20 57.84 16.91 16.25 9.47
19 12.25 11.67 18.07 11.33 100.00 •
20 13.37
sum 19.87 11.44 15.12 164.59 15.93 22.14 45.96
Average order size measured in thousands of pounds
Z: Order placed
P: Order partially filled
M: Order completely filled
C: Remainder of market order with list price cancelled
D: Order deleted by investor
E: Order expired as per investor instruction
F: Fill or kill order failed to execute
The 0800 - 0900 hour and 1600 -1700 hour has been split into 1/4 hours. 8 tot shows the full hourly
total. 16 adj is a grossed up figure based on the last half hour of trading (1600 -1630).
TABLE 6.3C RATIO OF SIZE OF BUY ORDER EVENTS OVER SIZE OF SELL ORDER EVE
Hour Z P M C D E F
1 1.11 0.92 1.03 1.03 1.21 0.46
2 1.34 1.05 1.02 1.22 1.63 0.79
3
A
1.08 1.07 1.00 2.40 1.02 0.71
4
7 1.23 1.99 1.17
8 1 0.53 1.27 0.91 0.01 0.90 1.62 1.16
82 1.04 1.16 0.94 5.25 0.94 3.06
83 0.98 1.15 0.94 0.95 1.06 0.00 0.63
8 4 0.95 1.07 0.97 1.14 0.82 7.50 0.96
8 tot 0.81 1.15 0.94 0.09 0.93 1.52 1.32
9 1.09 1.04 0.98 1.28 1.27 1.42 1.18
10 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.92 1.02 1.00 1.73
11 1.14 1.05 0.98 0.65 1.56 0.22 0.68
12 0.99 1.03 0.98 1.01 1.05 0.35 0.73
13 0.91 1.07 0.96 0.25 1.02 1.06 0.79
14 0.96 1.03 0.98 1.09 0.96 3.21 1.12
15 0.96 1.04 0.98 1.31 0.91 1.31 1.13
16 adj 0.89 1.04 0.98 0.92 0.70 1.22 2.24

























17 1.12 0.96 1.04 1.39 0.88 2.25 1.18
18 1.32 1.20 0.97 1.22 1.39 0.81 0.99
19 1.70 1.31 0.95 1.62 0.00
20 1.62
sum 0.98 1.04 0.98 0.51 1.02 1.17 1.21
Average order size measured in thousands of pounds
Z: Order placed
P: Order partially filled
M: Order completely filled
C: Remainder of market order with list price cancelled
D: Order deleted by investor
E: Order expired as per investor instruction
F: Fill or kill order failed to execute
Blank values show when no sell order events occur in that cell.
The 0800 - 0900 hour and 1600 -1700 hour has been split into 1/4 hours. 8 tot shows the full hourly
total. 16 adj is a grossed up figure based on the last half hour of trading (1600 -1630).
this table. Perhaps larger orders are placed because traders have instructions to fill an
order by midday, or perhaps it reflects a typical time for price sensitive company
announcements.
More sell orders than buy orders are placed during the 10am to 12am period.
Interestingly, the volume of sell orders exceeds that of buy orders from 8am to 9am
and 1pm to 4:30pm. So sellers place fewer but larger orders at the start and end of
the day. This may reflect the spread and depth at the time of trade, or it may reflect
behavioural issues.
The volume of orders placed increases dramatically during the last half hour of
trading. The combined volume of the orders placed in the period 4:15pm to 4:30pm,
is greater than the volume during the entire lunch hour. This is partly due to
increased order size, but primarily due to an increase in the number of orders added
to the book. This supports the theory that investors become more aggressive towards
the end of the day in order to close out their position for the day, or in response to the
fact that their limit order strategy hasn't satisfied their trading needs, and so a more
aggressive strategy is required. This is supported by an increase in the deleted
orders, which are discussed in section 6.3.3.
Another point worth noting is the period 16:10 to 16:30 is used to calculate the
VWAP (Volume Weighted Average Price). VWAP is used for many things, such as
the FTSE Actuaries All Share indices. There is something to be gained from
manipulating the VWAP, and so there is a chance that the increased trading activity
reflects this kind of trader behaviour. Also, the VWAP period may finish early in the




More than half of the orders placed (but less than 40% of the total volume) are fully
filled. The average size of those that transact is roughly 75% of the average size of
those placed. Since aggressive market orders are more likely to transact than limit
orders, it would seem that limit orders tend to be larger. Perhaps market orders are
split up to hide their information. Perhaps there are large traders, willing to offer
depth at prices far from the current spread.
The largest orders that transact occur in the first hour of trading. This is partly due to
the impact of the transactions that result in the opening call option, but the trades are
larger throughout the first hour of trading, so it seems that during the thin (relative to
the rest of the day) trading of the first hour, traders are willing to place larger orders.
We might assume that the first hour of trading is the most vulnerable to information
asymmetry, as there are 15 and a half hours of information gathering leading up to it.
Traders are willing to trade in larger chunks, however, which would neither disguise
information nor minimise the price impact of the trade.
6.3.3 Removed Orders
Of the orders that don't execute, most are deleted by the trader. 40% of the buy
orders placed (or 30% of the volume of buy orders) were cancelled during the trading
day. More orders are deleted at the start and end of the day, than in the middle. This
is indicative of diligent monitoring and active order management. As mentioned
earlier, the increase in deleted orders towards the end of the day reflects a switching
of trading strategy from passive to aggressive orders. The conditions under which
orders are deleted along with the motivations is clearly an area for further research.
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Cancelled orders occur when a market order with a limit price is partially filled, and
failed orders occur when a market order with a limit price does not trade at all.
There is no clear pattern to these events, as they are fairly evenly spread throughout
the day in terms of number and volume. Expired orders occur either at the end of the
trading day, or just before the open. The expiry date and time of an order are set at
the time of placing the order. There is no obvious reason for trades to expire just
before the opening of the market. Perhaps the traders are trying to influence the
opening price, or perhaps this is simply a procedural effect implied by the LSE
systems. There would be an advantage in leaving orders on the book overnight, and
deciding whether to cancel them before the market opens, to gain time priority, but
this does not seem to happen in practice.
The difference between the buy and sell order expiries are uninformative for all
hours other than 7am to 8am and 4pm to 5pm, during which there are roughly equal
volumes of buy and sell expiries. The average order size of buy orders that end in
expiry is larger than the average order size of sell orders that end in expiry, by 20%.
Given that buy and sell orders are roughly equal in size (buy orders are 2% bigger
than sell orders) this shows a selection issue for order expiries. Do traders enter an
expiry date when they think that failure to execute is likely? Orders that expire are
larger than average orders. Do these orders represent the uninformed traders that
offer liquidity to play the spread, which we introduced earlier.
Harris and Hasbrouk (1996) found that very few deleted orders are replaced with
new orders. Our initial analysis suggests otherwise, but we need to look at the
activity of individual traders to confirm this conclusion. All of the trading activity
following deleted orders is potentially very informative, as deleted orders are an
indication of trading intent as well an indication of the strategies that current market
participants are following. Deleted orders are not summarised on the SETS order
book system, so it would take some very close analysis in practice to imply what
145
orders were cancelled. This hindrance to the analysis may preclude traders from
trying to draw conclusions from such events.
6.4 Aggressiveness
Aggressive trading represents an investor's demand for immediacy. The most
widely supported theory is that aggressive trades reflect an information asymmetry.
With a simple classification of market orders as aggressive, and limit orders as
passive, then half of the volume of orders that execute are aggressive. But it is
unreasonable to assume that half the traders are privately informed. So we must
refine our definition to reflect the fact that the decision to trade aggressively is not
exogenous to the state of the market. The size of the spread represents the trade off
between certainty of execution and the cost of potentially losing the spread. Given a
small enough spread we might expect any investor to place a market order. We must
therefore first establish under what conditions traders behave most aggressively, to
refine our estimation of the likelihood of asymmetric information.
6.4.1 Market Capitalization
Table 6.4 shows that the order activity for each sample differs very little. There are
more market orders placed for the larger stocks but weighted by volume, this
relationship all but disappears. The medium sized companies have the largest
proportionate volume of type 1 buy orders. This is due to the fact that the larger
companies have greater depth at best (so a type 1 order has to be significantly bigger
for that sample), and the lack of depth for the smaller sample (so traders are more
concerned about moving the market price). These opposing forces almost cancel out,
and this is why the differences are so small.
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Aggressive sell orders are more common than aggressive buy orders as with Allen
and Gorton (1992), but we also find the relationship between aggressiveness and
market capitalization to be clearly monotonic. The proportion of aggressive orders
(by both number and volume) increases with market capitalization. Given that the
shares of the larger stock are likely to be spread between more investors, it is
possible that this reflects a greater information asymmetry i.e. while any informed
party may buy a stock, informed sellers must have the stock in the first place.
However, this is also likely to be a result of the smaller spreads associated with the
larger stocks.
One other noticeable difference is the proportion of type 3 orders. Since the spread
is usually wider for the smaller stocks, there is a greater opportunity to post orders
within the spread. So we find that the number and volume of buy orders placed
within the spread decreases with market capitalization. A corollary to this is that
orders at the spread are more likely for larger stocks. Although the number of buy
orders at the spread is fewer, we find that the volume does indeed increase with
market capitalization. This result holds for the sell orders as well.
6.4.2 Average Order Size
We established earlier that average order size increases with market capitalization.
In Table 6.5, however, we note that as a percentage of the average order size for each
stock, the average order size varies by aggressiveness. We can see that the market
orders (type 1 and 2) are smaller than the average order size for that stock in the
largest group of companies. For the smaller companies, the aggressive orders are
larger than the average for the stock. The opposite is true for the competitively
prices limit orders (type 3 and 4). These orders are larger than the average order size
for the large companies, and equal or smaller than the average for the smaller
companies. If we interpret size of trade as an indicator of information, this might
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TABLE 6.5A AVERAGE ORDER SIZE OF BUY ORDERS BY AGGRESSIVENESS AND MARKET CAPITALISATION
Rank 1 & 2
Aggressiveness





















3 13.83 33.76 10.21 15.05 13.23 12.17 11.68 - 13.66
34.874 34.89 70,47 29.12 38.60 30.68 29.67 35.53
5 13.87 28.98 11.17 14.06 11.75 8.88 11.73 ; 12.95
6 6.53 12.85 5.23 5.70 4.37 2.92 3.30 5.21
7 14.30 34.83 10.62 14.80 13.57 8.99 11.10
V;
13.62
8 7.32 16.90 5.60 7.43 5.50 3.64 9.68
■-
7.23
9 12.68 27.04 9.84 12.83 38.90 7.47 9.92 15.36
10 17.03 37.29 12.68 15.52 13.39 9.37 14.72 15.05
19.38 47.80 14.50 22.39 22.39 15.83 16.01 19.90
0.97 2.40 0.73 1.12 1.13 0.80 0.80 1.00
22 9.96 23.29 7.29 8.81 6.57 5.42 8.22 8.57
23 14.74 36.19 11.46 14.26 11.76 9.34 12.62 13,60
24 28.03 62.95 21.45 26.77 25.85 25.96 33.99 27.35
25 11.45 27.87 8.35 10.86 9.22 7.20 10.11 10.51
26 18.74 48.00 14.15 19.81 18.31 18.17 17.63 18.86
27 13.79 43.35 8.55 11.26 9.19 7.88 11.58 11.66
28 14.12 29.56 11.14 13.33 9.90 9.47 14.91 12.84
29 17.00 41,69 12.22 14.47 12.31 12.65 18.05 15.18
30 28.30 74.97 18.40 25.14 25.38 25.40 30.23 26.78
31 7.63 17.84 5.79 7.21 6.13 5.45 7.43 7.10
avg 16.38 40.57 11.88 15.19 13.46 12.69 16.48 15.25
prop" 1.07 2.66 0.78 1.00 0.88 0.83 1.08 1.00
44 10.43 24.25 7.86 10.01 8.24 8.06 10.51 9.81
45 9.23 21.27 7.22 9.47 6.97 6.37 9.36 8.83
46 7.12 17.75 5.27 6.66 5.04 4.76 6.25 6.39
47 6.51 14.69 5.05 6.38 5.10 4.45 6.24 6.07
48 10.84 22.72 8.21 9.09 7.06 6.68 10.70 9.31
49 15.58 31.02 11.96 14.03 12.03 12.48 16.58 14.38
50 9.51 19.39 7.95 8.69 7.44 6.29 8.37 8.73
51 6.24 15.36 4.84 7.06 4.67 4.39 5.97 6.23
52 10.76 26.60 7.43 9.13 7.02 7.33 10.43 9.41
53 9.69 23.31 6.72 7.45 6.10 5.59 8.86 7.98
avg 9.59 21.64 7.25 8.80 6.97 6.64 9.32 8.71
prop" 1.10 2.48 0.83 1.01 0.80 0.76 1.07 1.00
avg 15.12 36.67 11.21 15.46 14.27 11.72 13.94 14.62
prop" 1.03 2.51 0.77 1.06 0.98 0.80 0.95 1.00
Rank: Uniquely identifies the company (See table 5.1)
1 & 2: Is a combined total for all market orders (Category 1 & 2)
1: Orders at or better that the opposite side price, larger than depth at best
2: Orders at or better than the opposite side price, smaller than depth at best
3: Limit price within the spread
4: Limit price at the same side, best price
5: Limit price behind best price, but within 1p
6: Limit price further that 1 p away from the spread
Average order size mesaured in thousands of pounds
TABLE 6.5B AVERAGE ORDER SIZE OF SELL ORDERS BY AGGRESSIVENESS AND MARKET CAPITALISATION
Aggressiveness































































































































































































Rank: Uniquely identifies the company (See table 5.1)
1 & 2: Is a combined total for all market orders (Category 1 & 2)
1: Orders at or better that the opposite side price, larger than depth at best
2: Orders at or better than the opposite side price, smaller than depth at best
3: Limit price within the spread
4: Limit price at the same side, best price
5: Limit price behind best price, but within 1p
6: Limit price further that 1 p away from the spread
Average order size mesaured in thousands of pounds
TABLE 6.5C RATIO OF AVERAGE BUY ORDER SIZE AND AVERAGE SELL ORDER
SIZE BY AGGRESSIVENESS AND MARKET CAPITALISATION
Aggressiveness












































































































































































































































































Rank: Uniquely identifies the company (See table 5.1)
1 & 2: Is a combined total for all market orders (Category 1 & 2)
1: Orders at or better that the opposite side price, larger than depth at best
2: Orders at or better than the opposite side price, smaller than depth at best
3: Limit price within the spread
4: Limit price at the same side, best price
5: Limit price behind best price, but within 1p
6: Limit price further that 1p away from the spread
Average order size mesaured In thousands of pounds
suggest that informed traders are more willing to gamble on the larger stocks.
Perhaps the trading volume for the larger stocks gives a greater probability of quick
execution. So informed traders are willing to try a limit order and gain the spread,
with a view to placing a market order quickly if the gamble doesn't pay off. When
faced with the same decision for a smaller stock, they may not be willing to wait
while the lumpy orders flow in, and so prefer the certainty of execution.
There may also be a behavioural bias induced by the size of the trade. Due to mental
accounting, investors may gauge the size of their aggressive orders appropriate to
their holding, the size of their portfolio, or the absolute value. Investors may be
discouraged from sending a large aggressive order to the market for fear of how the
market may react to it.
For the smaller companies in particular, we can see that orders inside the spread are
bigger than orders at the spread, which are bigger than orders just behind the spread,
expressed in relation to the average order size. If we again interpret size of order as
an indicator of information, this would suggest that informed traders place limit
orders further up the queue. This agrees with the earlier statement that informed
traders are willing to use limit orders but are not willing to wait a long time. This
size effect can also be rationalised by the probability of completely filling the order.
After allowing for the prior ranking orders, it is more possible that a small order will
fill if placed behind the best quote, but a large order would have to be placed inside
the quote to fill completely against the same order.
6.4.3 Daily Patterns
Table 6.6 shows the number and volume of trades by aggressiveness, for each
quarter hour during the trading day. Table 6.7 shows the average order size
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1&2:Isacombinedtotalf rlmark torders(Category) 1:Ordersatobetterthatpposi esidric ,largert nde ht
2:Ordersatobetterthanppositesidpric ,sm llethd ths 3:Limitpricewith nthespr ad 4:Limitpriceatthesamid ,bespr ce 5:Limitpricebeh ndesi e,utwithin1p
6:Limitpricefurth4:iatthesamid ,besprice PropnfDay:prop5:Limitricebeh ndstri ,utwithin1 Aggressiveness:a<6:Limitpricfu th rthat1pwayfromt es r ad Marketo derssprop" ftotalrs:atioty na dtwoo de dividedbythotalor rsf t15minuteperiod.
TABLE 6.7A AVERAGE SIZE OF BUY ORDERS BY AGGRESSIVENESS AND TIME OF DAY
Hour 1/4 hour 1 & 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
8 1 35 82 27 22 34 53 23 27
82 37 111
: : 25 20 28 52 34 29
83 27 60 21 18 24 61 21 24
84 24 50 19 17 21 29 16 20
9 1 21 -62 15 16 19 22 15 18
92 21 54 15 16 19 19 14 18
93 19 45 15 16 59 17 14 23
94 20 48 15 17 18 17 14 18
10 1 19 45 | 14 16 18 17 16 18
10 2 18 49 13 17 17 17 14 17
10 3 20 48 15 17 19 17 14 18
10 4 19 48 15 17 19 17 14 18
11 1 19 46 .... 15 17 20 17 14 18
11 2 19 46 15 58 19 16 13 30
11 3 19 45 14 17 19 16 14 17
11 4 19 48 15 17 20 17 13 18
12 1 19 45 15 17 18 17 14 18
122 20 51 15 18 21 18 15 19
12 3 22 55 V:.' : 16 18 19 17 14 19
12 4 21 57 15 18 20 18 15 19
13 1 19 49 15 18 20 17 15 18
132 20 51 15 17 20 17 16 18
133 19 47 15 17 19 16 14 18
134 19 50 15 17 19 18 15 18
14 1 21 64 14 17 19 18 14 19
142 19 49 15 19 20 18 14 19
143 21 50 16 19 20 17 14 19
14 4 21 50 16 19 21 20 14 20
15 1 21 47 16 18 20 18 14 19
15 2 21 55 15 18 19 17 13 19
153 20 47 15 18 20 17 14 19
15 4 21 49 15 18 20 18 15 19
16 1 22 50 16 18 20 18 15 20
16 2 21 52 14 16 20 23 18 19
163 31 55 13 19 41 64 22 30
avg 21 51 15 19 21 19 16 19
average order size in thousands of pounds
1 & 2: Is a combined total for all market orders (Category 1 & 2)
1: Orders at or better that the opposite side price, larger than depth at best
2: Orders at or better than the opposite side price, smaller than depth at best
3: Limit price within the spread
4: Limit price at the same side, best price
5: Limit price behind best price, but within 1p
6: Limit price further that 1 p away from the spread
TABLE 6.7B AVERAGE SIZE OF SELL ORDERS BY AGGRESSIVENESS AND TIME OF DAY
Hour 1/4 hour 1 & 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
8 1 175 859 27 23 33 55 21 52
82 41 127 24 21 28 47 20 28
83 30 70 22 20 25 40 21 24
2184 24 53 18 18 22 48 15
9 1 20 49 15 17 19 20 13 17
92 19 48 15 16 18 17 14 17
93 23 81 14 16 18 15 13 18
94 19 49 jpt 14 16 17 15 14
10 1 17 41 | 13 15 18 16 15 16
10 2 16 39 12 16 17 15 13 16
10 3 19 46 15 20 17 15 14 18
10 4 18 45 14 16 19 16 14 17
11 1 20 48 15 16 19 16 14 18
11 2 23 70 15 17 18 17 14 :■ ? 19
11 3 19 45 15 17 19 17 13 ;0 18
11 4 21 57 14 17 19 16 15 18
12 1 20 50 15 17 19 17 15 18
12 2 21 52 16 18 19 16 16
-
19
123 23 62 16 18 19 17 16 20
12 4 22 57 15 18 20 16 15 19
13 1 35 152 15 18 20 16 15 24
13 2 21 57 15 18 19 16 15 19
133 22 54 16 19 20 16 15 19
13 4 20 52 15 18 20 15 14 18
14 1 21 50 16 18 20 17 13 19
142 21 49 16 18 20 16 13 19
143 22 53 17 26 21 17 13 22
144 22 53 17 18 21 17 14 20
15 1 21 48 16 18 20 18 13 19
15 2 21 46 16 18 20 17 13 19
15 3 20 44 15 18 20 24 14 19
15 4 22 52 16 26 20 17 15 22
16 1 27 85 15 18 20 18 15 22
• ' -
22162 27 80 14 16 20 22 18
163 33 57 9 23 32 28 22 30
avg 23 15 18 20 18 15 20
average order size In thousands of pounds
1 & 2: Is a combined total for all market orders (Category 1 & 2)
1: Orders at or better that the opposite side price, larger than depth at best
2: Orders at or better than the opposite side price, smaller than depth at best
3: Limit price within the spread
4: Limit price at the same side, best price
5: Limit price behind best price, but within 1p
6: Limit price further that 1p away from the spread
TABLE 6.7C RATIO OF AVERAGE SIZE OF BUY ORDERS OVER AVERAGE SIZE OF SELL ORDERS, BY
AGGRESSIVENESS AND TIME OF DAY
Hour 1/4 hour 1&2 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
8 1 20 10 97 96 104 96 110 52
82 91 87 103 96 102 110 167 104
83 89 86 95 93 95 154 103 98
84 100 95 .105 96 94 61 107 95
9 1 108 128 102 98 103 111 112 105
92 106 114 103
105
104 103 112 99 105
93 81 55
98
97 338 114 104 123
94 105 107 102 108 112 101 104
10 1 110 110 109 105 102 110 104 107
102 115 126 107 107 102 112 104 109
10 3 102 105 100 86 107 111 103 98
10 4 105 107 103 106 102 106 105 105
11 1 97 95 99 105 103 105 100 101
11 2 84 66 100 333 106 96 98 155
11 3 97
:




















12 2 98 97
90
99 101 112 110 93 101
123 96 102 100 101 101 89 97
124 96 100 97 105 101 112 98 100
13 1 55 32 95 101 101 103 101 76
13 2 93 89 99 98 106 109 104 98
13 3 89 88 96 93 94 100 98 93
134 94 96 97 95 99 114 106 98
14 1 102 129 93 96 98 103 109 100
142 92 99 92 103 99 109 108 99
143 94 94 96 74 93 103 108 88
144 94 94 97 102 98 114 98 99
15 1 98 98 100 101 99 105 109 100
15 2 104 121 98 101 95 102 100 101
9815 3 101 107 101 100 98 72 100
154 93 94 95 69 101 104 100 87
16 1 79 59 102 101 99 101 99 90
162 80 65 100 100 100 103 99 89
16 3 94 96 135 85 127 230 100 HK IOO
avg 90 79 100 102 106 104 103
average order size in thousands of pounds
1 & 2: Is a combined total for all market orders (Category 1 & 2)
1: Orders at or better that the opposite side price, larger than depth at best
2: Orders at or better than the opposite side price, smaller than depth at best
3: Limit price within the spread
4: Limit price at the same side, best price
5: Limit price behind best price, but within 1p
6: Limit price further that 1p away from the spread
of trades for each aggressiveness characteristic are presented as proportions of the
total number or volume in that quarter hour period.
The opening procedure ensures that limit orders are already on the book when
continuous trading starts at 8am. This is also the first time that investors can see the
orders on the book, rather than just the crossing price at open. Trading activity in the
first hour is very different to the rest of the day. Overall trading is lower, and the
aggressiveness is lower. In the first 15 minutes, only 19% of the orders are market
orders, compared to the daily average of 38%. This may be partly due to the risk and
uncertainty of the market after open. It could also be that the aggressive traders have
filled their orders with the opening procedure, or that those who offer liquidity, wait
to see the state of the order book, before setting or adjusting their limit price.
The slow start to the day drags on until around 10am. The overall volume of trading
is concave between 10am and 4pm, but the aggressiveness follows no clear pattern.
Other than a few odd results like the dip in volume weighted market buy orders at
11am, the aggressiveness is fairly steady. Order activity in general and
aggressiveness increase at the end of the day. The last half hour of trading sees the
daily high in number and volume of orders and also in the proportion of market
orders.
The number of type 1 orders (market orders greater than depth) fluctuates more
widely than the other categories as a result of the size related definition. During the
middle of the day, when depth is greater than earlier in the day, fewer market orders
are larger than the opposite side depth. Type 1 orders move the market price
immediately, and this may persist for the rest of the day and beyond. It is possible
that traders are less inclined to move the price in the middle of the day, as they are
trying to work a larger order. There is also no incentive to manipulate the price, as is
the case during the VWAP period at the end of the day.
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1&2:Isacombinedtotalfrollmark trders(Category) 1:Ordersatobetterthatoppositesideric ,l rg rt nd he
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numberitho sands volumeinmi lionsfp und prop"expressedaerc ntagelltradesInhat1/4h urnt rv l
1&2:Isacombinedtotalfrolmark trders(Cat gory) 1:Ordersatobetterthatoppositesidepric ,larg rt nd hes
2:Ordersatobetterthanppositesidpric ,m ll rthande hb s 3:Limitpricewith nthespr ad 4:Limitpriceatthesamid ,besri 5:Limitpricebeh ndes ,utwith n1 6:Limitpricefurthertha1pawayromsp ead
The pattern for sells is very similar to that for buys. As expected, the sells are in
general more aggressive than buys. Also, the relative change in aggressiveness at the
end of the day is sharper for sells than buys. If we assume that the increase in
aggressive trading at the end of the day reflects the last attempt to fill the order for
the day, it would seem that sellers who were using limit order strategies have a
greater need to trade. This may also reflect day traders who buy in the morning, but
are forced to close out their position at the end of the day. The increase in
aggressiveness is significant for the last half hour of trading and since the VWAP
period is mostly contained within the last quarter, the result cannot be solely
attributed to market manipulation.
There are a few spurious numbers in the buy and sell table. The large volume of type
1 sells at 8am and 1pm, type 3 buys at 11:15am and type 4 buys at 9:30am, reflect
four very large orders. These orders were entered for an unrealistic volume. The
market orders were also entered with a limit price at the opposite side of the spread.
It is not clear why the market would accept an offer to sell like this, since the
participant's ability to sell is obviously limited. An offer to buy is also limited by the
market capitalization. These four figures highlight how sensitive the results are to an
individual trader's actions. It is important to establish this, to put the results 'in
context, and to show how easy it is for a single institution to manipulate the market
statistics.
Average order size is largest during the first half hour of the day. This is consistent
for all aggressiveness categories. Order size decreases for most of the first hour,
although there are some erratic patterns for orders placed away from the spread,
presumably reflecting the uncertainty over how the price will settle after the opening
procedure. After the first hour of trading, the average order size of market buy orders
is fairly constant for all aggressiveness classes, until a sharp rise during the closing
150
procedure. In contrast, market sell orders increase in size from 4pm, adding to the
evidence of day traders trying to close out their position.
6.4.4 Price Impact
Table 6.9 shows the average change in price between the time the order was
submitted and 5 or 30 minutes after the event. The price is measured as the mid
point of the quoted spread. Traditionally, Price Impact is used to measure the
information content of a trade. Combining this interpretation with the theory that
informed traders trade aggressively, we would expect to see an increasing price
impact with aggressiveness.
The Price Impact is usually measured for trades, but we are expanding this set to
include all orders. The interpretation of the measure applies equally in this case, but
there are a few points worth special mention. A trade may automatically move the
mid point of the quoted spread, by taking the depth at best price (i.e. a type 1 order).
In theory, the Price Impact measures the permanent impact, due to the information
content of the trade. In practice, the short term price frictions and immediate price
changes can affect these measures. The problem is that orders of different
aggressiveness do not have the same immediate impact. For instance, a type 2 order
takes some of the depth at best price, but has no immediate impact on the price.
However, a type 3 order, which does not trade immediately, does have an immediate
impact, shifting the mid point of the quoted spread in the same direction as the order.
Orders placed at or behind the best price have no immediate impact. If these trades
are indeed uninformed, and the Price Impact is an accurate measure, we might expect
to see a Price Impact of zero on average. If however, traders take these uninformed
orders as a signal that the market can cope with a greater volume (in the opposite
direction) we might experience a negative Price Impact.
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PriceImpactisthechangenquot dm dpointov r5r30i u eeriod,m as rei er ntageoi tsabov10 .
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A simple arithmetic average has been calculated for all orders that are placed during
open trading, and for all periods that are contained entirely within the open trading
hours, (i.e. we have excluded the last quarter hour, when averaging the Price Impact
over 5 minutes, and the last 2 quarter hours for the 30 minute Price Impact). The
Price Impact at the very end of the day is large and negative for all aggressiveness
types. This reflects the artificial spread implied by the closing procedure and so can
be ignored. Unless otherwise stated, we will use the restricted average in making
comparisons.
Overall, Price Impact increases with the aggressiveness of the trade. This supports
the theory that aggressive trades are more informed. Over 5 minutes we observe a
positive Price Impact for all buy order aggressiveness categories, while the 30
minute measure has small negative values for orders placed behind the best price.
Given that these orders have no immediate price impact, we must conclude that in
the very short term (less than 5 minutes) passive buy orders are followed by
aggressive buy orders, but given more time (30 minutes), investors interpret the
information as an indication to sell.
Note that the Price Impact is directional, and so we expect to see negative Prifce
Impact for aggressive sell orders. This is the case for large aggressive orders (type
1), but we find that type 2 orders have a small positive Price Impact. This supports
the theory that sellers are on average less informed than buyers, but it seems
surprising that small aggressive sell orders wouldn't imply any information.
We also find that type 3 sell orders, which have an immediate negative impact on
prices, have a positive Price Impact over 5 and 30 minutes. This means that a sell
order placed within a spread is likely to lead to an increase in the mid price in the
short term. We have already shown that orders placed within the spread are more
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likely when the spread is wide. If the sell order reduces the spread, the next buy
order is more likely to be on one side of the spread, but not in between. Given that
the Price Impact is positive, large market buy orders must follow. Perhaps buyers
read this offer to sell as an indication of a more liquid market and so trade more
aggressively pushing the price up. And perhaps this spurs a chain reaction of buyers.
We find a curious result for type 5 sell orders (placed close to but behind the best
price), when these passive sell orders have a negative Price Impact. Given the
positive Price Impact for all other passive order types, we must question this result.
On closer inspection, the statistic is influenced by large negative values early in the
day (8:00am to 8:45am). Early in the day we might expect the results to vary, since
the market is just picking up speed, and it is still ascertaining the appropriate market
price. It is also likely that an indication to sell, placed behind the spread, is more
informative when placed in the context of the volatile opening period, than if it were
placed in the stable market conditions that apply for the majority of the day.
Other than the unusual results at the start of the day, and the distorted results at the
end of the day, there is very little pattern to the daily data. This is partly due to some
spurious results. For example, the 30 minute Price Impact for buy orders between
3:00pm and 3:15pm is 7.91 (way above the 0.67 daily average). In an earlier table
we found that 13,500 type 1 orders were placed, with a total volume of £639million,
during this time period.
Another unusual result worth noting is the 30 minute Price Impact for all buy orders
placed between 12:15pm and 12:30pm. They have negative values across the board.
We showed in Section 6.3 that trading activity slows down during the lunchtime
period, so we might expect a change in the sensitivity of the Price Impact. Given
that market sell orders are more likely than market buy orders, we might expect the
market price to fall during these periods of less vigilance. Note also that there are a
153
few days in the year when the LSE closes early, and on these public holidays, the
exchange closes at 12:30pm. For the same reason that we discarded the periods at
the end of the day, we can conclude that the 12:00pm-12:15pm period will be
negatively biased. This may contribute to that result, but is not great enough to
explain it entirely.
6.4.5 How Does Aggressiveness Depend on Spread and Depth
The Gravitational effect suggested by Cohen et al (1981), and the model defined by
Parlour (1998), state that investors are more likely to take liquidity when it is
plentiful, and add to it when it is low. Furthermore, they explain how this depends
on the depth at the same side and opposite side independently. Table 6.10 shows the
orders in each aggressiveness category, against the average characteristics of the
market at the time the order is placed.
The number, volume and average trade size have been included purely for context.
The "Propn" columns show the average ratio of bid side depth over offer side depth.
Propn BD is the ratio of depth at the best bid and offer prices, Propn ND is the ratio
of depth at the best two prices in either side, and Propn TD is the ratio of total depth.
The spread details are split into the same side and opposite side, and arranged
symmetrically for ease of comparison. The columns are labelled with three letters.
The first letter refers to which side of the spread (B = Bid, O = Offer), the second
refers to what prices it refers to (B = best price, N = next best price, T = total, or all
prices) and the last letter refers to the depth (D) or the number of orders that make up
that depth (N). Finally, the quoted spread, and the alternative "weighted quoted
spread" are displayed.
The quoted spread and the weighted quoted spread follow a similar pattern.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































depthividedby1000 agg=numberofccurancesi1000 voldi idedby1000000 QSexpressedapercentage alternativepresentation wtd:eighted Prop"BDistheratioofdepthb stidr ceoverthdepthtb stoff rprice Prop"NDistheratioofdepthb stidpr cendthenextb srice Prop"TDistheratioftotaldepthonthebidsi evert aldeptho f rside
BTD:Totaldepthnthebidsi e BTN:Totalnumberfrdersnthbisid BND:Depthathesecondb stidprice BNN:Numberofrdersatthsecondbestidprice BBD:Depthatheb stidprice BBN:Numberofrdersatthbestidpric
OTD:Totaldepthntheff rside OTN:Totalnumberfrdersnthff rside OND:Depthathesecondb stofferprice ONN:Numberofrdersatthsecondb stffprice OBD:Depthatheb sts llprice OBN:Numberofrdersatthbestffprice
SamesidndOppositeiref rthpreadonamrpositewh nrd ripl c d sameiddepthib tforuyrd rndffersi hellr e s.
when the spread is large, and orders are placed within the spread, when the spread is
very large. The result for type 3 orders may be biased by the orders placed early in
the trading day, when the spread is still establishing itself, but we would still expect
type 3 orders to be placed when the spread is at its widest. Another interesting result
is that the spread is wider for type 4 orders than for type 5. In other words, investors
who observe a narrow spread are more likely to place an order behind the best price,
than at the best price. This, along with the result for type 3 orders, supports the
theory that investors have a preconceived idea of what the spread should be, and so
place their limit orders with reference to that.
The design of the weighted quoted spread ensures that it is wider than the quoted
spread, but the ratio of the two spread measures is of interest. A larger ratio implies
a greater average depth imbalance. In general we find that the passive orders are
placed when the ratio is higher. This may reflect a preference for passive orders
when the imbalance is greatest, but this measure is not directional, and therefore far
from conclusive. Another explanation is that the depth imbalance is simply greater
when the spread is wider. However, one departure from the rule is the type 1 sell
orders. The weighted quoted spread is far greater than expected. This implies that
although aggressive sell orders and aggressive buy orders are entered when the
quoted spread is at a similar level, the sell orders are entered when the depth
imbalance is greater.
The buy side Propn TD column conforms to expectation. Aggressive buy orders are
submitted when there is more total depth on the buy side, with the exception of the
type 6 orders, which are entered when there is a greater depth imbalance than for
other orders placed at or behind the spread. This supports the theory that the orders
placed further from the spread are entered without reference to the current market
situation, but rather reflect private investment needs.
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We find a similar result on the sell side, with aggressive sell orders being entered
when the imbalance of buy to sell depth is tipped towards the sell side. The
exception this time is the type 3 orders. We have already established that type 3
orders are placed when the spread is wide, and for sell orders in particular, this is
likely to be a more important decision factor than the depth imbalance. It is worth
noting that the bid side depth is greater than the sell side depth for all aggressiveness
categories. If investors are aware that this is the norm, but have not calculated an
average, they may use this to support their decision to buy or disregard this as
unimportant if they wish to sell. Hirshliefer (2001) explains how individuals apply
these falsely weighted logical arguments to justify their trading decisions. This may
explain why sellers pay less attention to the depth imbalance than the buyers.
The proportion of depth at best price and at the best two prices (Propn BD and Propn
ND respectively) vary between aggressiveness categories a lot more than the
corresponding figures for proportion of total depth, and so are harder to interpret. It
is easy for traders to manipulate these statistics deliberately (if there is a financial
incentive to do so), and also as an indirect result of genuine trading strategies i.e.
front running. One important comparison to make is the Propn BD for aggressive
orders. While type 2 buy and sell orders have a similar depth at best price imbalance
of around 10:1, the type 1 buy orders have a 53:1 ratio, and the type 1 sell orders
have a 4:1 ratio. This implies that large aggressive orders are entered when the depth
at best price is balanced heavily in the same direction, compared to the average depth
imbalance. This may be expected, but it is not clear why the same is not true for
smaller aggressive orders. If the most aggressive orders imply greater information,
why are type 1 orders swayed so heavily by market conditions, while type 2 orders
are not?
Comparing the average order book in more detail offers a greater insight. The total
number of orders on either side of the market is consistently tipped in favour of the
156
sellers. This is in spite of the theory that sellers are on average more aggressive than
buyers. The average total depth is also greater on the sell side. We can also see that
type 3 and type 6 orders are placed when the total depth is at its lowest. This reflects
trading at the market opening, as well as periods of less liquidity. Interestingly,
when the total depth is largest on the same side, investors place either a type 1 order
or a type 5 order. If the depth on both sides is at its largest, investors are most likely
to enter a type 5 order. We saw earlier in the daily trading patterns that the trading
activity picked up towards the end of the day, and this order choice between type 1
and type 5 orders reflects the volatility and volume during the last half hour of the
market.
The depth at best price is interesting for several reasons. Most importantly is that
although other depth measures are consistent for the buy side or sell side, the depth
at best price is consistent for the same side and opposite side (i.e. the buy side depth
for buy orders is roughly the same as the sell side depth for sell orders). We find that
type 2 orders are entered when the depth is at its greatest, and the average depth on
each side is roughly equal. Not surprisingly, type 1 orders are more common when
the opposite side depth is smaller, but we find that the same side depth is also smaller
(than when type 2 orders are placed). The same side depth is larger than when
passive orders are placed, however, which supports the gravitational pull theory,
whereby losing time priority is too heavy a burden to bear, and so an aggressive
market order is used instead.
The depth figures for passive orders do not follow a simple linear pattern but the
figures are uncannily similar for buy and sell orders. Orders are placed in the market
when same side depth is quite high and opposite side depth is slightly lower. As
before, this may be a reflection of the prevailing depth figures, when the spreads are
largest. Orders are placed at the best price when same side depth is low and opposite
side depth is quite high. This reflects the willingness to accept the fact that they are
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not first in the queue, when the same side depth is low, and the opposite side depth
indicates greater trading interest on the other side. Orders are placed just behind the
spread when the same side depth is high and the opposite side depth is even higher.
This implies that traders see the opposite side depth as an indication of further
trading interest. Even though the same side depth is high, traders are willing to post
a limit price just behind the best price, in the belief that the opposite side depth is
forecasting opposite side market orders. Finally, orders are placed far behind the
spread when the depth on either side is low. This may simply be spread betting, or it
may again reflect the opening procedure when the depth is lower. There will also be
a size bias, as defined in section 6.4.2, whereby investors are more willing to post
orders away from the spread for smaller stocks, and so the depth figures reflect a
greater proportion of small stocks in this aggressiveness category.
The results from the depth figures and the Propn figures seem to conflict, and so we
should clarify exactly what these figures represent, and how they may be distorted.
In particular, we find that the Propn BD figure for type 1 sell orders is 4, implying
that the bid side depth is on average 4 times bigger than the offer side depth.
However, the OBD figure is 3 times bigger than the BBD figure, implying that the
average offer side depth is 3 times bigger than the bid side depth. This apparent
contradiction is a result of when the averaging takes place. Assume there are t\Vo
sell orders. At the time of the first one, the bid depth is 12 and the offer side depth is
1. At the time of the other order, the bid depth is 24 and the offer side depth is 36.
In this case the Propn BD figure is ((12/1 + 24/36)/2) = 6.33. BBD is ((12+24)/2) =
18 and OBD is ((l+36)/2) = 18.5. This gives us the situation whereby the Propn BD
implies greater bid side depth, and the depth figures imply that the offer side depth is
greater. We can see that the depth figures are weighted towards the larger depth
figures, and hence the larger stocks, but it is also far less sensitive to front running.
It is this second reason that makes the depth figures particularly useful.
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6.5 Is Order Activity Autocorrelated?
6.5.1 Introduction
A market buy order can have an immediate impact on the market. Given the changes
in the spread and depth on the offer side, another market buy order is theoretically
less likely. Parlour (1998) tells us that a limit buy order is likely, perhaps closing
the spread slightly, or a limit sell may replenish the liquidity that was taken by the
original order. So what happens when a market buy order is followed by another
market buy order? Is this more significant than seeing one large market buy order?
Does the combination of the two orders have a greater impact on the market? And
under what conditions is this likely to happen? There are many questions concerning
the patterns of order type, and this section aims to answer some of them.
We simplify the classification of orders by aggressiveness. An order that executes
(at least in part) immediately is reclassified as a market order, and all other orders are
limit orders. For simplicity, we refer to a market buy as "MB", a market sell as
"MS", a limit buy as "LB" and a limit sell as "LS". For each trade, we find the next
order type, and split each trade into 1 of the 16 ordered permutations. Table 6.11
shows the number and volume of each permutation.
For each trade type, the most likely trade type to follow is the same type. We might
expect this for the limit orders, as investors may place limit orders at several prices at
the same time, particularly in the morning. These orders may reflect genuine trading
interest, or an attempt to influence the direction of the market. The case for
autocorrelated market orders is less clear. On closer inspection of the data, it appears
that some traders split a market order to match the orders on the other side of the
spread. For example, if there were sellers at 100 and 101, the investor would enter a
buy order with a limit price of 100 for the depth at that price, and another at 101. A
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TABLE 6.11 AVERAGE NUMBER AND VOLUME OF GROUPED ORDER TYPES
Prop" of total
TT NTT Number Volume Prop" of total volume
LB LB 1489 25830 0.1237 0.1089
LB LS 1075 18219 0.0893 0.0768
LB MB 625 14390 0.0520 0.0607
LB MS 609 12372 0.0506 0.0522
sum 3798 70810 0.3156 0.2985
avg 950 17703
LS LB 1072 18026 0.0891 0.0760
LS LS 1415 22954 0.1176 0.0968
LS MB 600 13104 0.0499 0.0552
LS MS 612 12292 0.0508 0.0518
sum 3700 66376 0.3074 0.2798
avg 925 16594
MB LB 621 13137 0.0516 0.0554
MB LS 602 13354 0.0500 0.0563
MB MB 639 11718 0.0531 0.0494
MB MS 409 9156 0.0340 0.0386
sum 2272 47365 0.1888 0.1997
avg 568 11841
MS LB 615 14054 0.0511 0.0592
MS LS 607 15624 0.0505 0.0659
MS MB 408 11213 0.0339 0.0473
MS MS 635 11758 0.0528 0.0496
sum 2265 52650 0.1882 0.2220
avg 566 13162
sum tot 12035 237201
avg tot 752 14825
TT: First order type LB: Limit Buy order MS: Market Sell order
NTT: second order type LS: Limit Sell order avg: average for sub group
Number: Number of orders placed MB: Market Buy order avg tot: average over all orders
Volume: Volume of orders placed
Prop" tot: number of occurances expressed as a proportion of the total number of ordered pairs
Prop" vol tot: volume for each ordered pair expressed as a proportion of total volume
limit order for 101 would lead to the same transaction cost, unless of course, the limit
sell order was removed between the time the market buy order was entered, and
received at the market (which is less than a second). However, this behaviour is not
common, and so the result cannot be attributed solely to that. Another possibility is
that the market orders are grouped together, typically at the end of the day. This
would suggest a strong relationship between all market orders, rather than just buys
or just sells. And so, the autocorrelation of market buy orders and market sell orders,
seems to be the result of herd behaviour.
6.5.2 Performance Figures
Table 6.12 shows 4 different performance measures for each of the 16 trade type
combinations. "15R" is the return over the quarter hour, "1DR" is the return over the
full trading day, "PI_5" and "PI_30" are the price impact of the trade over 5 minutes
and 30 minutes respectively. Price Impact was defined formally in section 4.2, but is
simply the change in the midpoint of the spread over the stated time horizon. The
measure is usually interpreted as the level of asymmetric information implied by a
trade. In this comparison, we are calculating the price impact for those orders that
don't trade immediately, and so the interpretation should really be "the level of
asymmetric information implied by the order"
For both time horizons, we find the same pattern in the price impact measure, based
on the average of each subgroup. The groups ranked from highest to lowest are MB,
MS, LS, LB. This conforms to the expectation that buy orders are more informative
than sell orders. Although this exact result has never been stated formally, Allen and
Gorton (1992) stated that sellers are more likely to use a market order than buyers,
irrespective of information. This is partly because there is a lower chance that
someone is exploiting information on that side of the market (as they need the
information, and the stock to sell), and so the relative costs are lower. This means
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TABLE 6.12 AVERAGE PERFORMANCE FOR GROUPED ORDER TYPES
TT NTT 15R 1DR PI 5 PI 30
LB LB 1.0017 1.0234 0.9984 0.9969
LB LS 1.0019 1.0246 0.9973 0.9959
LB MB 1.0019 1.0332 0.9997 0.9973
LB MS 1.0019 1.0308 0.9965 0.9944
sum 4.0074 4.1120 3.9920 3.9844
avg 1.0019 1.0280 0.9980 0.9961
LS LB 1.0018 1.0250 0.9978 0.9959
LS LS 1.0020 1.0219 0.9993 0.9975
LS MB 1.0022 1.0335 1.0060 1.0032
LS MS 1.0022 1.0262 0.9984 0.9961
sum 4.0081 4.1066 4.0015 3.9927
avg 1.0020 1.0267 1.0004 0.9982
MB LB 1.0019 1.0357 0.9993 0.9964
MB LS 1.0022 1.0310 1.0067 1.0048
MB MB 1.0022 1.2829 1.0205 1.0132
MB MS 1.0025 1.3454 1.0264 1.0169
sum 4.0088 4.6950 4.0530 4.0313
avg 1.0022 1.1738 1.0132 1.0078
MS LB 1.0020 1.0275 0.9975 0.9952
MS LS 1.0020 1.0294 0.9986 0.9960
MS MB 1.0025 1.3471 1.0229 1.0138
MS MS 1.0034 1.2627 1.0135 1.0064
sum 4.0100 4.6666 4.0324 4.0114
avg 1.0025 1.1666 1.0081 1.0029
sum tot 16.0343 17.5802 16.0789 16.0199
avgtot 1.0021 1.0988 1.0049 1.0012
TT: First order type
NTT: second order type
15R: return over the 15 minute interval
1DR: daily return (from 08:00 to 16:30)
PI 5: Price Impact over 5 minutes
PI 30: Price Impact over 30 minutes
LB: Limit Buy order
LS: Limit Sell order
MB: Market Buy order
MS: Market Sell order
avg: average for sub group
avg tot: average over all orders
that less information is implied by sell orders in general, and that the decision to
choose a market or a limit order is a weaker indicator of information for sells than it
is for buys.
The Price Impact measure may also be distorted by the immediate impact of moving
the market. The time horizons are chosen to minimise the effect of transitory
volatility, and maximise the effect of the permanent price impact. Given that no time
horizon satisfies this precisely, we may expect the short term effects to be present in
the results. This may contribute to the positive price impact of the market buy
orders. However, the market sell orders, which could have an immediate negative
impact on the midpoint, have a positive price impact over 5 and 30 minutes.
Considering that limit sell orders have a negative price impact, this implies that
market sell orders contain more positive information than limit sell orders. This
seems counterintuitive, but it is possible that if investors are trying to buy a large
holding, they may be encouraged by the presence of an aggressive seller, and so act
more aggressively themselves. Clearly the market sell order cannot convey positive
valuation specific information, but it may indicate a trading interest than could be
exploited in the short term.
Note also that limit orders, which may have no immediate impact on the spread, lead
to a negative price impact (unless an LS is followed by an MB). Limit sell orders
may reduce the midpoint directly if placed within the spread. Although there are
proportionately few orders placed within the spread, this may explain the result.
However, limit buy orders can only increase the midpoint of the spread, and yet the
price impact is negative, irrespective of the following trade. This result cannot be
explained by moving the market, so we can attribute it to the information risk.
Extant literature tells us that limit orders are uninformed and that they wait to be
picked off by informed market orders. The negative price impact implies that,
although informed sellers may be more likely to use market orders, they may be
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waiting for other investors to post market buy orders before they act. This suggests
that sellers adopt a more thoughtful strategy than first envisaged.
6.5.3 Spread and Depth
Table 6.13 shows the average spread and depth characteristics for each of the 16
paired order types. Although we have established relationships between the
frequency of the ordered pairs, and whether they are an indication of short term
performance, we must put these events into the context provided by the market
spread.
As we showed earlier, the limit orders are more common when the quoted spread,
and the weighted quoted spread, are larger than average. Furthermore, we find that
the quoted spread measure for limit buys and limit sells is symmetrical. Using the
weighted quoted spread, we find that the spread is larger when limit buys are placed.
This implies that depth imbalance is greater when limit buys are placed. The one
exception to this rule is that the weighted quoted spread is larger for a limit buy then
a limit sell, than it is for two limit buys in a row. In this situation, the limit buy
order may affect the spread in a way that makes a limit sell more likely. Perhaps it
evens out the depth imbalance, or perhaps there are subtleties regarding the type of
limit order (type 3,4,5 or 6) that are not picked up by this statistic.
Another relationship worth noting is that of the autocorrelation of market orders.
Using either quoted spread measure, we find that the spread is larger when market
buy orders are followed by market buy orders, or market sell orders are followed by
market sell orders, than if a market order on one side is followed by a market order
on the other side. This supports the theory that market orders and order imbalances
are indicators of information. Market orders on one side of the market imply an
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information asymmetry. And the fact that traders in this situation are willing to
accept the cost of a larger spread, implies that they have a greater urgency to trade.
However, even though the spread is narrower when market orders swap sides, we
find that the depth is much greater on both sides of the spread. The depth is almost
20% bigger than when market orders stay on the same side of the market, and more
than 200% bigger than when a limit order appears somewhere in the ordered pair.
Although the average depth at best is almost symmetrical, we find, as before, that the
average proportion of depth at the bid side to depth at the opposite side is strongly
positive. When Propn BD is highest, the most likely order type to follow is a market
buy order, unless the original order was a market buy, in which case a limit buy order
is most likely to follow. This supports our earlier theory that buy orders are far more
dependent on market conditions, and a large same side depth at best price, gives
greater motivation to use a market order. However, when a market buy order is
placed in this situation, it may widen the spread, which makes a limit order more
likely. The fact that a limit buy order follows is interesting as it indicates that the
market is learning: the midpoint rises in response to the market buy order. We
found earlier that a limit sell order was most likely to follow a market buy order
(ceteris paribus), but now we learn that if the proportion of depth is greater on the bid
side, we are more likely to see a limit buy order. The combination of the two
indicate that the Propn BD measure may be an indicator for short term price
movements.
When Propn TD is highest, the most likely order to follow is a limit sell order, unless
the original order was a market sell, in which case a market buy order is most likely
to follow. The exception may be due to buyers exploiting a new limit order placed,
or they may feel that this is an indication of further demand on the opposite side of
the market. However, the general rule is more than likely a reflection of sellers using
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the depth imbalance as an indication that the price may be moving towards them, and
so a limit order strategy is more likely to execute. One way to interpret these Propn
measures is that Propn BD is an indicator of short term (minutes) order activity, and
Propn TD is an indicator of longer term (hours) order activity.
6.6 Summary
Order activity follows regular patterns. While the market opening procedure was not
analysed explicitly, the repercussions are felt in the early hours of the trading day.
Order activity increases for the first few hours, dips at lunchtime and rises to a peak
by the end of the day. The relative aggressiveness (and the average sell order size),
follow a similar pattern. The exciting period during the end of the day has a much
higher order volume and trading volume. As well as an increase in aggressive
orders, there is an increase in orders placed behind the spread. Beber and Caglio
(2003) found similar results on the NYSE. This activity reflects a combination of
pressing needs to fulfil daily trading objectives and manipulation of the VWAP
period.
Although size and aggressiveness are the most common indicators of informed
trading, the average size of orders that actually execute is roughly three quarters of
the size of the average order size. This suggests that size alone, is not a good
indicator of informed trading. Aggressive trading increases with market
capitalization, primarily due to the narrower spreads associated with the more liquid
stocks. The results support the Allen and Gorton (1992) gravitational pull theory,
that narrower spreads imply a greater proportion of market orders. But we also find
that the limit price of passive orders are affected by the spread. When the spreads
are narrow, orders are placed behind the spread, when they are wide, orders are
placed inside the spread, and at other times they are placed at the spread. We
attribute this result to a behavioural bias whereby investors assume that the spread
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will revert to a "normal" size of spread. This is an extension of the "anchoring"
theory described by Hirshliefer (2001). Despite offering a similar measure of
liquidity, this result does not hold for the weighted quoted spread, since this measure
is not readily available.
The price impact broadly increases with aggressiveness, which supports the link
between aggressiveness and information. However, the price impact over 30
minutes for limit orders placed behind the spread is negative for buys and sells. We
may attribute this partly due to the volatile periods at the end of the day, when
investors often choose between market orders or limit orders behind the spread, as
explained in Beber and Caglio (2003), to benefit from the volatility. Another
anomalous result is that type 2 sell orders have a positive price impact. These results
show that the aggressiveness of orders is not a strong indicator of short term price
movements.
We find that orders placed behind the spread are often placed with little reference to
the market conditions. This suggests an unsophisticated but not necessarily
uninformed strategy. We also use a behavioural bias to explain why buyers pay
more attention than sellers, to the asymmetry in depth when deciding between a
market order and a limit order. The ratio of same side depth over opposite side depth
may be used as a proxy for short term price movements. When the ratio is above
average, a market order is often the best option. Since depth is usually greater on the
bid side, traders may use this to justify the decision to place a market buy order. But
when a seller is faced with the same situation, even if the ratio is above average, the
bid side depth may still be greater than the sell side depth in absolute terms. Without
knowing the average value, a seller would not use the depth asymmetry to justify
their order choice.
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Contradicting Parlour (1998), we find that the most likely order event to follow a
market or limit buy or sell, is an order event of the same type. Consecutive market
buy orders lead to a positive price impact as expected, but the price impact is largest
when a market buy follows a market sell or vice versa. While traders may prefer to
use market orders when others are trading actively, it still seems odd that the net





This thesis offers many insights into trader behaviour on the SETS order book, and
puts them into the context of the LSE market and of the world exchanges. It also
provides a solid base from which to build a model of order strategy. The concluding
chapter is split into 3 main sections. The first two sections (8.2 and 8.3) outline
many of the important results from the empirical analysis. Section 8.2 summarises
the results of the comparison between SETS and SEAQ. Section 8.3 summarises the
results from the two chapters on the SETS order book and the observed trading
behaviour. The final section introduces an order strategy model, defining the
important characteristics and suggesting areas for further research.
7.2 Microstructure Comparison
Using the methodology of Haung and Stoll (1996) and Venkataraman (2001), it is
concluded that SETS has lower transaction costs than SEAQ. This implies that the
automated order book is more efficient than the dealer network. The result conflicts
with the result of Venkataraman (2001), that the human intermediation of the NYSE
trading floor reduces the overall transaction costs. However, an alternative
methodology, which compares the transaction costs of stocks that switched platforms
against those that did not, suggests that the dealer market (SEAQ) is more efficient
than the automated market (SETS). The likely reason for this result is that traders
are inexperienced in using the order book (SETS). The alternative methodology also
suggests that the order book can't cope with large orders.
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Transaction costs decrease with size of trade. This is inconsistent with existing
theory (O'Hara (1995)). The result is attributable to block trades in the case of
SEAQ and a time selection issue for SETS. We also show that price impact is a
suitable measure of the information content of trades. However, asymmetric
information leads to a much higher quoted spread and effective spread, and these
measures are stronger indicators of information asymmetry, than the price impact.
7.3 The SETS Order Book
We discovered many results and relationships concerning the variables of the order
book, aggregate trader behaviour and individual trader behaviour. Each result adds
to the bigger picture of the efficiency of the market. As well as adding depth and
breadth to the empirical work carried out on automated order book markets, and
SETS in particular, we draw many conclusions about the behavioural aspects of
trader activity. Perhaps the most concise way of summarising the results is to say
that there are clearly observable patterns of trader behaviour that highlight the
frictions imposed on the efficiency of prices, and that these patterns may be
exploitable in real markets. The next 2 sections cover the main points from Chapters
5 and 6.
7.3.1 The Order Book
The "typical" order book is different for each stock. Larger companies have smaller
quoted spreads, and greater overall depth, although depth at best price has a much
weaker correlation with the size of the company. Other relationships are consistent
for all of the companies in our sample. For example, total offer side depth is usually
greater than the total bid side depth, but the depth at best price is roughly
symmetrical. The ratio of depth (bid side depth divided by offer side depth)
fluctuates widely, due to a variety of order strategies, making the ratio a poor
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indicator of short term price movements. Spread decreases during the first hour of
trading, and depth increases during the first hour of trading, as the market stabilises
after the opening call auction. A higher proportion of orders go through the order
book on stable days, suggesting that off market traders are better informed. There is
also evidence that traders were learning how to use the order book more efficiently
as the sample period progressed.
We find some interesting results in comparing the bull and bear phase of the market.
Both the overall order activity and the proportion of trading on the market were
higher during the bear market. The quoted spread remained stable, but the weighted
quoted spread doubled in the bear period, relative to the bull period. There was
proportionately more sell volume on the book during the bear period. The ratio of
buyers over sellers at best price was greater during the bear period. Surprisingly, the
"day time" returns were higher during the bear period. This suggest that the opening
procedure may set more efficient prices than the continuous market which drives
prices higher than expected. And finally, the average order size was higher during
the bear period (more than can be justified by the increase in prices).
7.3.2 Order Strategy
Order activity follows consistent daily patterns. For example, overall trading activity
dips at lunchtime. Sellers place fewer, but larger orders at start and end of the day.
Overall trading volume increases sharply at the end of the day. Trading is thinner
and less aggressive at the start of the day, even though the book is thickest in the first
hour. This implies that quoted spread is more important than total depth when
assessing the liquidity of the market. Order activity and aggressiveness increase at
the end of the day, which is attributable to the activity of day traders, VWAP
manipulation and traders being drawn to times of greatest liquidity.
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As expected, we find that price impact increases with the aggressiveness of orders,
although there are a few exceptions. Type 4 buy orders (limit price at the best price)
have a positive price impact over 5 minutes implying that these orders are quickly
followed by more aggressive buy orders. Type 5 orders (limit price up to 4 ticks
behind the spread) have a higher than expected price impact (in some cases they
appear to be more informative than type 4 orders). Type 1 sell orders (market orders
bigger than the opposite side depth) have a positive price impact. The market seems
to interpret a type 1 sell orders as uninformed and as an indicator of short term offer
side activity.
Market sell orders, expressed as a proportion of all sell orders, is positively
correlated with the size of the company. This relationship exists, but is much weaker
for market buy orders. Not all market orders execute immediately or completely.
The average size of fully filled orders is three quarters of the average size of all
orders. Roughly one third of orders are removed before filling and deleted orders are
smaller than the average order size.
The quoted spread is similar when weighted by buy orders or sell orders, but the
weighted quoted spread (defined in chapter 5) varies a great deal. This implies that
order imbalance is less important than observable spread when determining order
choice. Market orders are more likely when the spread is small. Depth is also an
important factor for order choice. Buyers may use the depth imbalance to justify
aggressive trading, but since the imbalance is usually in that direction, sellers are less
likely to use this measure to justify a market order. Limit orders placed behind the
spread show no relationship with the prevailing market conditions (spread and
depth). The extent of the relationships described above, vary throughout the day.
During the last half hour of trading, many of the relationships seem weaker as the
order activity increases, and the prices become more volatile. Consecutive market
orders frequently switch sides towards the end of the day.
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7.4 Further Research
The results of this thesis may be extended in many directions. One obvious
application of the results, is a short term price forecasting model. Section 8.4.1
describes such a model, and explains what other areas should be studied before
the model could be developed. Section 8.4.2 then describes a few further areas of
research.
7.4.1 Price Forecasting
Paradoxically, theory regarding the price setting ability of order book markets
(O'Hara (1995), Parlour (1998)) is rarely used in the empirical analysis of the
markets (Venkataraman (2001), Beber and Caglio (2003)). This may be because
published empirical research generally uses the NYSE. However, another reason is
that the theoretical models have been developed from market maker markets, rather
than starting afresh. In some cases, the models seem to be manipulated to fit the
results of the older market microstructures. Some studies ignore the issue of fitting a
pricing model to an order book market, and merely state that prices are efficient
(Ahn et al (2001)). But before we can measure the efficiency of an order book
market, we must establish what factors lead to inefficiencies.
The results in this thesis could be used to develop a "black box", to determine the
most profitable order strategy. This model could simply be based on a regression
analysis that updates to account of changes in the market, followed by a set of
simulations. The inputs would include market data such as spread, depth,
asymmetry, recent price movements, time of day, recent order types, timing of
trades, number of traders posting orders and overall market performance. The inputs
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would also have to include the desired size of order, time restrictions, attitude to risk
and the strength and longevity of private information. The output would include the
preferred trading platform (if more than one is available), how to split the trade over
time, the limit price (if applicable), the predicted price impact and what alternatives
should be used if market conditions change during the process.
An important step in predicting short term price movements, is to determine who is
interested in trading in a given stock. Keeping a list of all investors who own a
specific company share is one way of narrowing the list of possible sellers. Traders
are anonymous unless you are the counter party to a trade, so placing a small trade to
identify the traders on either side of the market may prove useful. The data set does
not allow for this study, but theoretically we may show many relationships between
the size of orders, the likelihood of asymmetric information, the size of the trader,
the timing of orders, autocorrelation and cancellation of orders, and other variables
pertaining to order strategy. Working backwards from these results, we may use the
variables observed on the market to determine the most likely "type" of investors
present in the market. This may then suggest what hidden trading interest there
might be.
Having established which investors are present in the market, we may predict the
likelihood of asymmetric information. It was shown in Chapter 4 that price impact is
a crude measure of information asymmetry. Price impact is also retrospective; we
cannot wait 30 minutes to determine the level of information. A more sophisticated
model might allow for the types of investor present, the time of day, recent price
movements, the stability of the spread and depth, the number of traders on either side
of the spread and other current market variables. The more efficient the measure of
asymmetric information, the more confident traders might be of the value of their
own private information, and in the stability of the market price.
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Comparing the price impact of actual trades against those predicted by the model
could be used to refine our estimates. The model should update constantly, to cope
with all changes in the market conditions. O'Hara (1995) stresses the importance of
time in the efficiency of prices. This variable has been ignored throughout this thesis
due to the extra computational effort that would be required. (Applying the "time
since last trade" or "number of trades in the last 5 minutes" variables would be an
important extension of this work.) Since time of day and time since last order event
are potentially informative, the model should update even in the absence of changes
in the market. The model could also be refined after the publication of market
statistics (such as those used in this thesis) that offer greater detail than the real time
data.
Perhaps this section may seem to depart from the noble pursuit of knowledge.
However, the success of a model (like the one described above) would indicate
market inefficiency, and this is of great interest in academia. Some may argue that
inefficiency cannot be proven unless a model could beat the market net of transaction
costs. A natural extension would be to use the model to manipulate the market and
then profit from the inefficiency (or identify existing inefficiencies and exploit
them). Some may also argue that the results would be a product of data mining,
exposure to risk or just luck. However, while there exists a difficulty in modellihg
the real world, the above accusations remain an inescapable burden.
7.4.2 Other Areas for Further Research
Results in Chapter 6 suggest that the opening auction is more efficient than the
continuous trading day. This was not tested explicitly, but it is possible to analyse
the orders placed during the opening auction. It is also possible to identify trades
placed during the closing auction or any trading halts. Madhavan and
Panchapagesam (2000) study the opening auction on the NYSE, but little has been
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done to show how the two distinct microstructures (the opening auction and the
continuous market) interact. It may also be fruitful to study which types of investor
(categorised by size or investment style) use the opening auction, and under what
market conditions. Do more investors use the opening auction to fill their orders
when the markets are volatile? And if so, which investors? Since trading halts are
usually called when prices are volatile, we may expect the aggregate trader
behaviour to be different during the trading halt auction and the opening auction.
There are many aspects of trader behaviour that may be uncovered by an analysis of
the activity during the call auction process.
A further study could address the issue of conflicting trading interests, by collating
data for investors rather than traders. The aggregate data on the LSE does not
include this level of detail, but brokerage houses should have this information.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) use data from the Finnish Stock Exchange to show
how the holding period and returns over that period affect the decision to trade.
Given a similar data set, it would be possible to show how holding period and returns
affect the method of execution of a trade. It would also provide a more detailed
cross section of investors, to refine the relationship between size and aggressiveness
of orders.
Although survey based research is rare within published market microstructure
literature, there are many areas in which this may aid our understanding of trader
behaviour. First, we could collate information regarding actual decisions to trade
along with the reasons for choosing the method of execution. Second, we could
provide hypothetical questions to test for behavioural aspects such as anchoring,
biased self-attribution and regret theory, and evaluate how these affect the
aggressiveness of orders. A study of finance students, active practitioners and retired
traders may highlight the importance of knowledge and experience as well as the
susceptibility to be misled by market data.
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One of the criticisms of the SETS order book is that it cannot cope with large orders
(Chapter 4). Instead of working a large order through the book, block trades may be
negotiated by off-market traders. The statistics in this thesis make no explicit
allowance for block trades. Identifying block trades, how they affect the market
price, the information they imply and the overall cost of execution would aid the
understanding of how the two market structures (the formal order book and the
informal dealers) interact. It could also be used to refine the results of Chapter 4 and
the comparison of trade activity on and off the market in Chapter 6.
Testing behavioural aspects on the financial markets is difficult because the
"efficient price" is never known (unless declared bankrupt). An area with many
similarities to the financial markets (and as long a tradition) is poker. Texas Hold
'em poker involves four rounds of betting, with two cards dealt to each player and
five community cards laid on the table as the betting continues. When all five cards
are on the table, the omniscient observer knows with certainty, which player has the
best hand. Each player makes an assessment of the value of their own hand against
the value of their opponents' hands, based on the bets their opponents have made, the
positions they are sitting, their current chip levels and their "betting styles". The
analogy with the financial markets is clear; a player has private information (the two
cards in his hand), and market information (five cards on the table, and the actions of
other players), and the only way to make money is to take it from other players. The
advantage of studying poker is that it is mathematically tractable.
There are many other ways in which the results of this thesis could be refined or
extended. In Chapter 6 we concluded that investors were learning to use the order
book more efficiently. This could be tested more thoroughly given a data set
stretching from the order book inception (1997) to the present day. Also in Chapter
6, we defined an alternative spread measure. This could be tested against other
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measures of liquidity allowing for depth and asymmetry of depth, to determine the
most informative measures. In Chapter 6 we analysed how market performance and
trade activity depends on the volume of trading on and off the market. One way to
refine this study would be to match up the actions of investors trading on and off the
market, to determine how the two markets interact. Many of the suggestions in this
section rely on having sufficient data. While the LSE data set analysed in this thesis
offers a huge volume of detailed data, there are many limitations imposed. Further
studies would benefit greatly if the LSE (or another market) were to provide data in a
more appropriate format for quantitative research.
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